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No. I have absolutely no difficulty imagining such a thing. You might suppose that any physically identical entity must necessarily experience consciousness, a

No. I have absolutely no difficulty imagining such a thing. You might suppose that any physically identical entity must necessarily experience consciousness, and that may even be true, but this does not preclude imagining a p-zombie, any more than a knowledge of anatomy and aerodynamics precludes imagining a dragon.

red75prime 8y ago
How? You look at red apple, you think "such a nice red apple, but one side is a bit yellow". But "red" doesn't mean anything to you, you don't experience it. If you can imagine that, explain why red-p-zombie-you insist on being able to experience red color, while in fact he/she doesn't experience it. I can only suppose that you imagine someone like you with a textual annotation above his/her head "I don't experience red color", and not trying to imagine what it is like to be such a person. Doesn't it defy the purpose of a thought experiment? You don't imagine conscious experiences, but imagine descriptions of presence or absence of conscious experiences. ETA: Using your analogy it is like imagining pigeon with a label "Dragon" above its head, and then concluding that there's no logical reasons that dragons can't fly or exist. When you imagine a "real" dragon and then ponders on this imagination, you have to conclude that your imagined physics must be different for it to work.
- aninhumer 8y ago
  >You look at red apple, you think "such a nice red apple, but one side is a bit yellow". But "red" doesn't mean anything to you, you don't experience it. If you can imagine that Of course I can't imagine being a p-zombie, because there is no experience of being a p-zombie, that's the point. When I imagine a p-zombie, it is someone else. >explain why red-p-zombie-you insist on being able to experience red color, while in fact he/she doesn't experience it. They would say they experience it for the exact same reasons a non-p-zombie does. A chemical process in their brain produces that reaction. The difference is that they never actually have that experience, they just act as if they did.
  - red75prime 8y ago
    I wasn't talking about p-zombie. I was talking about partial p-zombie, which doesn't experience red color only. But I think I get your answer, and it is exactly as I described. You can't imagine p-zombie, you imagine someone with attached label "There's darkness inside" (as Chalmers had put it). I say that your label is incorrect and your "p-zombie" experiences everything as we do. Prove me wrong. Imagine being nothing. Otherwise you are just attaching label "dragon" to a pigeon. ETA: Have you noticed circularity of the argument? You need to accept that physicalism isn't true to be sure that your label "There's darkness inside" can be true, as you can't really imagine p-zombie. Partial p-zombie just makes it obvious. And physicalism requires less epicycles.
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    - aninhumer 8y ago
      >I was talking about partial p-zombie, which doesn't experience red color only. Ah sorry I missed that part of the argument. Yes, I agree that I can't imagine such a thing, because I don't think experience can be subdivided in that way. Anything a consciousness can perceive, it must experience. I could however imagine a person whose brain perceived and reacted to the colour red in certain ways, but never became conscious of that perception, and merely experiences vision with all red things having the same qualia as another colour. It's quite a weird thing to imagine, but if you're trying to assert that it's impossible, I will do so to disagree. > You can't imagine p-zombie, you imagine someone with attached label "There's darkness inside" (as Chalmers had put it). Can you imagine a non-conscious rock? Or does the rock just have a similar label attached? If you believe one can imagine such a rock, then I can imagine such a human in the same way. If not, then your imagination must be teeming with errant consciousnesses.
      - red75prime 8y ago
naasking 8y ago
> but this does not preclude imagining a p-zombie, any more than a knowledge of anatomy and aerodynamics precludes imagining a dragon. It kind of does. The argument goes: if you can imagine a p-zombie, then in your mind it's possible that consciousness is not tied to physical qualities. Therefore, physicalism would necessarily be false. It took me awhile to accept this, but the solution is simple: p-zombies can't exist because I can't imagine them. And this is because consciousness must serve a functional purpose, and so p-zombies would be distinguishable from humans.
- aninhumer 8y ago
  >in your mind it's possible that consciousness is not tied to physical qualities. Therefore, physicalism would necessarily be false. I mean, yes? I tend to assume physicalism, but I don't take it as axiomatic. >And this is because consciousness must serve a functional purpose I don't see why that has to be true?
  - naasking 8y ago
    > I don't see why that has to be true? It must be true if you accept physicalism.
- mikeash 8y ago
  Why is the ability to imagine something at all relevant? I can imagine a world where there are no physical laws, everything is entirely random, and by an astonishing coincidence it just so happens to behave exactly like the world we observe in every single way. Does that mean it's possible that there are no physical laws and everything is completely random? Strictly speaking yes, it is possible, but the odds are indescribably remote, and it's a completely useless hypothesis anyway. I can imagine a p-zombie which somehow comes up with the idea of consciousness and starts discussing it despite having no experience of it, but it would have to be some bizarre random occurrence, and is not really useful to consider.
  - naasking 8y ago
    > Why is the ability to imagine something at all relevant? https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/#3 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/#3

