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I can see and am grateful for your effort to answer the questions as helpfully as you can. But to me, when you say "the owner of the Mona Lisa is whoever has th

I can see and am grateful for your effort to answer the questions as helpfully as you can. But to me, when you say "the owner of the Mona Lisa is whoever has the most tokens in our system", it sounds like complete nonsense. The Louvre owns the Mona Lisa, and if your system disagrees with that, your system is broken.

hobofan 8y ago
I can definitely see where you are coming from since that mechanism of "most token wins", sounds very unintuitive and inherintly cheatable (and in a lot of places has rightfully bad connotations like "pay to win" in video games). When I first heard it I also had the same reaction. Sadly I don't think that I can offer any more information right now, but we are all very eager to publicize it and put it out into the open for critic ASAP.
- Sangermaine 8y ago
  >I can definitely see where you are coming from since that mechanism of "most token wins", sounds very unintuitive and inherintly cheatable (and in a lot of places has rightfully bad connotations like "pay to win" in video games). It does indeed seem exactly that way. You said upthread: >An additional actor X who knows about the ownership can add additional weight to the claim of Person A. But how do you verify that X is someone "knows about the ownership"? What if X was someone A or B paid or incentivized to vouch for them so the consensus would be swayed? How do prevent bad actors from gaming the system in this way? If the asset in dispute is valuable enough it would certainly be worth it to a bad actor to pay a little to cheat and have the consensus fall on their side.
  - hobofan 8y ago
    > What if X was someone A or B paid or incentivized to vouch for them so the consensus would be swayed? If B were to pay X a bribe of amount N, so X enforces the statement with amount N, B could also directly enforce the statement with amount N, which would lead to exactly the same result. If X would receive less than N, to add a weight of N, they would be gifting some money to B, and vice versa. So between rational untrusted parties, a simple bribe would not make sense. There are some rationality assumptions relating to 51% attacks similar to PoS oriented systems that have to be met, but there are some mechanisms in place that should reduce the practical requirement regarding rationality among participating parties significantly. > If the asset in dispute is valuable enough it would certainly be worth it to a bad actor to pay a little to cheat and have the consensus fall on their side. Good question, but I'm afraid that's one of the questions I can't answer right now without leaking too much information.
    - a1369209993 8y ago
      > If B were to pay X a bribe of amount N, [...] B could also directly enforce the statement with amount N Okay, better question: how do you deal with the (pathologic, and therefore approximately guarranteed to come up) situation where A's life savings are ten dollars and a horse, B has 100 million dollars, and B claims (with amount ≥ 11$) that B owns A's horse.
      - hobofan 8y ago
        As long as the "100 million dollars" don't make up more than 50% of the tokens in the network, the incentives are supposed to play out in a way that all the other participants of the network contest the wrong statement made by B, and thus B isn't able to introduce information that is deemed wrong. So in general the situation should be preventable. There are some specific versions of that edge case that come to my mind that where that situation could indeed be unresolvable but in those cases that should be detectable and displayable to the users of the system. As I said in my previous comment, there are some rationality requirements regarding some of the token amount.
    - admax88q 8y ago
      > If B were to pay X a bribe of amount N, so X enforces the statement with amount N, B could also directly enforce the statement with amount N You're assuming the bribe comes in your made up currency. B could bribe X with real money or out of band coerce/intimidate X with threats and violence.
      - hobofan 8y ago
        > B could bribe X with real money So a connected market with goods that can be bridged similar to the stock market. > or out of band coerce/intimidate X with threats and violence I'm not pushing for a world without governments and law enforcement.
- gus_massa 8y ago
  I guess your idea is to have an ultimate veto power to revert any decision. So it's a centralized service that can run in a traditional database instead of a blockchain. What will you do in polemic cases? For example, some people think that La Gioconda is own by the Italian people and should be returned to Italy (because Leonardo was Italian). What would you do if there is a huge campaign to claim that it is owned by some Italian museum? What about the Tutankhamen mummy? Alaska?
  - hobofan 8y ago
    > I guess your idea is to have an ultimate veto power to revert any decision. So it's a centralized service that can run in a traditional database instead of a blockchain. Not at all, and I don't know where you are getting that idea from. The system, as it is designed right now has no requirement for a single centralized or trusted party. It also has no requirement for any trust between the participants (which most systems in the same realm do). > What will you do in polemic cases? That's a good question, and one of the things we want to explore during iterations of the testnet. Without going into more specifics I would say that there is a part of the incentive mechanism that rewards a more clear-cut consensus (a 50/50 split on a boolean statement is the least favourable situation for participants on both sides). This unfavourable situation should then in turn fuel the contribution of more information so people can make a more informed rational decision which should then lead to a more clear consensus. There are also some higher level market mechanisms that we anticipate to develop which could be used to both stabilize and destabilize the consensus about a certain statement, like a off-chain PR campaign as you mentioned. We'll have to see how each of those can potentially impact a consensus and if that is something that needs a countermeasure in the core protocol.

hobofan 8y ago

I can definitely see where you are coming from since that mechanism of "most token wins", sounds very unintuitive and inherintly cheatable (and in a lot of places has rightfully bad connotations like "pay to win" in video games). When I first heard it I also had the same reaction. Sadly I don't think that I can offer any more information right now, but we are all very eager to publicize it and put it out into the open for critic ASAP.

