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> The p-zombie thought experiment entails the p-zombie world thought experiment, where a universe evolved with nothing but p-zombies, and this world is identica

> The p-zombie thought experiment entails the p-zombie world thought experiment, where a universe evolved with nothing but p-zombies, and this world is identical to our own. No? I don't see I need to imagine a parallel universe. I can just imagine a p-zombie existing in our own world. >I certainly can't without allowing what seems to be absurdity or inconsistency. I'm not sure how you manage to do it. "absurdity or inconsistency" do not limit my imagination. I do not think such things are realistic, but that doesn't mean I can't imagine them. For a similar example, most ideas of time travel end up inconsistent if you inspect them closely, and yet nonetheless I can imagine them.

naasking 8y ago
> No? I don't see I need to imagine a parallel universe. I can just imagine a p-zombie existing in our own world. I don't think you understand the issue. If the p-zombie thought experiment entails something about consciousness, then the p-zombie world thought experiment does too. And what it demonstrates is that the intuitions that the p-zombie thought experiment seems to entail are absurd, therefore the p-zombie thought experiment is either ill-conceived or missing some crucial element that would explain this dissonance. > "absurdity or inconsistency" do not limit my imagination. Except it must if the p-zombie conceivability argument is to have any weight. If we can allow ourselves imagine any inconsistent proposition, then any inconsistent proposition is conceivable, and any inconsistent proposition is possibly true. Which is obviously absurd, because inconsistent propositions are necessarily false if logic is to mean anything. The only possible resolutions are to invalidate the conceivability argument entirely as an inference rule, or to constrain that which is conceivable so the logical inference holds true.

naasking 8y ago

> No? I don't see I need to imagine a parallel universe. I can just imagine a p-zombie existing in our own world. I don't think you understand the issue. If the p-zombie thought experiment entails something about consciousness, then the p-zombie world thought experiment does too. And what it demonstrates is that the intuitions that the p-zombie thought experiment seems to entail are absurd, therefore the p-zombie thought experiment is either ill-conceived or missing some crucial element that would explain this dissonance. > "absurdity or inconsistency" do not limit my imagination. Except it must if the p-zombie conceivability argument is to have any weight. If we can allow ourselves imagine any inconsistent proposition, then any inconsistent proposition is conceivable, and any inconsistent proposition is possibly true. Which is obviously absurd, because inconsistent propositions are necessarily false if logic is to mean anything. The only possible resolutions are to invalidate the conceivability argument entirely as an inference rule, or to constrain that which is conceivable so the logical inference holds true.