4 ms·

This is an interesting read. However, the final example is a bit puzzling, because point 6 does not follow from 5, 7 does not follow from 6, and 10 does not fol

This is an interesting read. However, the final example is a bit puzzling, because point 6 does not follow from 5, 7 does not follow from 6, and 10 does not follow from the previous points because of the addition "if that preventive..." comes out of nowhere. It would be better to make the missing premises explicit. On a side note, I'd like to question the usefulness of using the term "reasonable" in contemporary philosophy. The problem is that "reasonable" is an evaluative predicate. In its everyday, non-technical use "being reasonable" certainly also involves conforming to social norms and expectations, which has barely anything to do with the quality of reasoning. Philosophers would be better served to use another term instead of playing with words inventing connections between "reason" and "being reasonable" when those words have deviated so much from each other over the past centuries. In contemporary English, "reasonable" does not primarily/by default mean "based on (good) reasons." Also worth mentioning is that moral philosophers rarely give satisfying definitions of having a reason vs. there being a reason, there being reason (mass noun reading), reasonable vs. rational, justification, reasoning, and good vs. bad reason. Especially the last point is strange, since we're ultimately only interested in good reasons. That being said, again, it's a nice and interesting article.

thethirdone 8y ago
> However, the final example is a bit puzzling, because point 6 does not follow from 5, 7 does not follow from 6, and 10 does not follow from the previous points because of the addition "if that preventive..." comes out of nowhere. It would be better to make the missing premises explicit. 6 follows from 4 and 5 by modus tollens. 7 is just a rewording of 6. "any ... which causes harm" -> harmful and "more highly than, nor equal to," -> "less highly than" 10 indeed does not follow because no premise provides a way of assessing effects of one behavior on another. However the phrasing "if that preventive" simply is a conditional referencing the object described in the consequent, "whatever prevents the harm"
- jonathanstrange 8y ago
  > 6 follows from 4 and 5 by modus tollens. You're right, I didn't see that at first glance and stand corrected.
foldr 8y ago
We allow most other disciplines to use words in special technical senses. For example, no-one thinks that physicists ought to stop using the terms 'force' or 'energy' just because their technical usage of the terms doesn't comport with regular usage.
- degrews 8y ago
  I take your point but even the current "rationalist" community (LessWrong, Eliezer Yudkowski, etc.) don't seem to use the word "reasonable" in that sense.
  - foldr 8y ago
    I'm not sure you can say that a few fringe blogs have some kind of monopoly on the concept of reason.
    - degrews 8y ago
      Of course I'm not saying anything like that. Just pointing out that the people who seem to be publicly talking about this the most also reject the use of "reasonable" as a synonym of "rational" [0] (LessWrong might be "fringe" to the general public, but is quite mainstream to people who are actually concerned about the topic of rationality). It could be that some current academics use the word that way. I would be surprised though, I don't know why they would prefer the ambiguous "reasonable" to the established and well-defined term "rational" (I don't think this is the same as asking physicists to stop using "energy"). It's even in the Wikipedia entry for "Reason" [1]: > The meaning of the word "reason" in senses such as "human reason" also overlaps to a large extent with "rationality" and the adjective of "reason" in philosophical contexts is normally "rational", rather than "reasoned" or "reasonable". [0] https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/g28WWuaMLXNzAnR9v/rational-vs-reasonable https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/g28WWuaMLXNzAnR9v/rational-v... [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reason https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reason
      - foldr 8y ago
        >LessWrong might be "fringe" to the general public, but is quite mainstream to people who are actually concerned about the topic of rationality No it isn't. It's not cited within any of the philosophical literature on rationality. I missed that you were focusing on 'reasonable' in contrast to 'rational', though. Indeed, 'rational' is generally preferred in a philosophical context.
dwaltrip 8y ago
I think following social norms is often (but not always) a "good reason" for doing something. It's a tricky line of analysis. I've been leaning heavily towards the idea the "usefulness", broadly interpreted, is utterly paramount -- even in the world of abstract philosophy. It is perhaps second only to truth, but it is much easier to evaluate, and often an incredibly good proxy for truth anyways.

thethirdone 8y ago

> However, the final example is a bit puzzling, because point 6 does not follow from 5, 7 does not follow from 6, and 10 does not follow from the previous points because of the addition "if that preventive..." comes out of nowhere. It would be better to make the missing premises explicit. 6 follows from 4 and 5 by modus tollens. 7 is just a rewording of 6. "any ... which causes harm" -> harmful and "more highly than, nor equal to," -> "less highly than" 10 indeed does not follow because no premise provides a way of assessing effects of one behavior on another. However the phrasing "if that preventive" simply is a conditional referencing the object described in the consequent, "whatever prevents the harm"

jonathanstrange 8y ago
> 6 follows from 4 and 5 by modus tollens. You're right, I didn't see that at first glance and stand corrected.

foldr 8y ago

We allow most other disciplines to use words in special technical senses. For example, no-one thinks that physicists ought to stop using the terms 'force' or 'energy' just because their technical usage of the terms doesn't comport with regular usage.

degrews 8y ago
I take your point but even the current "rationalist" community (LessWrong, Eliezer Yudkowski, etc.) don't seem to use the word "reasonable" in that sense.
- foldr 8y ago
  I'm not sure you can say that a few fringe blogs have some kind of monopoly on the concept of reason.
  - degrews 8y ago
    Of course I'm not saying anything like that. Just pointing out that the people who seem to be publicly talking about this the most also reject the use of "reasonable" as a synonym of "rational" [0] (LessWrong might be "fringe" to the general public, but is quite mainstream to people who are actually concerned about the topic of rationality). It could be that some current academics use the word that way. I would be surprised though, I don't know why they would prefer the ambiguous "reasonable" to the established and well-defined term "rational" (I don't think this is the same as asking physicists to stop using "energy"). It's even in the Wikipedia entry for "Reason" [1]: > The meaning of the word "reason" in senses such as "human reason" also overlaps to a large extent with "rationality" and the adjective of "reason" in philosophical contexts is normally "rational", rather than "reasoned" or "reasonable". [0] https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/g28WWuaMLXNzAnR9v/rational-vs-reasonable https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/g28WWuaMLXNzAnR9v/rational-v... [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reason https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reason
    - foldr 8y ago
      >LessWrong might be "fringe" to the general public, but is quite mainstream to people who are actually concerned about the topic of rationality No it isn't. It's not cited within any of the philosophical literature on rationality. I missed that you were focusing on 'reasonable' in contrast to 'rational', though. Indeed, 'rational' is generally preferred in a philosophical context.

dwaltrip 8y ago

I think following social norms is often (but not always) a "good reason" for doing something. It's a tricky line of analysis. I've been leaning heavily towards the idea the "usefulness", broadly interpreted, is utterly paramount -- even in the world of abstract philosophy. It is perhaps second only to truth, but it is much easier to evaluate, and often an incredibly good proxy for truth anyways.