3 ms·

> The UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer's (UBSan) signed and unsigned integer overflow sanitization was first utilized when hardening the media stack ... we've expande

> The UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer's (UBSan) signed and unsigned integer overflow sanitization was first utilized when hardening the media stack ... we've expanded usage of these sanitizers in the media framework with each release. It's a great step but for anyone else looking to capitalize on UBSan make sure you couple it with fuzzing or some other testing strategy that will go beyond just coverage. UBSan won't find latent code that overflows if you don't give it inputs that actually cause overflows.

pslam 8y ago
If this is deployed in release builds — in production — then it is effective in mitigating anything which isn't covered in fuzzing. Your application/process gets terminated, which is perfectly acceptable behavior.
king_nothing 8y ago
Yup, defense-in-depth requires broad(coverage) and deep(overlapping) holistic solutions. There’s too many defenses on too many platforms to enumerate comprehensively, but they’re discoverable. Afl for overall fuzzing: http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl Klee for generating minimal test-cases automatically: http://klee.github.io http://klee.github.io (by LLVM) Property-based testing to specify test-cases manually: https://github.com/silentbicycle/theft https://github.com/silentbicycle/theft http://www.quviq.com/products http://www.quviq.com/products Toolchain docs: https://clang.llvm.org/docs https://clang.llvm.org/docs https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs Binutils gold (new ld) linker https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=tree;f=gold https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=t... Compiler defensive best-practices source docs: https://blog.quarkslab.com/clang-hardening-cheat-sheet.html https://blog.quarkslab.com/clang-hardening-cheat-sheet.html https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/24444/what-is-the-most-hardened-set-of-options-for-gcc-compiling-c-c#24840 https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/24444/what-is-t... https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=GNU-Glibc-2.27-Released https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=GNU-Glib... PIE and PIC https://stackoverflow.com/q/2463150/246672 https://stackoverflow.com/q/2463150/246672 https://www.netbsd.org/gallery/presentations/khorben/asiabsdcon2017/Hardening%20pkgsrc.pdf https://www.netbsd.org/gallery/presentations/khorben/asiabsd... https://edgeofus.com/information-security-2/how-to-harden-cc-programs-through-defensive-compilation/ https://edgeofus.com/information-security-2/how-to-harden-cc... https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2018/03/21/compiler-and-linker-flags-gcc/ https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2018/03/21/compiler-and-l... https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Harden_All_Packages https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Harden_All_Packages https://www.owasp.org/index.php/C-Based_Toolchain_Hardening https://www.owasp.org/index.php/C-Based_Toolchain_Hardening and lots of reading man pages for latest code and DuckDuckGoing

pslam 8y ago

If this is deployed in release builds — in production — then it is effective in mitigating anything which isn't covered in fuzzing. Your application/process gets terminated, which is perfectly acceptable behavior.

king_nothing 8y ago

Yup, defense-in-depth requires broad(coverage) and deep(overlapping) holistic solutions. There’s too many defenses on too many platforms to enumerate comprehensively, but they’re discoverable. Afl for overall fuzzing: http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl Klee for generating minimal test-cases automatically: http://klee.github.io http://klee.github.io (by LLVM) Property-based testing to specify test-cases manually: https://github.com/silentbicycle/theft https://github.com/silentbicycle/theft http://www.quviq.com/products http://www.quviq.com/products Toolchain docs: https://clang.llvm.org/docs https://clang.llvm.org/docs https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs Binutils gold (new ld) linker https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=tree;f=gold https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=t... Compiler defensive best-practices source docs: https://blog.quarkslab.com/clang-hardening-cheat-sheet.html https://blog.quarkslab.com/clang-hardening-cheat-sheet.html https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/24444/what-is-the-most-hardened-set-of-options-for-gcc-compiling-c-c#24840 https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/24444/what-is-t... https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=GNU-Glibc-2.27-Released https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=GNU-Glib... PIE and PIC https://stackoverflow.com/q/2463150/246672 https://stackoverflow.com/q/2463150/246672 https://www.netbsd.org/gallery/presentations/khorben/asiabsdcon2017/Hardening%20pkgsrc.pdf https://www.netbsd.org/gallery/presentations/khorben/asiabsd... https://edgeofus.com/information-security-2/how-to-harden-cc-programs-through-defensive-compilation/ https://edgeofus.com/information-security-2/how-to-harden-cc... https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2018/03/21/compiler-and-linker-flags-gcc/ https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2018/03/21/compiler-and-l... https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Harden_All_Packages https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Harden_All_Packages https://www.owasp.org/index.php/C-Based_Toolchain_Hardening https://www.owasp.org/index.php/C-Based_Toolchain_Hardening and lots of reading man pages for latest code and DuckDuckGoing