3 ms·
anyone care to expand on the practical applications/implications/threat model where this makes sense?
by cascom 8y ago
anyone care to expand on the practical applications/implications/threat model where this makes sense?
- arkadiyt 8y agoIt's for when you trust someone but don't want to risk either your or their device being compromised in the future. For instance: - if your or their phone gets taken at a border crossing - if your or their phone gets taken by the FBI (which is how they recovered encrypted WhatsApp/Signal chats from Michael Cohen's phone) - etc
- cascom 8y agothank you - this is what i was looking for
- ProblemFactory 8y agoOr in a much simpler and common case: you trust someone right now to run a non-modified client and not to take screenshots, for example based on a corporate policy. Months later the relationship turns sour, and they are fired or denied a promotion. They can't then go through the archives any more to take the screenshots.
- giancarlostoro 8y agoApparently those dank memes and corporate espionage according to the article are some of the uses.
- schuetze 8y agoIt works as long as no one takes a screenshot.
- tylersmith 8y agoOr even extract the text + signature before it "explodes". Keybase messages don't have repudiability so anybody who has received a sign message should be considered to always have that message.
- WorldMaker 8y agoThough the FAQ at the bottom of the article suggests some sort of minimal repudiation support is in the works.