Sangermaine 8y ago
>I can definitely see where you are coming from since that mechanism of "most token wins", sounds very unintuitive and inherintly cheatable (and in a lot of places has rightfully bad connotations like "pay to win" in video games). It does indeed seem exactly that way. You said upthread: >An additional actor X who knows about the ownership can add additional weight to the claim of Person A. But how do you verify that X is someone "knows about the ownership"? What if X was someone A or B paid or incentivized to vouch for them so the consensus would be swayed? How do prevent bad actors from gaming the system in this way? If the asset in dispute is valuable enough it would certainly be worth it to a bad actor to pay a little to cheat and have the consensus fall on their side.
- hobofan 8y ago
  > What if X was someone A or B paid or incentivized to vouch for them so the consensus would be swayed? If B were to pay X a bribe of amount N, so X enforces the statement with amount N, B could also directly enforce the statement with amount N, which would lead to exactly the same result. If X would receive less than N, to add a weight of N, they would be gifting some money to B, and vice versa. So between rational untrusted parties, a simple bribe would not make sense. There are some rationality assumptions relating to 51% attacks similar to PoS oriented systems that have to be met, but there are some mechanisms in place that should reduce the practical requirement regarding rationality among participating parties significantly. > If the asset in dispute is valuable enough it would certainly be worth it to a bad actor to pay a little to cheat and have the consensus fall on their side. Good question, but I'm afraid that's one of the questions I can't answer right now without leaking too much information.
  - a1369209993 8y ago
    > If B were to pay X a bribe of amount N, [...] B could also directly enforce the statement with amount N Okay, better question: how do you deal with the (pathologic, and therefore approximately guarranteed to come up) situation where A's life savings are ten dollars and a horse, B has 100 million dollars, and B claims (with amount ≥ 11$) that B owns A's horse.
    - hobofan 8y ago
      As long as the "100 million dollars" don't make up more than 50% of the tokens in the network, the incentives are supposed to play out in a way that all the other participants of the network contest the wrong statement made by B, and thus B isn't able to introduce information that is deemed wrong. So in general the situation should be preventable. There are some specific versions of that edge case that come to my mind that where that situation could indeed be unresolvable but in those cases that should be detectable and displayable to the users of the system. As I said in my previous comment, there are some rationality requirements regarding some of the token amount.
  - admax88q 8y ago
    > If B were to pay X a bribe of amount N, so X enforces the statement with amount N, B could also directly enforce the statement with amount N You're assuming the bribe comes in your made up currency. B could bribe X with real money or out of band coerce/intimidate X with threats and violence.
    - hobofan 8y ago
      > B could bribe X with real money So a connected market with goods that can be bridged similar to the stock market. > or out of band coerce/intimidate X with threats and violence I'm not pushing for a world without governments and law enforcement.
gus_massa 8y ago
I guess your idea is to have an ultimate veto power to revert any decision. So it's a centralized service that can run in a traditional database instead of a blockchain. What will you do in polemic cases? For example, some people think that La Gioconda is own by the Italian people and should be returned to Italy (because Leonardo was Italian). What would you do if there is a huge campaign to claim that it is owned by some Italian museum? What about the Tutankhamen mummy? Alaska?
- hobofan 8y ago
  > I guess your idea is to have an ultimate veto power to revert any decision. So it's a centralized service that can run in a traditional database instead of a blockchain. Not at all, and I don't know where you are getting that idea from. The system, as it is designed right now has no requirement for a single centralized or trusted party. It also has no requirement for any trust between the participants (which most systems in the same realm do). > What will you do in polemic cases? That's a good question, and one of the things we want to explore during iterations of the testnet. Without going into more specifics I would say that there is a part of the incentive mechanism that rewards a more clear-cut consensus (a 50/50 split on a boolean statement is the least favourable situation for participants on both sides). This unfavourable situation should then in turn fuel the contribution of more information so people can make a more informed rational decision which should then lead to a more clear consensus. There are also some higher level market mechanisms that we anticipate to develop which could be used to both stabilize and destabilize the consensus about a certain statement, like a off-chain PR campaign as you mentioned. We'll have to see how each of those can potentially impact a consensus and if that is something that needs a countermeasure in the core protocol.