I get the general argument, but the spec doesn't really try to make that case. The default knock and PSK are (PQ) tiny: they appear to be 20 base32-encoded byte

I get the general argument, but the spec doesn't really try to make that case. The default knock and PSK are (PQ) tiny: they appear to be 20 base32-encoded bytes or 96 bits of entropy. If they were being used in the same sense as Wireguard/Noise's PQ, I'd expect them to be 256 bits. EDIT: I take it back: the keys _used_ to be 96 bits (example given in the protocol description), but are now 256 judging by the keygen code. Apparently (I'm spelunking in the bug tracker) they were short once because there was an attempt to make them diceware-style verbally transmittable? Regardless: at least it looks like an effective PQ measure assuming the key derivation works. (Generally hedging against DH snafus makes a lot of sense to me, hedging against clients who can somehow manage to hold on to one kind of key material but not another is less convincing. I guess you could have P-256 on a smartcard and PSK on disk or something?)