5 ms·
Issues and requirements for SNI encryption in TLS
- y0ghur7_xxx 8y agoSeems like slowly the web is becoming secure like TOR.
- mjevans 8y agoLooking at this from an information exposure viewpoint, TOR is actually the only type of technology that I think can provide actual anonymity (by making it computationally expensive to track an end user with diligent opsec; which is actually an extremely high bar). If one node is speaking to another node (packets are routed) then it is known that the user may be speaking to any publicly listed, previously expected to exist there (pub/priv), or plausibly secret services at that location. If the attacker is able to impersonate the identity (crypto) of the target node or otherwise transparently observe the node's contents then the same can also be said for any data routed through the node. Given the above I do not see a compelling reason to reserve information about a desired target of contact from that node. Thus it seems logical to have any name resolution / identity certification system allow delegates for 'middle men' (other crypto IDs) that are authorized to provide termination routing. With that included in the name resolution / certificate, connecting to a specified node and then asking for the 'named service' over that secured connection should not expose any information that could not already be observed via other systemic weaknesses. If desirable a tunneled session to the end service seems the most likely to be secure, but some method of switching to a still encrypted direct channel to that other service (without any further encryption between the source and middle node) might be useful in the case of load balancing systems.
- diafygi 8y agoCorrect, this strategy has been best practice for a while now. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7258 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7258 (Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack)
- bcaa7f3a8bbc 8y agoFinally! Well done, IETF!
- exabrial 8y agoSRV records... we could actually use all of those unused ports.
- caf 8y agoThat ship sailed years ago. Today, if you want a client-facing service to be reliably available, it has to run on port 80 or 443.
- bcaa7f3a8bbc 8y agoExactly. Effectively, there is only a single usable Internet protocol, called TCP. There is only two usable ports, 80 and 443. There is only a single usable transport-layer protocol, called SSL/TLS. And nothing more. Luckily, Tor relay operators have recognized this problem from the beginning - Tor uses standard TLS for the transport-layer encryption, most of the relays are running at port 443. It enables everyone to bootstrap them to the complete version of Internet. And recently definitely IETF is well-aware of this, hence DNS-over-HTTPS.
- mlindner 8y agoContext: https://huitema.wordpress.com/2017/09/12/cracking-the-sni-encryption-nut/ https://huitema.wordpress.com/2017/09/12/cracking-the-sni-en...
- tialaramex 8y agoOne of the good things in TLS 1.3 was that cryptographers were brought in early, the TLS 1.3 core design is a product of cryptographers plus engineers, and then the work to file off sharp corners and make it work in the real world are the engineering problem, whereas previous versions the engineers built something that seems to work, then (sometimes years later) the cryptographers were shown the results and usually they are not entirely comfortable but it's too late. Maybe SNI needs (if it hasn't had already) a few rounds of smart crypto postgrads and postdocs trying to figure out what is possible here. If the answer is that nothing we can possibly do fulfils all the criteria, well, that's sad but we must find a compromise knowing this limitation, if there's a way to satisfy all requirements in this document, maybe they can find it. As it is today, it feels a bit hopeless, or at least I'm worried that it does.
- Someone1234 8y agoSmall bit of background: TLS typically works via per-hostname certificates. If you have only a single host on an end-point then no problem. But what if you want to host two or more domains with different certificates on a single end-point? It's a problem. So Server Name Indication (SNI) was invented. In effect you send, in plain text, the hostname name you wish to contact to the end-point, who is then able to use that information to route the request. The correctly routed request can then utilize the right certificate. At the time this didn't have large security implications because unencrypted DNS was already leaking requests like crazy. But with DNS slowly getting more secure and TLS gaining a huge market share (<3 Let's Encrypt), SNI is starting to stand out as an "easy" way to spy on what someone is requesting. While IP Addresses themselves can be used for spying, encrypted DNS, protected SNI, and TLS all increase the cost and complexity of that spying, and make the results harder to trust (particularly on shared hosts or sites using a shared load balancing system). If encrypted SNI becomes a reality, it is a huge win against ISPs spying on us and selling our browsing histories.
- dorfsmay 8y agoWorded differently: With non-SNI TLS (traditional) the server name is only sent ONCE the connection is encrypted, you can have several severs by using Subject Alternate Names (SAN), with a de facto maximum of about a 100. All the names have to be in a single cert though, because at time of establishing the encrypted connection, there is no way to know which cert to use. With SNI, the hostname is sent before the encryption starts, so you can have more than one cert on the same server. This makes life easier for the admins as they no longer have to coordinate a bunch of hostname within a single cert, but it means that the target hostname travels through your ISP etc... in clear.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- peterwwillis 8y agotl;dr the only reason to care about SNI in TLS 1.3 is if you are a privacy freak. It's not a security concern. (Incidentally, your ISP can still learn what hosts you visit with traffic analysis)
- textmode 8y agoTitle: Default, unchangeable1 browser settings and modern, unencrypted SNI 1 Ignoring the possibility of editing and recompiling the source code, if the browser is open source. Background SNI is only required for websites using TLS that are also using shared IP address space (e.g., CDNs) where a single IP address may be used by multiple websites, perhaps having no common owner or no relationship to each other. However websites that have rented or purchased a dedicated IP address do not need to use SNI in order to take advantage of TLS. Traditionally, all websites using SSL/TLS fell into this category. It is possible many websites using TLS still use dedicated IP addresses and hence do not need SNI. For the curious, some data on websites posted to HN is provided below. By default popular browsers send unencrypted SNI regardless of whether the website is using a shared IP address and regardless of whether the website actually requires SNI. This default, unchangeable setting makes sense if one assumes that, by and large, most websites using TLS are also sharing an IP address with other websites. The question is whether that assumption is true. Hence we ask: What percentage of the websites does the HN reader visit that are both (a) using TLS and (b) using a shared IP address. In other words, what percentage of these websites accessed by HN readers actually require SNI to be sent by the browser? Sample data: A survey of websites currently appearing on HN Number of unique urls: 462 Number of http urls: 72 (unique domains: 67) Number of https urls: 390 (unique domains: 229) Number of https urls requiring SNI: 36 Number of https urls requiring correct SNI: 22 What is meant by "correct SNI"? It is possible with some CDNs to send incorrect SNI and still retrieve the correct page. This is because these CDNs do not use the SNI in order to retrieve the correct page. Like all other sites since the dawn of the web (up until the appearance of SNI) they only need a correct Host header. (This begs the question of what, if anything, the SNI might be used for within these CDNs. Users concerned about privacy, tracking, ads, etc. might wonder if the SNI is being used for something.) Sending an incorrect (fake) SNI has been nicknamed "domain fronting". The user simply picks any domain using the CDN and sends it as the "fake" SNI. 14 of the 36 are using a CDN that does not require a correct SNI in order to retrieve the correct page. I have automated this "SNI test" and can run it daily, weekly or, for a larger sample, I can run it on historical HN data, e.g., all domains appearing on HN in the year XXXX. Is anyone aware of formal studies on the percentage of sites that actually require (correct) SNI?
- 8y ago
- eastdakota 8y agoWe are dedicating significant resources toward solving this problem. I consider it one of the core bugs of the Internet. Stay tuned.