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> Once you take IP address and city out of the equation browser fingerprinting becomes much harder That's not true, see all the values that can be used to fing

> Once you take IP address and city out of the equation browser fingerprinting becomes much harder That's not true, see all the values that can be used to fingerprint a browser: https://fpcentral.tbb.torproject.org/fp https://fpcentral.tbb.torproject.org/fp https://browserprint.info https://browserprint.info https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#fingerprinting-linkability https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#finge...

jandrese 8y ago
There is also Panopticlick https://panopticlick.eff.org/ https://panopticlick.eff.org/ My only complaint is that if you have canvas fingerprint randomization turned on it still counts as unique.
- jerheinze 8y ago
  > My only complaint is that if you have canvas fingerprint randomization turned on it still counts as unique. It's not a good idea to randomize it, see the Tor Browser design document for more details https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#fingerprinting-linkability https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#finge...
  - jandrese 8y ago
    I was referring to WebGL and Canvas fingerprinting there, which the document seems to be in favor of, although they return a single value instead of a randomized value--presumably so all TOR browsers will look the same and muddy the data. At any rate, a randomized canvas or WebGL fingerprint shouldn't be very useful for tracking a particular browser.
    - jerheinze 8y ago
      Read the "Strategies for Defense: Randomization versus Uniformity" part.
      - jandrese 8y ago
        Most of their drawbacks to randomization apply to uniformity too, other than sites changing behavior due to your randomization. Uniformity has the big drawback of making it apparent that you're using the Tor browser, which is a red flag in some cases. At the very least it invites extra scrutiny. It's a strange design decision in my opinion to announce to loudly that a visitor is using the Tor browser when they presumably want to attract as little attention as possible.
st1ck 8y ago
And https://amiunique.org/ https://amiunique.org/

jandrese 8y ago

There is also Panopticlick https://panopticlick.eff.org/ https://panopticlick.eff.org/ My only complaint is that if you have canvas fingerprint randomization turned on it still counts as unique.

jerheinze 8y ago
> My only complaint is that if you have canvas fingerprint randomization turned on it still counts as unique. It's not a good idea to randomize it, see the Tor Browser design document for more details https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#fingerprinting-linkability https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#finge...
- jandrese 8y ago
  I was referring to WebGL and Canvas fingerprinting there, which the document seems to be in favor of, although they return a single value instead of a randomized value--presumably so all TOR browsers will look the same and muddy the data. At any rate, a randomized canvas or WebGL fingerprint shouldn't be very useful for tracking a particular browser.
  - jerheinze 8y ago
    Read the "Strategies for Defense: Randomization versus Uniformity" part.
    - jandrese 8y ago
      Most of their drawbacks to randomization apply to uniformity too, other than sites changing behavior due to your randomization. Uniformity has the big drawback of making it apparent that you're using the Tor browser, which is a red flag in some cases. At the very least it invites extra scrutiny. It's a strange design decision in my opinion to announce to loudly that a visitor is using the Tor browser when they presumably want to attract as little attention as possible.

st1ck 8y ago

And https://amiunique.org/ https://amiunique.org/