5 ms·

How do we know the experience itself influences behaviour? Just because we experience something that feels like a decision-making process does not mean that ex

How do we know the experience itself influences behaviour? Just because we experience something that feels like a decision-making process does not mean that experience is part of the process itself. For all we know, our consciousness is just a spectator along for the ride.

naasking 8y ago
This can seem plausible until you ask yourself how we can be talking about consciousness and experience if these things don't influence our behaviour.
- aninhumer 8y ago
  It certainly seems implausible that our physical brains would behave as if they experienced things without ever having any kind of input from that process, but not impossible. But the point of the idea of p-zombies isn't to describe something that plausibly exists. It's thought experiment to highlight the hard problem of consciousness, by demonstrating how the notion of experience is separable in our conception from any physical process we can imagine. That is, regardless of how our brain physically comes to behave as if it were conscious, we can still conceive of a version of it that does not actually experience consciousness. This is because, at least to me, conscious experience is something entirely unlike any physical process. I can conceive of it being the result of a physical process, but nonetheless, my conception of that experience is still of a separate thing which happens as a result of that process. And as such, I can always imagine any such physical process occurring without the corresponding experience. To say that conscious experience "is" a physical process, is to my conception, a category error.
  - naasking 8y ago
    > It's thought experiment to highlight the hard problem of consciousness, by demonstrating how the notion of experience is separable in our conception from any physical process we can imagine. Except it isn't. The p-zombie thought experiment entails the p-zombie world thought experiment, where a universe evolved with nothing but p-zombies, and this world is identical to our own. How do you suppose our p-zombie equivalents would be here debating consciousness in this very moment in a universe in which such a thing doesn't actually exist? > That is, regardless of how our brain physically comes to behave as if it were conscious, we can still conceive of a version of it that does not actually experience consciousness. I certainly can't without allowing what seems to be absurdity or inconsistency. I'm not sure how you manage to do it. > To say that conscious experience "is" a physical process, is to my conception, a category error. Why?
    - aninhumer 8y ago
      > The p-zombie thought experiment entails the p-zombie world thought experiment, where a universe evolved with nothing but p-zombies, and this world is identical to our own. No? I don't see I need to imagine a parallel universe. I can just imagine a p-zombie existing in our own world. >I certainly can't without allowing what seems to be absurdity or inconsistency. I'm not sure how you manage to do it. "absurdity or inconsistency" do not limit my imagination. I do not think such things are realistic, but that doesn't mean I can't imagine them. For a similar example, most ideas of time travel end up inconsistent if you inspect them closely, and yet nonetheless I can imagine them.
      - naasking 8y ago
        > No? I don't see I need to imagine a parallel universe. I can just imagine a p-zombie existing in our own world. I don't think you understand the issue. If the p-zombie thought experiment entails something about consciousness, then the p-zombie world thought experiment does too. And what it demonstrates is that the intuitions that the p-zombie thought experiment seems to entail are absurd, therefore the p-zombie thought experiment is either ill-conceived or missing some crucial element that would explain this dissonance. > "absurdity or inconsistency" do not limit my imagination. Except it must if the p-zombie conceivability argument is to have any weight. If we can allow ourselves imagine any inconsistent proposition, then any inconsistent proposition is conceivable, and any inconsistent proposition is possibly true. Which is obviously absurd, because inconsistent propositions are necessarily false if logic is to mean anything. The only possible resolutions are to invalidate the conceivability argument entirely as an inference rule, or to constrain that which is conceivable so the logical inference holds true.

naasking 8y ago

This can seem plausible until you ask yourself how we can be talking about consciousness and experience if these things don't influence our behaviour.

aninhumer 8y ago
It certainly seems implausible that our physical brains would behave as if they experienced things without ever having any kind of input from that process, but not impossible. But the point of the idea of p-zombies isn't to describe something that plausibly exists. It's thought experiment to highlight the hard problem of consciousness, by demonstrating how the notion of experience is separable in our conception from any physical process we can imagine. That is, regardless of how our brain physically comes to behave as if it were conscious, we can still conceive of a version of it that does not actually experience consciousness. This is because, at least to me, conscious experience is something entirely unlike any physical process. I can conceive of it being the result of a physical process, but nonetheless, my conception of that experience is still of a separate thing which happens as a result of that process. And as such, I can always imagine any such physical process occurring without the corresponding experience. To say that conscious experience "is" a physical process, is to my conception, a category error.
- naasking 8y ago
  > It's thought experiment to highlight the hard problem of consciousness, by demonstrating how the notion of experience is separable in our conception from any physical process we can imagine. Except it isn't. The p-zombie thought experiment entails the p-zombie world thought experiment, where a universe evolved with nothing but p-zombies, and this world is identical to our own. How do you suppose our p-zombie equivalents would be here debating consciousness in this very moment in a universe in which such a thing doesn't actually exist? > That is, regardless of how our brain physically comes to behave as if it were conscious, we can still conceive of a version of it that does not actually experience consciousness. I certainly can't without allowing what seems to be absurdity or inconsistency. I'm not sure how you manage to do it. > To say that conscious experience "is" a physical process, is to my conception, a category error. Why?
  - aninhumer 8y ago
    > The p-zombie thought experiment entails the p-zombie world thought experiment, where a universe evolved with nothing but p-zombies, and this world is identical to our own. No? I don't see I need to imagine a parallel universe. I can just imagine a p-zombie existing in our own world. >I certainly can't without allowing what seems to be absurdity or inconsistency. I'm not sure how you manage to do it. "absurdity or inconsistency" do not limit my imagination. I do not think such things are realistic, but that doesn't mean I can't imagine them. For a similar example, most ideas of time travel end up inconsistent if you inspect them closely, and yet nonetheless I can imagine them.
    - naasking 8y ago
      > No? I don't see I need to imagine a parallel universe. I can just imagine a p-zombie existing in our own world. I don't think you understand the issue. If the p-zombie thought experiment entails something about consciousness, then the p-zombie world thought experiment does too. And what it demonstrates is that the intuitions that the p-zombie thought experiment seems to entail are absurd, therefore the p-zombie thought experiment is either ill-conceived or missing some crucial element that would explain this dissonance. > "absurdity or inconsistency" do not limit my imagination. Except it must if the p-zombie conceivability argument is to have any weight. If we can allow ourselves imagine any inconsistent proposition, then any inconsistent proposition is conceivable, and any inconsistent proposition is possibly true. Which is obviously absurd, because inconsistent propositions are necessarily false if logic is to mean anything. The only possible resolutions are to invalidate the conceivability argument entirely as an inference rule, or to constrain that which is conceivable so the logical inference holds true.