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I 100% agree that science is held back by that desire, but there are some parts of consciousness we can test. Giving sight to the blind, for example, and gettin

I 100% agree that science is held back by that desire, but there are some parts of consciousness we can test. Giving sight to the blind, for example, and getting them to see a cube and sphere for the first time. Giving someone varying amounts of LSD. I would argue even talking about consciousness with individuals in a lab-like setting. If most individuals use the same type of language to describe certain behaviours at the very least it bounds the range of what could be collective delusion.

hliyan 8y ago
We had a debate at office about this. We had a lot of trouble untangling perception (or awareness) from qualia (which is basically a thing as experienced by a person). For example, a cat may be aware of its reflection in the mirror, and may eventually map points on the mirror to points on its own body, but is there something inside the cats brain that is doing the observing? Or is it just a computing device that operates on a continuous input-processing-output loop that learns from previous loops?
- 3pt14159 8y ago
  I think the riddle is in the language. When someone talks of oceans they don't question if it is just a bunch of quarks. The information processing system is intelligible to us because we live in a universe of consequence. Perception, awareness, and qualia seem to be all possible from neural activity.
- Mahn 8y ago
  > is there something inside the cats brain that is doing the observing? Or is it just a computing device that operates on a continuous input-processing-output loop that learns from previous loops? The big question is, is there a difference? We haven't really established whether a sufficiently complex input-processing-output algorithm could also be a self-aware thing inside the cat's brain doing the observing. To posit that both things are separate mechanisms is a dangerous assumption, I think, when we don't really know what that "thing inside the cat's brain that observes" is.
  - hliyan 8y ago
    Interesting. Would you say there is a "thing inside the brain that observes" in the case of humans, or more specifically, in your case personally? Much of my argument rests on the flimsy pillar that I personally perceive myself as an observer in a way that is different from inanimate objects. Perhaps the only difference is in the level of complexity?
    - Mahn 8y ago
      We can only speculate, but in my mind, to "be" the one that observes does not preclude from there being something in my brain that observes, which in turn, unconsciously, becomes part of what I call my identity and self. At the end of the day, to the best of our knowledge, living beings are made of the same atoms and chemical reactions as inanimate objects. So, yes, I would speculate that it's all a question of complexity.
- RichardCA 8y ago
  When I pet my cat and it begins to purr and stretch out its paws, I know there is qualia involved. But a cat's brain is scarcely larger than a walnut.
- mannykannot 8y ago
  > Is there something inside the cats brain that is doing the observing? That would be the homunculus fallacy, the idea that an agent must have an agent within itself to account for its agency. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus_argument https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus_argument
  - hackinthebochs 8y ago
    I don't think this is what he meant. Asking whether there is an observer in the cat is asking whether there is any mental life in the cat, i.e. whether there is anything it is like to be the cat. This is different from the homunculus fallacy that posits an inner observer to explain how mental representations of sensory information are consumed (e.g. the cartesian theater).
- naasking 8y ago
  > We had a debate at office about this. We had a lot of trouble untangling perception (or awareness) from qualia (which is basically a thing as experienced by a person). This is the essence of the hard problem of consciousness: do qualia actually exist such that they are different than the perceptions that lead to them? Dennett thinks not, and that like all of our mental faculties, "qualia" are simply another cognitive trick to help us shift or maintain focus on important stimuli (or serve some other functional purpose). An analogy I like to use is that qualia would be similar to how single-CPU computers can give the illusion of parallelism by rapid context switching.

hliyan 8y ago

We had a debate at office about this. We had a lot of trouble untangling perception (or awareness) from qualia (which is basically a thing as experienced by a person). For example, a cat may be aware of its reflection in the mirror, and may eventually map points on the mirror to points on its own body, but is there something inside the cats brain that is doing the observing? Or is it just a computing device that operates on a continuous input-processing-output loop that learns from previous loops?

3pt14159 8y ago
I think the riddle is in the language. When someone talks of oceans they don't question if it is just a bunch of quarks. The information processing system is intelligible to us because we live in a universe of consequence. Perception, awareness, and qualia seem to be all possible from neural activity.
Mahn 8y ago
> is there something inside the cats brain that is doing the observing? Or is it just a computing device that operates on a continuous input-processing-output loop that learns from previous loops? The big question is, is there a difference? We haven't really established whether a sufficiently complex input-processing-output algorithm could also be a self-aware thing inside the cat's brain doing the observing. To posit that both things are separate mechanisms is a dangerous assumption, I think, when we don't really know what that "thing inside the cat's brain that observes" is.
- hliyan 8y ago
  Interesting. Would you say there is a "thing inside the brain that observes" in the case of humans, or more specifically, in your case personally? Much of my argument rests on the flimsy pillar that I personally perceive myself as an observer in a way that is different from inanimate objects. Perhaps the only difference is in the level of complexity?
  - Mahn 8y ago
    We can only speculate, but in my mind, to "be" the one that observes does not preclude from there being something in my brain that observes, which in turn, unconsciously, becomes part of what I call my identity and self. At the end of the day, to the best of our knowledge, living beings are made of the same atoms and chemical reactions as inanimate objects. So, yes, I would speculate that it's all a question of complexity.
RichardCA 8y ago
When I pet my cat and it begins to purr and stretch out its paws, I know there is qualia involved. But a cat's brain is scarcely larger than a walnut.
mannykannot 8y ago
> Is there something inside the cats brain that is doing the observing? That would be the homunculus fallacy, the idea that an agent must have an agent within itself to account for its agency. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus_argument https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus_argument
- hackinthebochs 8y ago
  I don't think this is what he meant. Asking whether there is an observer in the cat is asking whether there is any mental life in the cat, i.e. whether there is anything it is like to be the cat. This is different from the homunculus fallacy that posits an inner observer to explain how mental representations of sensory information are consumed (e.g. the cartesian theater).
naasking 8y ago
> We had a debate at office about this. We had a lot of trouble untangling perception (or awareness) from qualia (which is basically a thing as experienced by a person). This is the essence of the hard problem of consciousness: do qualia actually exist such that they are different than the perceptions that lead to them? Dennett thinks not, and that like all of our mental faculties, "qualia" are simply another cognitive trick to help us shift or maintain focus on important stimuli (or serve some other functional purpose). An analogy I like to use is that qualia would be similar to how single-CPU computers can give the illusion of parallelism by rapid context switching.