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Presented with an example of an algorithm having the appearance of self-awareness, how can you tell that it is not self-aware, yet when you apply the same crite

Presented with an example of an algorithm having the appearance of self-awareness, how can you tell that it is not self-aware, yet when you apply the same criteria to humans, you conclude they are self-aware? If you are thinking of Chalmers' p-zombie argument, that does not do the job, because it is, at most, a claim that Chalmers sees the logical possibility of p-zombies as plausible, which, even if one agrees, is a long way from an argument that apparently self-aware algorithms must therefore be faking it. Not that I have an actual example to try this on, which is why the issue is a source of endless debate...

fvdessen 8y ago
> how can you tell that it is not self-aware ? Let the algorithm run for a while and see if it starts asking itself existential questions on the nature of consciousness.
- majewsky 8y ago
  So a dog is not self-aware because it's not pondering its own existence? (For all we know.)
  - fvdessen 8y ago
    It is hard to know for dogs since they lack the language necessary to ponder. But if we have an intelligence with the necessary language to ponder, and we see that it doesn't, then I think it is reasonable to assume that it doesn't. There's an interesting book that uses this argument to advance the idea that consciousness as we understand it now emerged 3000 years ago, as it was only then that humans started to make artworks about pondering on consciousness. (The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind)
    - asfasgasg 8y ago
      P-zombies do appear to ponder, though. They are in every way externally indistinguishable from normal people. That's the whole point of the thought experiment.
      - fvdessen 8y ago
        P-Zombies are a logical impossibility; For p-zombies to be indistinguishable, you would need consciousness to have no effect on behaviour, which is clearly contradicted by the discussion we are having.
        mikeash 8y ago
        Exactly my thinking. I have no problem with intelligent, thinking, reasoning beings that aren't conscious and don't have qualia. But it's highly contrived that such beings would go around talking about consciousness and qualia.
        asfasgasg 8y ago
        If it were actually as simple as that, don't you think this would have occurred to the greatest philosophical minds of our generation, and don't you think therefore that P-zombies would not be discussed? I'm all for bagging on philosophy as navel-gazing and generally unproductive, but you've taken it a step too far.
        mannykannot 8y ago
        That is a reasonable response to fdvessen's one-sentence rebuttal, but with regard to the significance of p-zombies in general, an appeal to authority is much more effective when all the authorities agree, but this is not the case here, with Dennett being just the most visible counter-example. From popular articles on the issue of consciousness, you might think that most philosophers are opposed to physicalism or anything like it, but that is apparently not the case. It does not help that these same popular articles exaggerate and simplify - they make claims about the philosophical arguments that cannot be sustained by the arguments themselves. As I mentioned above, it is a misrepresentation to state that Chalmers' highly conditioned claim about the plausibility of p-zombies proves that no machine can have consciousness.
      - dahauns 8y ago
        But that's where we end up at Dennett's zimboes (or even the Systems reply to the Chinese room, if you wanna go there :) ) - if they are completely indistinguishable, isn't our postulate "they don't have consciousness" completely meaningless and the conclusion simply begging the question?
- mcguire 8y ago
  if (rand() > .99) quote (sartre);
asfasgasg 8y ago
> Not that I have an actual example to try this on, which is why the issue is a source of endless debate... This is the core of the issue. Until we can build an apparently conscious entity, there will still be people claiming there's something ineffable and magical about consciousness. Probably even after we've done it once, there will still be folks who so claim. But eventually, people will stop wondering about it once it becomes commonplace.

fvdessen 8y ago

> how can you tell that it is not self-aware ? Let the algorithm run for a while and see if it starts asking itself existential questions on the nature of consciousness.

majewsky 8y ago
So a dog is not self-aware because it's not pondering its own existence? (For all we know.)
- fvdessen 8y ago
  It is hard to know for dogs since they lack the language necessary to ponder. But if we have an intelligence with the necessary language to ponder, and we see that it doesn't, then I think it is reasonable to assume that it doesn't. There's an interesting book that uses this argument to advance the idea that consciousness as we understand it now emerged 3000 years ago, as it was only then that humans started to make artworks about pondering on consciousness. (The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind)
  - asfasgasg 8y ago
    P-zombies do appear to ponder, though. They are in every way externally indistinguishable from normal people. That's the whole point of the thought experiment.
    - fvdessen 8y ago
      P-Zombies are a logical impossibility; For p-zombies to be indistinguishable, you would need consciousness to have no effect on behaviour, which is clearly contradicted by the discussion we are having.
      - mikeash 8y ago
        Exactly my thinking. I have no problem with intelligent, thinking, reasoning beings that aren't conscious and don't have qualia. But it's highly contrived that such beings would go around talking about consciousness and qualia.
      - asfasgasg 8y ago
        If it were actually as simple as that, don't you think this would have occurred to the greatest philosophical minds of our generation, and don't you think therefore that P-zombies would not be discussed? I'm all for bagging on philosophy as navel-gazing and generally unproductive, but you've taken it a step too far.
        mannykannot 8y ago
        That is a reasonable response to fdvessen's one-sentence rebuttal, but with regard to the significance of p-zombies in general, an appeal to authority is much more effective when all the authorities agree, but this is not the case here, with Dennett being just the most visible counter-example. From popular articles on the issue of consciousness, you might think that most philosophers are opposed to physicalism or anything like it, but that is apparently not the case. It does not help that these same popular articles exaggerate and simplify - they make claims about the philosophical arguments that cannot be sustained by the arguments themselves. As I mentioned above, it is a misrepresentation to state that Chalmers' highly conditioned claim about the plausibility of p-zombies proves that no machine can have consciousness.
    - dahauns 8y ago
      But that's where we end up at Dennett's zimboes (or even the Systems reply to the Chinese room, if you wanna go there :) ) - if they are completely indistinguishable, isn't our postulate "they don't have consciousness" completely meaningless and the conclusion simply begging the question?
mcguire 8y ago
if (rand() > .99) quote (sartre);

asfasgasg 8y ago

> Not that I have an actual example to try this on, which is why the issue is a source of endless debate... This is the core of the issue. Until we can build an apparently conscious entity, there will still be people claiming there's something ineffable and magical about consciousness. Probably even after we've done it once, there will still be folks who so claim. But eventually, people will stop wondering about it once it becomes commonplace.