4 ms·

> It's as if it's very important to them personally to be able to classify perpetrators of atrocities into two simplistic categories, People Who Do Stuff Like T

by lsc 8y ago

> It's as if it's very important to them personally to be able to classify perpetrators of atrocities into two simplistic categories, People Who Do Stuff Like That and People Who, Somehow, Magically, Don't. You don't see why that is something a person might want to believe, if at all possible? Humans have done some pretty terrible things; I think that being able to say "Yeah, but I wouldn't do that" is almost as important (regardless of truthiness) as believing in free will. I mean, sure, maybe everyone would have done those horrible things, and maybe we don't have free will... But it's clear that you will make better decisions if you act as if you have free will... if you act as if you have some power to stop or at least not contribute to the horrible things that happen in the world. So... yeah, I'm personally quite sympathetic to people who feel it's really important to believe that not all of us would become nazis.

CamperBob2 8y ago
You don't see why that is something a person might want to believe, if at all possible? The people I respect want to know the truth, even if it's upsetting or disillusioning. I think Zimbardo and Milgram were similarly motivated, even if their methods were questionable. We are, after all, talking about a scientific experiment here. Starting with a conclusion and looking for evidence to justify it is what the researchers are being criticized for, so we need to avoid making the same mistake in support of our own comforting biases.
- WillPostForFood 8y ago
  Yes, even if your comforting bias is pro-Zimbardo.
  - CamperBob2 8y ago
    Sigh, here come the ad hominems. I do not have a "pro-Zimbardo bias," whatever that is. I wouldn't know Zimbardo if he came to the door selling encyclopedias. I have read Solzhenitsyn, Mayer, Ma Bo, and any number of other authors who have recounted similar 'experiments' that also took place outside the comforting oversight of a peer-reviewed ethics committee, though. At some point, patterns emerge and conclusions are drawn.
- lsc 8y ago
  >The people I respect want to know the truth, even if it's upsetting or disillusioning. Even if it makes you dramatically less effective? As far as I can tell, the best evidence is that we probably don't have free will in a way we would find meaningful. However I can tell you that you will have a much better life if you act as if you have free will, in spite of that evidence. Even if I'm wrong on that point of fact, and I could be; this isn't really my field, my point stands. Would you prefer to believe in something, even if the 'upsetting or disillusioning' side of that belief is that truly believing it would cripple you as a human?
  - CamperBob2 8y ago
    It's an interesting question, all right. In some ways it's similar to the question of whether we'd be off as a species if the resources we spend on religious institutions and practices were directed toward rational ends. I'm unquestionably less 'effective' as a member of society because I'm not religious, and I might even be happier if I took advantage of the free social capital that comes with participation in communal irrationality. But at some point, it would threaten my sense of self-actualization. I don't want to die feeling like a successful, happy fraud. Do you? For the same reason, I don't want to pretend that Zimbardo's results can be ignored because of the unscientific manner in which they were obtained.

by lsc 8y ago

CamperBob2 8y ago

You don't see why that is something a person might want to believe, if at all possible? The people I respect want to know the truth, even if it's upsetting or disillusioning. I think Zimbardo and Milgram were similarly motivated, even if their methods were questionable. We are, after all, talking about a scientific experiment here. Starting with a conclusion and looking for evidence to justify it is what the researchers are being criticized for, so we need to avoid making the same mistake in support of our own comforting biases.

WillPostForFood 8y ago
Yes, even if your comforting bias is pro-Zimbardo.
- CamperBob2 8y ago
  Sigh, here come the ad hominems. I do not have a "pro-Zimbardo bias," whatever that is. I wouldn't know Zimbardo if he came to the door selling encyclopedias. I have read Solzhenitsyn, Mayer, Ma Bo, and any number of other authors who have recounted similar 'experiments' that also took place outside the comforting oversight of a peer-reviewed ethics committee, though. At some point, patterns emerge and conclusions are drawn.
lsc 8y ago
>The people I respect want to know the truth, even if it's upsetting or disillusioning. Even if it makes you dramatically less effective? As far as I can tell, the best evidence is that we probably don't have free will in a way we would find meaningful. However I can tell you that you will have a much better life if you act as if you have free will, in spite of that evidence. Even if I'm wrong on that point of fact, and I could be; this isn't really my field, my point stands. Would you prefer to believe in something, even if the 'upsetting or disillusioning' side of that belief is that truly believing it would cripple you as a human?
- CamperBob2 8y ago
  It's an interesting question, all right. In some ways it's similar to the question of whether we'd be off as a species if the resources we spend on religious institutions and practices were directed toward rational ends. I'm unquestionably less 'effective' as a member of society because I'm not religious, and I might even be happier if I took advantage of the free social capital that comes with participation in communal irrationality. But at some point, it would threaten my sense of self-actualization. I don't want to die feeling like a successful, happy fraud. Do you? For the same reason, I don't want to pretend that Zimbardo's results can be ignored because of the unscientific manner in which they were obtained.