red75prime 8y ago

How? You look at red apple, you think "such a nice red apple, but one side is a bit yellow". But "red" doesn't mean anything to you, you don't experience it. If you can imagine that, explain why red-p-zombie-you insist on being able to experience red color, while in fact he/she doesn't experience it. I can only suppose that you imagine someone like you with a textual annotation above his/her head "I don't experience red color", and not trying to imagine what it is like to be such a person. Doesn't it defy the purpose of a thought experiment? You don't imagine conscious experiences, but imagine descriptions of presence or absence of conscious experiences. ETA: Using your analogy it is like imagining pigeon with a label "Dragon" above its head, and then concluding that there's no logical reasons that dragons can't fly or exist. When you imagine a "real" dragon and then ponders on this imagination, you have to conclude that your imagined physics must be different for it to work.

aninhumer 8y ago
>You look at red apple, you think "such a nice red apple, but one side is a bit yellow". But "red" doesn't mean anything to you, you don't experience it. If you can imagine that Of course I can't imagine being a p-zombie, because there is no experience of being a p-zombie, that's the point. When I imagine a p-zombie, it is someone else. >explain why red-p-zombie-you insist on being able to experience red color, while in fact he/she doesn't experience it. They would say they experience it for the exact same reasons a non-p-zombie does. A chemical process in their brain produces that reaction. The difference is that they never actually have that experience, they just act as if they did.
- red75prime 8y ago
  I wasn't talking about p-zombie. I was talking about partial p-zombie, which doesn't experience red color only. But I think I get your answer, and it is exactly as I described. You can't imagine p-zombie, you imagine someone with attached label "There's darkness inside" (as Chalmers had put it). I say that your label is incorrect and your "p-zombie" experiences everything as we do. Prove me wrong. Imagine being nothing. Otherwise you are just attaching label "dragon" to a pigeon. ETA: Have you noticed circularity of the argument? You need to accept that physicalism isn't true to be sure that your label "There's darkness inside" can be true, as you can't really imagine p-zombie. Partial p-zombie just makes it obvious. And physicalism requires less epicycles.
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  - aninhumer 8y ago
    >I was talking about partial p-zombie, which doesn't experience red color only. Ah sorry I missed that part of the argument. Yes, I agree that I can't imagine such a thing, because I don't think experience can be subdivided in that way. Anything a consciousness can perceive, it must experience. I could however imagine a person whose brain perceived and reacted to the colour red in certain ways, but never became conscious of that perception, and merely experiences vision with all red things having the same qualia as another colour. It's quite a weird thing to imagine, but if you're trying to assert that it's impossible, I will do so to disagree. > You can't imagine p-zombie, you imagine someone with attached label "There's darkness inside" (as Chalmers had put it). Can you imagine a non-conscious rock? Or does the rock just have a similar label attached? If you believe one can imagine such a rock, then I can imagine such a human in the same way. If not, then your imagination must be teeming with errant consciousnesses.
    - red75prime 8y ago

naasking 8y ago

> but this does not preclude imagining a p-zombie, any more than a knowledge of anatomy and aerodynamics precludes imagining a dragon. It kind of does. The argument goes: if you can imagine a p-zombie, then in your mind it's possible that consciousness is not tied to physical qualities. Therefore, physicalism would necessarily be false. It took me awhile to accept this, but the solution is simple: p-zombies can't exist because I can't imagine them. And this is because consciousness must serve a functional purpose, and so p-zombies would be distinguishable from humans.

aninhumer 8y ago
>in your mind it's possible that consciousness is not tied to physical qualities. Therefore, physicalism would necessarily be false. I mean, yes? I tend to assume physicalism, but I don't take it as axiomatic. >And this is because consciousness must serve a functional purpose I don't see why that has to be true?
- naasking 8y ago
  > I don't see why that has to be true? It must be true if you accept physicalism.
mikeash 8y ago
Why is the ability to imagine something at all relevant? I can imagine a world where there are no physical laws, everything is entirely random, and by an astonishing coincidence it just so happens to behave exactly like the world we observe in every single way. Does that mean it's possible that there are no physical laws and everything is completely random? Strictly speaking yes, it is possible, but the odds are indescribably remote, and it's a completely useless hypothesis anyway. I can imagine a p-zombie which somehow comes up with the idea of consciousness and starts discussing it despite having no experience of it, but it would have to be some bizarre random occurrence, and is not really useful to consider.
- naasking 8y ago
  > Why is the ability to imagine something at all relevant? https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/#3 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/#3