4 ms·
> It also makes it easy to use a name server of your choice for a particular application instead of the one configured globally (often by someone else) for your
by xg15 8y ago
> It also makes it easy to use a name server of your choice for a particular application instead of the one configured globally (often by someone else) for your entire system.
I can see app developers wanting this, but as a user, I really hope, this doesn't happen. It's bad enough that many applications today manage their own certificate stores, making the next part of internet infrastructure app-specific seems to me a way to more fragmentation and less understanding or oversight I'd have over my own system.
- effie 8y agoThe intent is good - to give users of the applications more power in their relation with their employer and state, similarly to what the GNU project and the GNU Hurd kernel promote. Of course, there is danger that develepers will misuse this and hardwire their preferred DNS into their application. If this becomes a problem, the users will have to either reject the application or apply some MITM remedy.
- tialaramex 8y agoIf anything we want _more_ trust stores rather than less, although I'd certainly take "uses the latest Mozilla NSS trust store" over "I pasted in this list I found on the Internet fifteen years ago and have never updated it" in most applications. One reason to desire separate trust stores is that your model of trust is almost certainly not "I wish my application trusted exactly the same CAs as [say] the Firefox web browser and I will incorporate all the same special rules and exception as that browser". Example: Back in 2016 the US government expressed interest in operating its own public CA. This probably won't happen under Trump of course, but in Firefox this would have been no problem if they met its other criteria, it's easily able to accept a new CA and apply constraints to it. So that in Firefox a US Federal Web PKI cert for whitehouse.gov works, but one for gov.uk or google.com does not. But does your application have that logic? Or would it just blindly trust the new CA because Mozilla added it to their trust store? The other reason is that your application is (especially if you aren't on the ball enough to run your own trust store) probably not able to keep up with the security treadmill, and falling off may be painful. Example: If your system depended upon SHA-1 certificates to function, but you used the Web PKI CAs from somewhere like Mozilla's NSS store, magically in 2016 no more new certificates were available. No problem for the browser vendors, they had voted for exactly this outcome. Too bad for your application.