2 ms·
Multiverse theories like string landscape, eternal inflation, or many-worlds generally have this property: Almost anything that possibly could happen will happe
by skissane 8y ago
Multiverse theories like string landscape, eternal inflation, or many-worlds generally have this property: Almost anything that possibly could happen will happen in some universe. But, it is said, that some universes are more frequent than others. From local observations we infer the global laws of physics, which tell us the relative distribution of different types of universes. But, surely there will be some "deceptive" universes, in which (purely by chance) observers are always mislead as to what the actual laws of physics are. Experimental error always goes in the same direction, such that the true laws of physics are never known, and those observers rationally believe in false laws of physics instead. Now, an observer in such a universe will rationally infer a given probability distribution of universes based on their local observations, but the distribution they infer will be completely wrong. My question is: how do we know we are not in such a universe? To say such universes must be exceedingly rare (even though existent) is sort of circular, because our conclusion they are rare is based on our idea of the global probability distribution, but in order to validly make the inference from local observation to global distribution we have to assume we are not in such a universe. But, if we can't know we are not in such a universe, then we can't know that some universes are "more likely" than others, which is a central claim of these theories, and what distinguishes them from David Lewis' modal realism. This is why I think all such "multiverse" theories should be rejected.