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> This only proves that behaving identically to a human is reducible to an algorithm. The actual experience of consciousness is something secondary to behaviour
by naasking 8y ago
> This only proves that behaving identically to a human is reducible to an algorithm. The actual experience of consciousness is something secondary to behaviour.
We've started a conversation in other threads below, but I just wanted to point out that your claim here is actually conjecture. We don't actually know that the experience of consciousness is separate from behaviour. I further conjecture that this claim is outright false because it requires a non-trivial expansion of our ontology for what seems to amount to special pleading that consciousness is special when compared to every other phenomenon that has fallen to scientific inquiry.
Ask yourself why consciousness is really all that different from vitalism which was felled by biology. The same will happen to dualism in good time.
- mikeash 8y agoIt's worse than conjecture, it's contrary to the available evidence. The actual experience of consciousness clearly influences human behavior, otherwise we wouldn't talk about it.
- naasking 8y ago> The actual experience of consciousness clearly influences human behavior, otherwise we wouldn't talk about it. The argument that epiphenominalists put forth is that zombies can also talk "as if" they had consciousness, with all the same arguments that we put forth that they are conscious, that qualia are important, etc. The difference is that they simply aren't conscious, they are just acting out a play, and what they mean by consciousness is not the same thing as what we mean. If you think then that the concept of consciousness then becomes virtually vacuous, amounting merely to your first person, passive observation of an automoton that is your body moving through space and time, then you're not alone.