11 ms·
An illusion to whom though?
by mrfusion 8y ago
An illusion to whom though?
- lisper 8y agoTo you, obviously. That's kind of the point: your own consciousness isn't really what you think it is. Yes, I know that sounds really weird to the point of being a logical impossibility, but trust me: there's experimental data to back it up.
- arbitrage 8y ago"Trust me" pretty much always means "don't".
- lisper 8y agoIn this case it's just a figure of speech. You don't actually have to trust me. You can read Dennett's book and see for yourself.
- Florin_Andrei 8y agoDennett is becoming more and more part of the "old guard". Things are shifting towards other approaches. Of course, popularity doesn't necessarily mean anything, but keep that in mind when referring to him as an authority.
- pokemongoaway 8y agoEveryone without much direct experience of what consciousness is will continuously become the "old guard."
- Florin_Andrei 8y agoEveryone who is not brain dead has direct experience of what consciousness is. It's the only thing that is directly experienced, in fact. Everything else is second-hand.
- pokemongoaway 8y agoEveryone who has a computer has the same level of understanding about what a computer is? Mental.
- Florin_Andrei 8y agoYou're missing the point so badly, I'm not even sure where to begin.
- pokemongoaway 8y agoAnd I felt the same about your comment, but I still tried my best to explain where I think you're delusional.
- naasking 8y ago> Dennett is becoming more and more part of the "old guard". Things are shifting towards other approaches. What evidence do you have of this? In fact, the majority of practicing philosophers are actually physicalists (56.5%): https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl
- mrfusion 8y agoIs there an easy read where I can get a gist of where things are shifting?
- Florin_Andrei 8y agopanpsychism
- skosch 8y agoIf that's true – and I don't know if it is, even though panpsychism resonates with me personally – can you explain how panpsychism would conflict with the idea that consciousness is an illusion? It seems like it'd be the next logical step: if consciousness is simply what (sensory) computations feel like "from the inside", then it stands to reason that other computations can also "feel like" something from the inside, regardless of the substrate they run on, no?
- lisper 8y agoI didn't refer to him as an authority. I just said his thesis resonated with me (but at 53 I guess I'm part of the "old guard" too). YMMV of course.
- throwaway37585 8y ago> there's experimental data to back it up To back what up, exactly?
- lisper 8y agoDennett's thesis.
- throwaway37585 8y agoThe thesis that there is no hard problem, or the thesis that we don't understand our own consciousness?
- lisper 8y agoIf you really want to know the answer to that, read the book. Life is to short to argue with anonymous trolls.
- throwaway37585 8y agoI ask a simple question and you call me a “troll”. Do you always get offended when someone presses you for details?
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- kolpa 8y agoWhat is "you"? That's the question of consciousness. Sure, maybe you entire internal and sensory existence is a play that your mind is watching. It's well known that a robot can be built to measure your decisions before you are aware that you mean. That doesn't answer the core question: What is the "you" that is aware of (the rest of your brain's) decisions, that is observing your thought process?
- lisper 8y ago> What is "you"? You is the thing (or, more accurately, the process) that is conducting this conversation. > What is the "you" that is aware of (the rest of your brain's) decisions, that is observing your thought process? But that is the whole point: you aren't actually aware of the rest of your brain's decisions. You think you are, but you're wrong. That is Dennett's thesis.
- naasking 8y agoYour question presupposes the existence of a subject and is therefore circular. An "illusion" does not need a subject, it's merely a fact that, taken naively at face value, entails a false conclusion.
- michaelscott 8y agoWhat is your definition of "illusion" here, as I see you've used quotes? Even your description of it is as a fact that is taken naively at face value; who takes the fact naively, and at face value? Only a subject could do that. Information can only be knowledge when there's a "knower".
- naasking 8y ago> Even your description of it is as a fact that is taken naively at face value; who takes the fact naively, and at face value. Only a subject could do that. Information can only be knowledge when there's a "knower". That's incorrect, unless you consider machine learning algorithms to suddenly be subjects/"knowers". They suffer from some of the same perceptive illusions that plague our optical processing. So to answer your question directly, there is no "who", there need only be a "what", at which point any problem with calling qualia an illusion evaporates. There is no irreducible subject involved, there is only an information processing automoton that integrates facts acquired from perceptions. When a perception is taken to be accurate but it entails a conclusion that is false, that's an illusion.
- kolpa 8y ago"Information processing" doesn't create the internal feelings I feel, just as information processing can never create and apple for me to eat, even if it can perfectly simulate an apple and eating.
- naasking 8y ago> "Information processing" doesn't create the internal feelings I feel, Pure speculation, and almost certainly false. If you hadn't evolved the pleasurable feeling of eating an apple, or any other food, you would have died and your inability to feel would have gone with it. Feelings provide drive and motivation, they are functional.