4 ms·

That's literally the second option I describe. What is your point?

• schrodinger 8y ago
  Your tone is unnecessarily harsh.
• therein 8y ago
  What you guys are describing is starting to sound more and more like onion routing.
  • User23 8y ago
    Point is online security is a bad joke. You wrote it, you own it. The real interesting question is what happens when you get owned by what you didn't write?
• eftychis 8y ago
  Just wanted to clarify that the issue was not with the Diffie-Hellman key exchange itself, but the way we currently do DNS plus IP routing are the issues. Technically, the client could encrypt their IP with the y=H(g^{scr}) key (result of the DH KE) and send (Enc(y, IP), g^{rc})-- where H is the oracle, g^s server public key, rc <session nonce>*key (or generally 1 time key). The server can then compute the same key (g^{rc}^s and then apply H) and decrypt. So the second and third paragraph contradict a bit each other, which was the sole reason for my clarification. I am not stating you as wrong or anything; I was just augmenting, so other readers don't get the wrong impression and decouple Diffie-Hellman KE from public key cryptography. P.S. The remaining issue is to make sure the server does not have to decrypt the IP for invalid connections etc (that is avoid DOS or leaking secrets as we are operating on not trusted ciphertext).