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IEEE Position Statement in Support of Strong Encryption [pdf]
- bcaa7f3a8bbc 8y ago> globalpolicy.ieee.org uses an invalid security certificate. > The certificate is only valid for the following names: > * .wpengine.com, wpengine.com > Error code: SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN HTTPS is not deployed on globalpolicy.ieee.org.
- bcaa7f3a8bbc 8y agoIt's quite interesting to see my comment, first got a couple of upvotes and went to the top (because it looks interesting?), then got a couple of downvotes (because my comment was seen as nonconstructive? 0r because it ranked #1 and some thought it shouldn't?), finally got more upvotes. There must be some misunderstanding. Not at all I'm saying or implying IEEE is being hypocrisy. I just wanted to point out the simple fact that there are still works need to be done to ensure "HTTPS by default" on the public internet. One website at a time. Perhaps we should start with this IEEE website which coincidentally published a pro-encryption statement.
- _verandaguy 8y agoI think you're attributing too much weight to a comment moving up and down a thread without being made dead.
- herodotus 8y agoGood to see this strong statement against backdoors being made by the IEEE. But what seems never to be mentioned in these discussions is anonymity: while I completely believe in the right of any one to send communications securely, I do not have the same belief that people should be able to be anonymous. I think there should be layers of anonymity and I should have the right to decide if I would ever receive a truly anonymously sourced message. Other identities should be protected, but subject to legal disclosure with the usual legal protections.
- bloak 8y agoBut communication by an anonymous sender, and, indeed, anonymous sending of small physical objects, has been available ever since public postal services were implemented, in the 17th century. I'm not sure it's worth trying to roll that back. Real-time full-duplex encrypted and off-the-record communication between several anonymous parties is a new thing that skilled people can, with difficulty, obtain today.
- crististm 8y agoPeople on the street communicate with you all the time. Communication is not only digital communication. These people don't have to be non-anonymous to communicate effectively or for you to trust or distrust their message. Have you considered the cost of enforcing non-anonymous communication?
- closeparen 8y agoPeople on the street are not anonymous. Their bodies are right there, available to be seized by police if the speech crosses certain lines (stalking, threats, etc).
- crististm 8y agoWords means different things to different people. What is bad though is when people are redefining words to fit their story. Did you mean that people are not invisible?
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- pjc50 8y agoWhy do you think that?
- herodotus 8y agoJust two examples: Imagine if I could set a preference in my email client that said "I do not accept anonymous emails". No more junk mail. And, secondly, that if I did get a spoofed communication that caused some sort of harm, I could in some way track down the spoofer. These would be big improvements to life on the internet.
- davidkuhta 8y agoIf you're interested in an exegesis of encryption from a legal perspective, I suggest reading one of the citations: "Encryption Workarounds" (O. Kerr, B. Schneier) Georgetown Law Journal https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2938033 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2938033 > The first lesson of encryption workarounds is that there are no guarantees. Workarounds are inherently probabilistic. On one hand, no approach will work every time. On the other hand, that a target has used encryption does not mean the investigation is over. The government has to search for a workaround that might succeed. Note: The authors define a range of workarounds to include the "password sticky note on monitor" to "vendor installed backdoors".