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> Not unless we can reduce self-awareness to an algorithm, which I don't think we can. By the Bekenstein Bound, the human brain is at best a finite state autom
by naasking 8y ago
> Not unless we can reduce self-awareness to an algorithm, which I don't think we can.
By the Bekenstein Bound, the human brain is at best a finite state automoton. Unless you wish to appeal to some supernatural element in consciousness, like dualism, consciousness is reducible to an algorithm.
- hliyan 8y agoa. I don't think the Bekenstein Bound is relevant here. b. The commenter below has a point. We don't know whether consciousness is theoretically reducible to an algorithm or not. All we know is that we can't at the moment, and we don't even know where to begin. So the answer is unknown.
- naasking 8y ago> a. I don't think the Bekenstein Bound is relevant here. Yes it is. A system with finite volume can only contain finite information. A system with finite information can be encoded as a finite state automoton. Our brain is contained within a finite volume, ergo, our brain is at best a finite state automoton. > We don't know whether consciousness is theoretically reducible to an algorithm or not. We do unless you want to rewrite physics. Which some people do with panpsychism. There seems little compelling reason to though.
- simsla 8y ago> by Bekenstein Bound Can you explain why this would be the case? (Or point me in the right direction.)
- red75prime 8y agoGiven that a brain can be perfectly described by a limited amount of information, you can write an algorithm which perfectly simulates a brain. Consciousness needs to be supernatural to not be present in this simulation. ETA: Algorithm will require quantum computations to be feasible though.
- aninhumer 8y agoThis only proves that behaving identically to a human is reducible to an algorithm. The actual experience of consciousness is something secondary to behaviour. It's possible that an algorithm which behaves as a human experiences consciousness identically to a human, as some fundamental property of reality, or it's possible that it does not. We cannot know, because consciousness is not something that we can observe.
- fvdessen 8y agoHow is the experience of consciousness secondary to behaviour when the concept of consciousness emerged from and influenced our behaviour ? It seems as strange to me to imagine that we could have two identically behaving beings, one with consciousness, and one without; as imagining that we could have identically behaving beings, one with eyesight and one without.
- majewsky 8y agoWhen I think of my mother (e.g. how she would react when I tell her something), that's basically a simulation of her running in my head. Is this simulation self-aware? If not, then that's one way to imagine two identically behaving beings, one with consciousness (my actual mother) and one without (my brain's simulation of her). (For the sake of argument, I assume that I know my mother so well that her behavior will be indistinguishable for all intents and purposes from my simulation of her in my head.)
- fvdessen 8y agoOr maybe you substitute her consciousness with your own.
- red75prime 8y agoIf your model of your mother is aware of her own existence as a model in your brain, wouldn't she beg you to continue modelling her, or mention the fact at least? > I assume that I know my mother so well that her behavior will be indistinguishable for all intents and purposes from my simulation of her in my head. Then you are running perfect simulation of your mother and some parts of her environment (such that she'll not freak out finding herself in nothingness) in your brain, so yes, she'll be conscious.