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Yes, and good for them! The problem is that, without a publicized investigation, there is absolutely no way for users to verify no-logging claims by VPN provid
by mirimir 8y ago
Yes, and good for them!
The problem is that, without a publicized investigation, there is absolutely no way for users to verify no-logging claims by VPN providers. The same is so for Tor relays. And Tor deals with that by using three-relays circuits. In order to connect users with online activity, adversaries would need access to logs from multiple relays.
One can do the same, albeit more crudely, using nested VPN chains. It's quite easy, using pfSense VMs as VPN gateways.
- CodesInChaos 8y ago> It's quite easy, using pfSense VMs as VPN gateways. One privacy tool that I'd like to see is a program that takes a .ovpn file and user credentials and outputs a pfSense config file which the user just has to import. Following a guide like yours is quite a bit of work and somewhat error prone. Few users will be able and willing to do that.
- vxxzy 8y agoThis is available within pfSesne. There is a package called openvpn-client-export that exports the pfSense config to .ovpn and a number of other config/packages.
- mirimir 8y agoI agree that it's tedious and error-prone. Perhaps someone could automate it. But that's over my head. There is the argument that, in doing the setup manually, users come to understand what they're doing. But yes, it seems that most are put off by it all.
- ddtaylor 8y ago.
- jstanley 8y agoNothing has any defence against global traffic analysis. Tor still does better than anything else. I don't think it's worth scaring people away from using Tor, because whatever else they'd be using instead is certainly worse. EDIT: Parent comment originally said words to the effect of "Reminder that Tor has no defence against global traffic analysis".
- ddtaylor 8y agoI'm not against Tor but I think it's an important fact if we're going to discus how using multiple relays is a way to obfusticate traffic.
- zrm 8y ago> Nothing has any defence against global traffic analysis. It's possible to guard against global traffic analysis by establishing permanent fixed-bandwidth links between each node and sending traffic along them even when they aren't assigned to a circuit (or the circuit is idle). Then there is nothing to passively analyze because the amount of traffic between each node is always the same. The problem is that this consumes a very large amount of bandwidth.
- owenmarshall 8y agoThis works against global passive adversaries. If you instead ask yourself "how many Tor nodes are out there"[1], and then ask yourself "what is the NSA's annual budget"[2], the concept of a global active adversary makes me a bit nervous. [1]: http://torstatus.blutmagie.de http://torstatus.blutmagie.de [2]: https://www.theverge.com/2013/8/29/4672414/leaked-snowden-documents-reveal-details-of-surveillance-budget https://www.theverge.com/2013/8/29/4672414/leaked-snowden-do...
- zrm 8y agoThe scary thing about a global passive adversary is that the attack is undetectable. Active attacks are harder to defend against but they're also harder to keep secret.
- bitminer 8y agoYou may want to investigate i2p which is resistant to traffic analysis. And does not run 100%bandwidth all day and all night.
- zrm 8y agoI think you're referring to traffic analysis for protocol identification, which is something else entirely, and Tor handles that as well. Resisting protocol identification can be done very efficiently -- you basically get the same information theoretical efficiency as the protocol you're mimicking does, and the primary failure mode is to not be mimicking it completely accurately. It's theoretically possible to mimic the target protocol perfectly, and each time someone finds a way to distinguish them is one step closer to there not being any more ways left. Resisting global traffic analysis for the purposes of deanonymization is not so easy. The issue is that if every time Alice sends ~476MB of traffic, Bob promptly receives ~476MB of traffic, it's not hard to deduce that Alice is talking to Bob. To fix that, the amount and timing of the traffic Bob receives needs to be independent of the traffic Alice is sending him. Which is possible but inherently comes at an efficiency cost.
- bogomipz 8y ago>"using nested VPN chains. It's quite easy, using pfSense VMs as VPN gateways" Can you elaborate on this? I am not familiar with the term "nested VPN chains", is this a specific configuration supported by pfSense?
- icedchai 8y ago1) You create a VPN. 2) Over that VPN connection, you connect to another VPN... Repeat until your tinfoil hat feels secure.
- Thriptic 8y agohttps://www.ivpn.net/blog/privacy-guides/advanced-privacy-and-anonymity-part-1 https://www.ivpn.net/blog/privacy-guides/advanced-privacy-an...
- bogomipz 8y agoWhat a great resource, thanks for sharing. Might you have any feedback on IVPN as a provider as well?
- mirimir 8y agoI've freelanced with IVPN for five years. IVPN was "[f]ounded in 2009 by a group of security professionals at the prestigious Information Security Group at the University of London (Royal Holloway)".[0] In my experience, their CEO Nick Pestell is fundamentally a privacy activist. 0) https://www.ivpn.net/aboutus https://www.ivpn.net/aboutus
- torenthusiast 8y agoI can think of few reasons not to extend this even further, and compose proxy chains from an eclectic mix of VPNs, and other networks, such as Tor, JonDonym, and i2p (using private, short-lived outproxies). The first hop ought to be as innocuous as possible, for which a VPN is a good candidate. The exit node ought to be as widely shared as possible, making Tor a natural choice there. While not purely additive, it would, at least intuitively (here be dragons), make it substantially harder to determine the origin of the traffic. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, your physical internet gateway link should also be difficult to trace. Here, you could do a lot worse than a frequency- or cell-locked (to possibly thwart any commodity geolocation systems) cellular modem, or a Yagi antenna pointed at an open Wi-Fi AP. One possible caveat which is apparent even to a dilettante like me is that this might increase your exposure to so-called passive traffic correlation attacks. The addition of a high-latency proxy could mitigate this, but I'm not aware of any in common use.