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"In addition, TCP supports “fan-in, This allows multiple connections to the same well-known port at the same time. ... This creates a security problem, because
by zamadatix 8y ago
"In addition, TCP supports “fan-in, This allows multiple connections to the same well-known port at the same time. ... This creates a security problem, because the server must rely on the source IP address, and source port-id (values that it did not create) to distinguish this connection. This is the source of many spoofing attacks."
I really don't see how "source port" is relevant in this section, the issues are all about source IP + the lack of source verification. Using node IDs without the lack of source verification results in the same issue, source port or not.
Most of the other points I agree with but they are written with an agenda, well summed up in: "The reader should be getting a sense of how what may have seemed like a good idea at the time is proving to be a cascading series of patches that increase complexity and generally introduce new problems."
As a network guy I'll say it's much easier to look back at the last 40 years with the view of how all systems are ethernet + IP + TCP/UDP today and say "well obviously this is dumb". The same would probably be said for RINA in 40 years if it took off (haven't read through how it works so I can't judge it). The point is you can't skip the middle 40 years in how it should have been done and provide a high level "just do <x> technology direction instead" as evidence why it was done wrong. You have to go back and describe the full alternative and how it would make sense each step of the way (or at least how the full alternative could be implemented today). If the idea is "we think we could do better" then the article should have been written in the form of discovery of what's broken today.
Could there be a few good improvements to how networking is done now that we are a bit further along in both knowledge and technology? Sure, plenty, but I've yet to see one that covers both all use cases, is actually possible to implement in hardware, and can be decentralized.
- toast0 8y agoI'm dealing with some of the 30+ year old broken stuff today, and I don't think TCP / IP is that bad. That there are some holes in the spec isn't really so bad when they didn't become readily apparent for 20+ years; many things are fixable with changes on just one end of the connection too (if you skip some 'required' sends, you can avoid ack storms, etc). IP Fragmentation is pretty awful. I wouldn't say it never worked, because I see some legitimate traffic using it. But with decades of hindsight, it was never a better solution than breaking up data into right sized packets, and it would probably have been better for routers to truncate packets and forward rather than fragment or drop. IP could use the 16-bit ID field as a 16-bit original length, if you need to truncate a packet, change the total length, leave the original length alone; adjust the ip and tcp/udp checksums (sorry other protocols / maybe IP should have checksummed the whole packet or owned the data checksum), and send it on its way. For TCP, the acking packets could use the mss option to indicate the new effective MTU (under the current spec, MSS is only valid on SYNs, but let's pretend), providing an in band way to notify the sender, since clearly the out of band methods haven't worked out so well. For UDP, the peers can figure it out themselves. If individual datagrams must be larger than the path MTU, you have to frame it yourself, but you have more options than what IP provides. OTOH, I bet nobody expected janky path MTUs to be so prevalent.
- bogomipz 8y ago>"I'm dealing with some of the 30+ year old broken stuff today..." I am curious which behaviors you are referring to. Can you elaborate? >"IP Fragmentation is pretty awful. I wouldn't say it never worked, because I see some legitimate traffic using it." I am curious what types of traffic you you have that's doing IP fragmentation regularly?
- toast0 8y agoI'm trying to get data on clients with path MTU problems, with an eye toward fixing it through statistics; assuming I can only intervene on the server side, because the clients are on Android, so path mtu blackhole detection is there, but disabled (thanks Google), and you can't set any useful socket options from Java anyway. I work for a messaging service , but won't tell you which one. I first saw IP fragments when some nice people were doing charge reflection ddos against our www servers, but the reflector hosts were sending fragmented UDP responses, and also filtering the first fragment out (probably because the first fragment has the port number, and chargen is clearly bad, but their firewall didn't think to drop or reassemble fragments). Since fragment reassembly was a big performance problem, I thought maybe we could just disable it, but actually we see a trickle of fragments on legitimate connections. I didn't track it further than we can't turn it off, but we can set the reassembly buffer to be incredibly small, which was enough to weather the storm (and knowing we could turn it off in case of high fragmentation rate was nice too).
- bogomipz 8y agoThanks for the response. Interesting, do you mean Android has PMTU detection disabled in that Google is filtering "fragmentation needed but DF bit set" ICMP replies? That would be very surprising for Google I would think. Or are you referring to something else?
- toast0 8y agoAndroid either doesn't enable PMTU detection, or it's only enabled in recent versions, or it's configured such that it's not effective. I've seen pcaps with iOS devices doing it though. I don't think Google would intentionally filter out the ICMP fragmentation needed packets, but there are lots of problems actually getting them, between routers that drop packets without sending them, firewalls that drop all ICMP, and NAT devices that don't know how to direct them to the underlying client. Edit: sorry I really mean PMTU probing. If you got a connection, but no acks when you send a large packet, after a significant timeout, it's worth trying to send smaller packets, even if you didn't get an icmp that says you should.