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>You look at red apple, you think "such a nice red apple, but one side is a bit yellow". But "red" doesn't mean anything to you, you don't experience it. If you

>You look at red apple, you think "such a nice red apple, but one side is a bit yellow". But "red" doesn't mean anything to you, you don't experience it. If you can imagine that Of course I can't imagine being a p-zombie, because there is no experience of being a p-zombie, that's the point. When I imagine a p-zombie, it is someone else. >explain why red-p-zombie-you insist on being able to experience red color, while in fact he/she doesn't experience it. They would say they experience it for the exact same reasons a non-p-zombie does. A chemical process in their brain produces that reaction. The difference is that they never actually have that experience, they just act as if they did.

red75prime 8y ago
I wasn't talking about p-zombie. I was talking about partial p-zombie, which doesn't experience red color only. But I think I get your answer, and it is exactly as I described. You can't imagine p-zombie, you imagine someone with attached label "There's darkness inside" (as Chalmers had put it). I say that your label is incorrect and your "p-zombie" experiences everything as we do. Prove me wrong. Imagine being nothing. Otherwise you are just attaching label "dragon" to a pigeon. ETA: Have you noticed circularity of the argument? You need to accept that physicalism isn't true to be sure that your label "There's darkness inside" can be true, as you can't really imagine p-zombie. Partial p-zombie just makes it obvious. And physicalism requires less epicycles.
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- aninhumer 8y ago
  >I was talking about partial p-zombie, which doesn't experience red color only. Ah sorry I missed that part of the argument. Yes, I agree that I can't imagine such a thing, because I don't think experience can be subdivided in that way. Anything a consciousness can perceive, it must experience. I could however imagine a person whose brain perceived and reacted to the colour red in certain ways, but never became conscious of that perception, and merely experiences vision with all red things having the same qualia as another colour. It's quite a weird thing to imagine, but if you're trying to assert that it's impossible, I will do so to disagree. > You can't imagine p-zombie, you imagine someone with attached label "There's darkness inside" (as Chalmers had put it). Can you imagine a non-conscious rock? Or does the rock just have a similar label attached? If you believe one can imagine such a rock, then I can imagine such a human in the same way. If not, then your imagination must be teeming with errant consciousnesses.
  - red75prime 8y ago
    > I don't think experience can be subdivided in that way. So you are adding more epicycles. > merely experiences vision with all red things having the same qualia as another colour. Swapped qualia qualia argument. I can answer that, but I think I already know how you will answer. ETA: Or do you mean you see all greens as greens and all reds as greens? Will it not change your behavior when you'll notice that you are confidently calling very similar colors by very different names and cannot say why are you doing that? > Can you imagine a non-conscious rock? I can imagine a rock. I can guess that the rock is not conscious because it doesn't demonstrate any signs of consciousness, unlike you and me. I am pretty sure I can't change whether the rock is conscious or not by the power of my imagination. Thank you for conversation.
    - aninhumer 8y ago
      >So you are adding more epicycles. Not really? I don't conceive of consciousness experience as something that can be meaningfully separated from the perception of that consciousness. For a consciousness, perception is experience. However, I can imagine a perceiving system which does not have any consciousness, and thus experiences nothing. > Will it not change your behavior when you'll notice that you are confidently calling very similar colors by very different names and cannot say why are you doing that? In this hypothetical, the "partial p-zombie" cannot distinguish them consciously, so they would not do that. This is the closest thing I can conceive of to what you described. >I am pretty sure I can't change whether the rock is conscious or not by the power of my imagination. But the rock exists within your imagination, you have total power over it?
      - red75prime 8y ago
        > I can imagine a perceiving system which does not have any consciousness, and thus experiences nothing. I can imagine a system which is presumably too simple to have any conscious experiences. But the only thing that really matters is the lack of first person experience of such a system. I can't imagine being such system, and that is what matters, if we are talking about consciousness and not about some words which are used as a substitute for a real conscious experiences. > In this hypothetical, the "partial p-zombie" cannot distinguish them consciously, so they would not do that. Let's suppose, for simplicity, that I don't experience color differences at all. All I experience is brightness. But my brain works exactly the same as yours. I see two grey cups and hear myself saying "Do you prefer red or green?" Am I not conscious of this discrepancy too? Am I also not conscious of the lack of any clues when I'm asked to select one of the things which looks exactly the same to me? Sorry, sounds like complete bullshit to me. I will prefer physical consciousness over such brain-damaged metaphysical one. BTW, are you sure you are experiencing colors? You will not notice if your point of view is true. > But the rock exists within your imagination, you have total power over it? Sure, I can image a rock which has supernatural soul and conscious experiences. Why all the p-zombie fuss, when it clearly shows that dualism is true? That's sarcasm of course. But why p-zombie argument is any better? You can't even conceive what is really matters in p-zombie - the lack of first person experience. You can only conceive some images like "dark inside" or a textual description of that.

