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There's a lot interesting in here, but a few real howlers. In particular: > Homo economicus, not only has it never existed, my contention is that if homo econ
by Sniffnoy 8y ago
There's a lot interesting in here, but a few real howlers. In particular:
> Homo economicus, not only has it never existed, my contention is that if homo economicus evolved for some peculiar reason, it would die out very, very quickly or we would club it to death with sticks. It's not in our evolutionary interest to be rational optimizers, by the way. Any species that's rational also becomes highly predictable, and anybody who's highly predictable is rapidly dead because you can anticipate his behavior and game it. Sometimes being unpredictable is the best approach.
There is no reason that rational behavior necessitates predicatability. The author mentions game theory but based on this paragraph you'd imagine he'd never studied it. Has he never heard of a mixed strategy?
> In the commercial world it's not in the interests of consumers to be rational. If you imagine a world of rational consumers where they all bought cars based on some formula, which was fuel economy multiplied by acceleration divided by depreciation or whatever it may be, what they would end up with would be really, really terrible cars. Car manufacturers would immediately game their predictable and easily understanding preferences and produce cars, which met all the metrics laid down for a desirable car, but the cars would be ugly, uncomfortable, and generally ghastly, and no pleasure to own.
Apparently "rational" to this author means "taking one's actual preferences, and then throwing them out and replacing them by an easier-to-specify set of preferences that aren't your real preferences". Either the formula is their real preferences or it is not. If it is indeed their real preferences, then there is no problem; to say that this is their real preferences means they are truly indifferent to the fact that the cars are "ugly, uncomfortable, and generally ghastly", and so the conclusion that they would be "no pleasure to own" would be incorrect. If it's not, then there's your problem right there -- the problem isn't that they attempted to be "rational", it's that they attempted to make explicit their own preferences and got it wrong. You can't "game" someone's real preferences! Now it's true that any attempt to explicitly write down your real preferences is almost certainly going to go wrong, and it's probably a bad idea to attempt it, but the problem here isn't "rationality", it's making the mistake of deciding to act according to preferences you've written down rather than by your real preferences.
More generally: If you find yourself saying "it is not in your interest to be rational", something has gone wrong.
- Misdicorl 8y ago> You can't "game" someone's real preferences! You absolutely can in some domains. Taste buds for instance have been exploited pretty heavily by the snack industry. We can argue back and forth about what we really mean when we say "true preferences" but I think most readers would admit that mostly they don't want to eat an entire bag of Doritos in a single sitting.
- eli_gottlieb 8y agoA large part of the issue here is that behavioral economics has no idea what "actual preferences" are, so it defines them tautologically as "that which can have its expectation taken and be mapped to the real number line." Without constraints on the notion of preferences, you can always take any behavior and map it back to a class of scalar functions over outcomes for which it was perfect behavior.
- Sniffnoy 8y agoI mean, assuming the behavior satisfies appropriate coherence conditions... (which actual human behavior doesn't as Misdicorl points out, but that's another matter).
- a1369209993 8y agoNo, any behavior can be mapped to "I prefer world-histories where I do A at time 1, B at time 2, C at time 3, ...". Your coherence conditions are the constraints on the notion of preferences without which trivial-behaviorist preferences can be constructed. Edit: but yes, human behavior (often) doesn't satisfy von Neumann-Morgenstern utility axioms (the coherence conditions for scale-free origin-free utility functions as prefered by behavioral economics).
- eli_gottlieb 8y ago>Edit: but yes, human behavior (often) doesn't satisfy von Neumann-Morgenstern utility axioms (the coherence conditions for scale-free origin-free utility functions as prefered by behavioral economics). In specific, the VNM axioms assume that preferences aren't over histories at all, but instead over states, which severely constrains the kind of outcome-generating process they allow an agent to care about. They effectively state, "only the end-point matters, not the trajectory". This doesn't really make sense for humans in the first place, since we're made of meat and need to do things like eat and sleep cyclically. What it does make sense for is bank accounts, which is why economists think it makes sense.