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I agree mostly with the point you're making, but there's an important distinction between "reputational trust" and an assumption that game theory and market for
by dperfect 8y ago
I agree mostly with the point you're making, but there's an important distinction between "reputational trust" and an assumption that game theory and market forces will continue to provide the necessary levels of decentralization for Bitcoin to operate as intended. I'm not sure it's fair to put those two ideas on equal ground as if all forms of trust should be embraced because it's "inescapable".
Reputational trust (as you call it) often isn't even based on reputation so much as military force (sovereign governments). A lot of people - myself included - would much rather have their finances in the hands of algorithms and theoretically-sound incentives (even without a 100% guarantee of decentralization) than in the hands of central banks controlled by the whims of politicians.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- Felz 8y agoIn other words, you think that the blockchain setup is more trust _worthy_ than political accountability. That's fine (if not my cup of tea). My point was that you're still extending the same amount of trust; i.e. you have to accept things without direct proof in an environment that may attempt to manipulate you for its own benefit. It's worth considering what these things are. What you essentially want is: - There should be a limited total amount of money - Iff people want to give money to somebody else in exchange for something, they should be able to do so in a timely fashion - People should only be able to give away their money - There should be no possibility of double-spending. - People should generally be willing to accept money for things you want at a stable rate. Given that you cannot personally examine every transaction ever made and ask people if they _really_ wanted to do that at the time, and that you also cannot control what people want, where does the abstraction you use start leaking?