red75prime 8y ago

I wasn't talking about p-zombie. I was talking about partial p-zombie, which doesn't experience red color only. But I think I get your answer, and it is exactly as I described. You can't imagine p-zombie, you imagine someone with attached label "There's darkness inside" (as Chalmers had put it). I say that your label is incorrect and your "p-zombie" experiences everything as we do. Prove me wrong. Imagine being nothing. Otherwise you are just attaching label "dragon" to a pigeon. ETA: Have you noticed circularity of the argument? You need to accept that physicalism isn't true to be sure that your label "There's darkness inside" can be true, as you can't really imagine p-zombie. Partial p-zombie just makes it obvious. And physicalism requires less epicycles.

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aninhumer 8y ago
>I was talking about partial p-zombie, which doesn't experience red color only. Ah sorry I missed that part of the argument. Yes, I agree that I can't imagine such a thing, because I don't think experience can be subdivided in that way. Anything a consciousness can perceive, it must experience. I could however imagine a person whose brain perceived and reacted to the colour red in certain ways, but never became conscious of that perception, and merely experiences vision with all red things having the same qualia as another colour. It's quite a weird thing to imagine, but if you're trying to assert that it's impossible, I will do so to disagree. > You can't imagine p-zombie, you imagine someone with attached label "There's darkness inside" (as Chalmers had put it). Can you imagine a non-conscious rock? Or does the rock just have a similar label attached? If you believe one can imagine such a rock, then I can imagine such a human in the same way. If not, then your imagination must be teeming with errant consciousnesses.
- red75prime 8y ago
  > I don't think experience can be subdivided in that way. So you are adding more epicycles. > merely experiences vision with all red things having the same qualia as another colour. Swapped qualia qualia argument. I can answer that, but I think I already know how you will answer. ETA: Or do you mean you see all greens as greens and all reds as greens? Will it not change your behavior when you'll notice that you are confidently calling very similar colors by very different names and cannot say why are you doing that? > Can you imagine a non-conscious rock? I can imagine a rock. I can guess that the rock is not conscious because it doesn't demonstrate any signs of consciousness, unlike you and me. I am pretty sure I can't change whether the rock is conscious or not by the power of my imagination. Thank you for conversation.
  - aninhumer 8y ago
    >So you are adding more epicycles. Not really? I don't conceive of consciousness experience as something that can be meaningfully separated from the perception of that consciousness. For a consciousness, perception is experience. However, I can imagine a perceiving system which does not have any consciousness, and thus experiences nothing. > Will it not change your behavior when you'll notice that you are confidently calling very similar colors by very different names and cannot say why are you doing that? In this hypothetical, the "partial p-zombie" cannot distinguish them consciously, so they would not do that. This is the closest thing I can conceive of to what you described. >I am pretty sure I can't change whether the rock is conscious or not by the power of my imagination. But the rock exists within your imagination, you have total power over it?
    - red75prime 8y ago
      > I can imagine a perceiving system which does not have any consciousness, and thus experiences nothing. I can imagine a system which is presumably too simple to have any conscious experiences. But the only thing that really matters is the lack of first person experience of such a system. I can't imagine being such system, and that is what matters, if we are talking about consciousness and not about some words which are used as a substitute for a real conscious experiences. > In this hypothetical, the "partial p-zombie" cannot distinguish them consciously, so they would not do that. Let's suppose, for simplicity, that I don't experience color differences at all. All I experience is brightness. But my brain works exactly the same as yours. I see two grey cups and hear myself saying "Do you prefer red or green?" Am I not conscious of this discrepancy too? Am I also not conscious of the lack of any clues when I'm asked to select one of the things which looks exactly the same to me? Sorry, sounds like complete bullshit to me. I will prefer physical consciousness over such brain-damaged metaphysical one. BTW, are you sure you are experiencing colors? You will not notice if your point of view is true. > But the rock exists within your imagination, you have total power over it? Sure, I can image a rock which has supernatural soul and conscious experiences. Why all the p-zombie fuss, when it clearly shows that dualism is true? That's sarcasm of course. But why p-zombie argument is any better? You can't even conceive what is really matters in p-zombie - the lack of first person experience. You can only conceive some images like "dark inside" or a textual description of that.