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He's wrong about security being ignored in HTML5. HTML5 added postMessage that allows to isolated DOMs to communicate (previously you'd have to give up isolati
by pornel 16y ago
He's wrong about security being ignored in HTML5.
HTML5 added postMessage that allows to isolated DOMs to communicate (previously you'd have to give up isolation), sandboxed iframes (you can embed untrusted content and e.g. disable plugins in it), blocking of link referrers (webmail links won't leak your inbox URL), cleaned up content sniffing, defined exactly how browsing contexts and window proxy objects behave (very tricky balance of backwards compatibility and isolation of pages).
Almost every section of the spec has "Security considerations" subsection and whole thing is plastered with security warnings: http://www.whatwg.org/specs/web-apps/current-work/multipage/ http://www.whatwg.org/specs/web-apps/current-work/multipage/
All new features have same-origin restrictions, and are going to support CORS: http://www.w3.org/TR/cors/#origin-header http://www.w3.org/TR/cors/#origin-header
There have been other advancements, like CSP and STS: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Features#Origin_Header_.2F_Sec-From https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Features#Origin_Header_.2F... which are going to be standardized by AppSec WG at W3C (http://www.w3.org/2010/07/appsecwg-charter http://www.w3.org/2010/07/appsecwg-charter).
If there's something missing, he could report a bug (I don't recall anything reported by him): http://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/enter_bug.cgi?product=HTML%20WG http://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/enter_bug.cgi?product=HTML%20W... It's even possible to report bugs without registration straight on the spec page: http://www.whatwg.org/specs/web-apps/current-work/multipage/ http://www.whatwg.org/specs/web-apps/current-work/multipage/
And many fundamental issues are really unfixable, i.e. a "fixed" browser would "fail" to work "properly" with many major websites. Lots of simple payment gateways (including some of PayPal) rely on CSRF vulnerability to pass payment data. Google-hosted jQuery relies on XSS vulnerability. The only practical solution is opt-in to new, stricter security models, which is what HTML5 and other WGs are developing.
- olavk 16y agoI think he is referring to a specific issue: He wants a security model that allows "sandboxing" partially-trusted code so that it cannot take over the whole page. Today, if you execute a piece of JavaScript you have to trust it fully. This is an issue with e.g, ads. If an ad includes JavaScript, it can steal your users passwords. He mentions Caja (http://code.google.com/p/google-caja/ http://code.google.com/p/google-caja/) which is an attempt to provide such a security model. I guess this is a serious issue for the big ad-driven sites like Yahoo and Google. He is frustrated that the other parties involved in standardization (primarily browser vendors) does not prioritize this issue. I do agree that it is disingenuous to state that security was ignored.
- pornel 16y agoNot having his pet feature in the way he likes is not same as ignoring security (and he repeats few times that HTML5 prioritised other stuff over security, keeps making things worse, etc. which is not true). <iframe seamless sandbox="allow-scripts"> allows embedding of untrusted scripts. JS won't be able to escape the frame, but will be able to display result within the frame or send you result via postMessage().
- wvenable 16y agoUsing an <iframe> this way is like securing your house by nailing your door shut. Caja is more like just adding a lock to the door.