Kudos. The award seems familiar... a year of lifelock and identity protection, with other future damages still too speculative. Is lifelock sufficient to prev

Kudos. The award seems familiar... a year of lifelock and identity protection, with other future damages still too speculative. Is lifelock sufficient to prevent malfeasance from stolen SSNs? I honestly don't know how effective it is, but it is part of the default post breach response. If it is sufficient, maybe the SSA should just be responsible for providing the equivalent to everyone. That way we can stop expecting unprotectable data to be protected. (Not to let Equifax off the hook, they were the point of failure in this case, but the system is also broken in aggregate.) Or, if lifelock doesn't work, we should stop pretending it does, and not be satisfied with it as a post breach measure, and not waste money on it either. Maybe SSA needs to ultimately move to some asymmetric solution like Estonia has. They've had a few bumps with that, but they're trying, and in comparison, we have basically no reasonable answer for situations that require revocation or private/public solutions. (Ie, your public SSN is the last four digits, and your private SSN is shared with almost everyone you transact with. Recommend a system like that to anyone studying information theory and you will get a drink thrown in your face.)