> The executives at Blockbuster had skin in the game, they were experts, they got their asses kicked. Last election the Democrats had skin in the game, they wer

> The executives at Blockbuster had skin in the game, they were experts, they got their asses kicked. Last election the Democrats had skin in the game, they were experts, they got their asses kicked. Recently the institutional Tesla shorts had skin in the game, they are experts, they got their asses kicked. So what does having skin in the game have to do with anything? Not much. None of these examples show skin in the game. Executives at Blockbuster were almost all certainly wealthy prior to its demise, and its failure probably didn't affect their future earnings potential/job prospects. Institutional investors (non hedge fund) by definition have no skin in the game. Even by posting disappointing returns, a lot of their compensation is tied to a management fee, with future job prospects being lightly tied to prior returns. My argument is that all experts should be looked at skeptically. Without the proper incentives/punishments for incorrect predictions, it doesn't matter to said expert whether they are right or wrong. Even with the "closed system" experts, mistakes are made. In the article, the author talks about car engines as a closed system. So why have there been so many car recalls? Obviously expecting experts to be correct every single time is foolish, but my point is that for the most part, because the disincentive for an incorrect prediction is not proportional to the weight of the prediction, most expert claims should be taken skeptically.