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Ok, let me ask: why? What is the absolute worst case scenario here? That a user in your organization gains admin privileges on their workstation? Nearly every
by AnIdiotOnTheNet 8y ago
Ok, let me ask: why? What is the absolute worst case scenario here? That a user in your organization gains admin privileges on their workstation?
Nearly every org I've ever worked at already gave their users admin privileges because trying to do their job without it caused far more friction than any imaginary gains from locking them down. So they might screw up their OS, big deal, that's what imaging is for.
It's not like ransomware needs admin privileges to ruin your day anyway. In fact, local admin does absolutely nothing for it since it will still only have permissions to the same network resources that the user does, and of course their local documents.
There are some kiosk-style single-application appliance use cases out there where it makes sense to lock things down just to make sure the user isn't browsing reddit all day or something, but by their nature those are at low risk of being infected and you care even less about them than a workstation if they are.
I honestly can't think of a realistic scenario in which this isn't a complete non-issue.
- grkvlt 8y ago> Nearly every org I've ever worked at already gave their users admin privileges I assume you've never worked at a large retail or investment bank, or similar organisation, then? Admin privileges are never granted to ordinary users; to install new programs or perform administrative tasks requires a call to the helpdesk, and there is usually some form of remote management service running to handle updates and so on.
- AnIdiotOnTheNet 8y agoOk, but why? What does that actually accomplish?
- KAMSPioneer 8y agoJust a few ideas off the top of my head: An attacker that gains SYSTEM permissions on a machine can dump the SAM database, which may contain credentials for domain or enterprise administrators. This is very bad. A user with administrator permissions can modify their DNS settings to avoid DNS-level filtering to block known malware domains. This can be bad. A malicious or ignorant user can disable or remove antivirus protection. This can be bad. A user can accidentally make a computer nonfunctional by, for example, deleting system files, perhaps because it was suggested (sarcastically) on a help forum ("LOL delete system32"). This is bad. I'm far from a security expert, but from a sysadmin perspective, every user having local admin privs is an absolute nightmare.
- AnIdiotOnTheNet 8y ago> An attacker that gains SYSTEM permissions on a machine can dump the SAM database, which may contain credentials for domain or enterprise administrators. This is very bad. True enough, but unlikely to be a significant risk. If you are concerned about it then it is much easier to have a separate AD account that only has local administrator on normal (non-admin) workstations and use that. > A user with administrator permissions can modify their DNS settings to avoid DNS-level filtering to block known malware domains. This can be bad. It is trivial to block or even reroute DNS queries to unapproved servers at the firewall. At least until DNS over HTTPS ruins that and simultaneously renders your point moot. > A malicious or ignorant user can disable or remove antivirus protection. This can be bad. I disagree. Anti-virus software has negative value and always causes significantly more trouble than it is worth. Case in point, the very issue we're talking about. > A user can accidentally make a computer nonfunctional by, for example, deleting system files, perhaps because it was suggested (sarcastically) on a help forum ("LOL delete system32"). This is bad. This is a minor inconvenience at best, that's what imaging is for. > I'm far from a security expert, but from a sysadmin perspective, every user having local admin privs is an absolute nightmare. If it were a nightmare, I'd have expected to see more issues arise from it throughout my career, but I've yet to see even one instance where a user having local admin has caused any significant trouble.
- KAMSPioneer 8y ago> True enough, but unlikely to be a significant risk. If you are concerned about it then it is much easier to have a separate AD account that only has local administrator on normal (non-admin) workstations and use that. I strongly disagree. If an attacker gains access to a system as an admin user, that is a much larger problem than a non-admin user. Designing an environment as you suggested helps compartmentalize that, but it doesn't help the fact that a SAM database from one of those machines can potentially spell an almost company-wide compromise. Such a strategy gives far too much opportunity for lateral movement in case of a single compromised machine. > It is trivial to block or even reroute DNS queries to unapproved servers at the firewall. That's a good point. >I disagree. Anti-virus software has negative value and always causes significantly more trouble than it is worth. Case in point, the very issue we're talking about. Regardless of your feelings on antivirus (I'm ambivalent myself), I don't quite see how a potential abuse of an antivirus software, which can lead to EoP, is justification for allowing all users in an enterprise to have full local admin privileges. You're cutting out the step where an attacker has to exploit an EoP vulnerability. > This is a minor inconvenience at best, that's what imaging is for. True, but if I can avoid the trouble by limiting user privileges, why not? > If it were a nightmare, I'd have expected to see more issues arise from it throughout my career, but I've yet to see even one instance where a user having local admin has caused any significant trouble. It's possible it may never be a problem in $arbitraryEnvironment, but that doesn't make it good security practices. I can imagine that in smaller environments, it may even be somewhat manageable. There will probably be circumstances that create a need for local admin access as you described, but I don't think it should be the modus operandi.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- quietbritishjim 8y agoIt's less serious for any machine you have physical access to, but it is definitely an issue if you are remotely logged into a central server. If you manage to escalate privileges in this situation you could look at the files of other users e.g. the spreadsheets that only the payroll team is supposed to have access to...
- AnIdiotOnTheNet 8y agoWhy does a non-admin user in an RDS environment even have access to the restore functionality of a virus scanner?
- tinus_hn 8y agoIt doesn’t have to be the non-admin user who restores the file. You can also ask an administrator.
- mehrdadn 8y ago> Ok, let me ask: why? What is the absolute worst case scenario here? That a user in your organization gains admin privileges on their workstation? I think the critical bit you're missing is that if a user can do something, a virus running under their credentials can do it too. Meaning I'd expect a virus can use this to get admin access.