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Context: 1. So called "Security" companies (middlebox vendors) advise customers to write what are effectively firewall rules that bake ossification into their
by tialaramex 8y ago
Context:
1. So called "Security" companies (middlebox vendors) advise customers to write what are effectively firewall rules that bake ossification into their systems using, I kid you not, regular expressions
https://www.fidelissecurity.com/threatgeek/2018/02/exposing-x509-vulnerabilities https://www.fidelissecurity.com/threatgeek/2018/02/exposing-...
This type of nonsense is why one of the optional TLS 1.3 features is certificate compression. It seems like a no-brainer to offer this for earlier versions, but it turns out that middleboxes snoop the certificate and make decisions about it so compressing it causes them to freak out. Why can we (hopefully) fix that with an optional extension in TLS 1.3? Because in TLS 1.3 now the certificate is encrypted, so the middleboxes can't see it in the first place.
2. In about 2016 when it originally looked like TLS 1.3 was almost finished, the middlebox vendors finally noticed something was happening and began yelling about how their products had "legitimate" ‡ uses that would be blocked by these improvements and it all needed re-thinking.
Fortunately (or perhaps inevitably) the middlebox vendors have no idea how the IETF works, so they spent a lot of effort on trying to "win votes" which should have anybody who was somehow unaware of this drama but involved with the IETF smiling since there are no votes and you can't win. They also, like typical business people, figured they could fly in to meetings in say, Singapore or London, and spin up at the meeting, but of course those meetings are just a temporary physical incarnation of the IETF, it exists all the time as mailing lists, so if you aren't following those lists you're basically always a kid who wandered into a room where people are having grown-up discussions you can't understand.
3. After a surprisingly long time the middlebox vendors got the hint and went to ETSI to make their own alternative. ETSI is a traditional SDO which is perfectly happy to work on a standard without any messy ethical considerations. It is also, like most traditional SDOs, closed door, so we have only limited visibility of what they're up to. So far it looks like TLS 1.2 (so, bad) but with the ability for an arbitrary number of middleboxes to interact with all the packets on path (so, worse).
It's OK though because under their ETSI proposal the user will "Consent" to this. If you've spent the last month mindlessly clicking through GDPR-inspired boxes on US web sites you regularly visit, or indeed if you're the new hire who has just this moment realised why the big boss decided he needed her with him on this trip, and is now calculating whether to say "No" and risk losing everything or to close her eyes and pretend this is happening to somebody else you have a very good idea what "Consent" means in this context.
‡ "Legitimate" is a word you use when it's important for people to accept that what you're doing is OK, without them thinking about what you were actually doing because they might throw up. "Bribe officials to ignore flagrant safety violations" makes you angry but "Legitimate facilitation payment" sounds very respectable.