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How? You look at red apple, you think "such a nice red apple, but one side is a bit yellow". But "red" doesn't mean anything to you, you don't experience it. If

How? You look at red apple, you think "such a nice red apple, but one side is a bit yellow". But "red" doesn't mean anything to you, you don't experience it. If you can imagine that, explain why red-p-zombie-you insist on being able to experience red color, while in fact he/she doesn't experience it. I can only suppose that you imagine someone like you with a textual annotation above his/her head "I don't experience red color", and not trying to imagine what it is like to be such a person. Doesn't it defy the purpose of a thought experiment? You don't imagine conscious experiences, but imagine descriptions of presence or absence of conscious experiences. ETA: Using your analogy it is like imagining pigeon with a label "Dragon" above its head, and then concluding that there's no logical reasons that dragons can't fly or exist. When you imagine a "real" dragon and then ponders on this imagination, you have to conclude that your imagined physics must be different for it to work.

aninhumer 8y ago
>You look at red apple, you think "such a nice red apple, but one side is a bit yellow". But "red" doesn't mean anything to you, you don't experience it. If you can imagine that Of course I can't imagine being a p-zombie, because there is no experience of being a p-zombie, that's the point. When I imagine a p-zombie, it is someone else. >explain why red-p-zombie-you insist on being able to experience red color, while in fact he/she doesn't experience it. They would say they experience it for the exact same reasons a non-p-zombie does. A chemical process in their brain produces that reaction. The difference is that they never actually have that experience, they just act as if they did.
- red75prime 8y ago
  I wasn't talking about p-zombie. I was talking about partial p-zombie, which doesn't experience red color only. But I think I get your answer, and it is exactly as I described. You can't imagine p-zombie, you imagine someone with attached label "There's darkness inside" (as Chalmers had put it). I say that your label is incorrect and your "p-zombie" experiences everything as we do. Prove me wrong. Imagine being nothing. Otherwise you are just attaching label "dragon" to a pigeon. ETA: Have you noticed circularity of the argument? You need to accept that physicalism isn't true to be sure that your label "There's darkness inside" can be true, as you can't really imagine p-zombie. Partial p-zombie just makes it obvious. And physicalism requires less epicycles.
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  - aninhumer 8y ago
    >I was talking about partial p-zombie, which doesn't experience red color only. Ah sorry I missed that part of the argument. Yes, I agree that I can't imagine such a thing, because I don't think experience can be subdivided in that way. Anything a consciousness can perceive, it must experience. I could however imagine a person whose brain perceived and reacted to the colour red in certain ways, but never became conscious of that perception, and merely experiences vision with all red things having the same qualia as another colour. It's quite a weird thing to imagine, but if you're trying to assert that it's impossible, I will do so to disagree. > You can't imagine p-zombie, you imagine someone with attached label "There's darkness inside" (as Chalmers had put it). Can you imagine a non-conscious rock? Or does the rock just have a similar label attached? If you believe one can imagine such a rock, then I can imagine such a human in the same way. If not, then your imagination must be teeming with errant consciousnesses.
    - red75prime 8y ago
      > I don't think experience can be subdivided in that way. So you are adding more epicycles. > merely experiences vision with all red things having the same qualia as another colour. Swapped qualia qualia argument. I can answer that, but I think I already know how you will answer. ETA: Or do you mean you see all greens as greens and all reds as greens? Will it not change your behavior when you'll notice that you are confidently calling very similar colors by very different names and cannot say why are you doing that? > Can you imagine a non-conscious rock? I can imagine a rock. I can guess that the rock is not conscious because it doesn't demonstrate any signs of consciousness, unlike you and me. I am pretty sure I can't change whether the rock is conscious or not by the power of my imagination. Thank you for conversation.
      - aninhumer 8y ago

aninhumer 8y ago

>You look at red apple, you think "such a nice red apple, but one side is a bit yellow". But "red" doesn't mean anything to you, you don't experience it. If you can imagine that Of course I can't imagine being a p-zombie, because there is no experience of being a p-zombie, that's the point. When I imagine a p-zombie, it is someone else. >explain why red-p-zombie-you insist on being able to experience red color, while in fact he/she doesn't experience it. They would say they experience it for the exact same reasons a non-p-zombie does. A chemical process in their brain produces that reaction. The difference is that they never actually have that experience, they just act as if they did.

red75prime 8y ago
I wasn't talking about p-zombie. I was talking about partial p-zombie, which doesn't experience red color only. But I think I get your answer, and it is exactly as I described. You can't imagine p-zombie, you imagine someone with attached label "There's darkness inside" (as Chalmers had put it). I say that your label is incorrect and your "p-zombie" experiences everything as we do. Prove me wrong. Imagine being nothing. Otherwise you are just attaching label "dragon" to a pigeon. ETA: Have you noticed circularity of the argument? You need to accept that physicalism isn't true to be sure that your label "There's darkness inside" can be true, as you can't really imagine p-zombie. Partial p-zombie just makes it obvious. And physicalism requires less epicycles.
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- aninhumer 8y ago
  >I was talking about partial p-zombie, which doesn't experience red color only. Ah sorry I missed that part of the argument. Yes, I agree that I can't imagine such a thing, because I don't think experience can be subdivided in that way. Anything a consciousness can perceive, it must experience. I could however imagine a person whose brain perceived and reacted to the colour red in certain ways, but never became conscious of that perception, and merely experiences vision with all red things having the same qualia as another colour. It's quite a weird thing to imagine, but if you're trying to assert that it's impossible, I will do so to disagree. > You can't imagine p-zombie, you imagine someone with attached label "There's darkness inside" (as Chalmers had put it). Can you imagine a non-conscious rock? Or does the rock just have a similar label attached? If you believe one can imagine such a rock, then I can imagine such a human in the same way. If not, then your imagination must be teeming with errant consciousnesses.
  - red75prime 8y ago
    > I don't think experience can be subdivided in that way. So you are adding more epicycles. > merely experiences vision with all red things having the same qualia as another colour. Swapped qualia qualia argument. I can answer that, but I think I already know how you will answer. ETA: Or do you mean you see all greens as greens and all reds as greens? Will it not change your behavior when you'll notice that you are confidently calling very similar colors by very different names and cannot say why are you doing that? > Can you imagine a non-conscious rock? I can imagine a rock. I can guess that the rock is not conscious because it doesn't demonstrate any signs of consciousness, unlike you and me. I am pretty sure I can't change whether the rock is conscious or not by the power of my imagination. Thank you for conversation.
    - aninhumer 8y ago