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Your first quote proves my point: $177 times... how many malicious attempts? That isn't a cost that scales, because in the case of a multitude of malicious acti
by ocdtrekkie 8y ago
Your first quote proves my point: $177 times... how many malicious attempts? That isn't a cost that scales, because in the case of a multitude of malicious activities online, the number of attempts, at $177 a try, would not be worth it. You are using an example of singular high profile attempts, such as "I incorporated a company for this demo" or "I am a state actor trying to derail a Presidential election". While you fail to recognize that EV would likely protect users from 99% of attacks caused by malicious actors spoofing domains, which could trivially be domain validated otherwise.
I find this a particular trend amongst security discussion, particularly here on HN: Focus on the most possibly sophisticated and capable attack, while ignoring that tens of millions of users are afflicted by pretty rudimentary attacks that are more or less automated on a daily basis. If EV were to solely succeed in ensuring an actual human had to go through the registration process, it would almost certainly be worth it.
Additionally, as a point of note, EV certificates could be made vastly more effective by easily addressing your concerns: Raise the price of EV certs significantly, which CAs would be more than happy to do, and ensure you needed to go to one of the upper levels of the CA system (say, having to go to Comodo for them, rather than your Trustico nonsense) to reduce the number of parties which could issue them as much as possible, and raise the mutual requirements between them to issue them.
- geofft 8y agoOur scales of economics must be totally off. I'd argue that an attack that costs $177 a try is entirely scalable - presumably you should gain more than $177 in value from a single spoofed domain, right? I do agree that if $177 is too high a cost, then the problem is solvable by just setting a price floor on certificates (modulo CA/Browser Forum antitrust concerns). I do not think that solution is likely to work, except at a price point at which EV becomes unusably expensive for legitimate users. EV only works if we are reasonably confident that users will refuse to enter credentials into a site without EV. As EV stands today - with EV costing less than $177 for a legitimate user (because they've already incorporated) - that isn't happening. Making EV harder to acquire doesn't actually solve phishing. That's my objection. Sure, you can make it harder to get an EV cert for a phishing site, but, so what? (A better solution that actually works against rudimentary attacks is to just give everyone a U2F security key.)
- ocdtrekkie 8y agoI don't agree EV should be the bar for "entering credentials". I currently don't consider it a requirement that I only "enter credentials" in HTTPS sites either, insofar as "credentials" is a very wide term. (I find the fact that simple password boxes on low security sites now pester me with a dropdown warning on Firefox. I know they're HTTP sites, but I don't care.) As an example I do not care about: My HN account. I would not care if it was intercepted and "hacked", because the damage it can do to me personally is minimal. It would probably annoy the mods somewhat, but the handful of spam posts would get cleaned up, I'd have to reach out to the mods to get unbanned, and life would move on. I don't really care that HN has a cert at all, I certainly don't think HN needs an EV cert, I have no real concern about either my password being intercepted, or me being phished into believing a fake site is HN. If we move DV certificates to be the bare minimum a site is expected to have, then EV should be a bar for important credentials. Aka, your Gmail account, your Bank of America account, etc. You know, Fortune 500 level companies which could afford, I don't know, a $5,000 or more annual investment. The higher cost would also justify higher requirements to get one. At that sort of cost, they could literally fly someone out to your office to check you out directly. Whereas people have mistakenly corroborated the lock icon with "legitimate websites", an EV cert should ideally be the sort of thing household name companies have, which someone trustworthy has directly ensured is actually the keepers of that certificate. I don't think placing the burden on my grandma to have a U2F security key is reasonable, but we should have a process so that google.com is clearly marked as being owned by Google, LLC, and that it is, in fact, the real google.com.
- geofft 8y agoI support DV as the bare minimum for sites, and agree that sites with specific concerns should have something stronger. I don't think that EV for "important credentials" is likely to be a workable option or a good one for society for the following reasons: - Simply displaying EV and not using it as part of some automated should-the-browser-pass-credentials flow is, I believe, unlikely to deter phishing. (If you disagree, let's find studies, which probably exist, and I'll concede the point if the studies show that it works. But given that Verified by Visa uses this site with this EV cert https://www.mycardsecure.com/ https://www.mycardsecure.com/ and expects you to enter personal info there, I'm not optimistic.) - I do not see how a web browser can determine whose credentials are important to whom. I would expect that there are people on HN who do care deeply about their account not being compromised (e.g., founders and VCs). - If we simply state that the only people with EV certs are current Fortune 500 companies and current household names, that seems like a bad political decision for the web - first, it is political, and second, it seems like a position that's pretty strongly at odds with the web's political values, insofar as they exist: the web has long been a place for upstarts to compete on an equal footing with companies that have been around for years. - There are solutions other than EV for these problems, like U2F and also password managers. The fact that the MyEtherWallet BGP attackers were able to steal user login credentials without even getting a valid SSL cert makes me not optimistic about "make certs harder to get" being the answer - we should stop the mechanism by which those credentials were sent in the first place. I do think placing the burden on your grandma to have a U2F security key is entirely reasonable - she has a key to get into her house, right? A fob to get into her car? A credit card with an EMV chip? I think your grandma is perfectly capable of plugging something into a USB port.