> I don't understand the distinction you're trying to draw between block ciphers and the ECLDP. Dual EC was an RNG, which is (among other things) an important s

> I don't understand the distinction you're trying to draw between block ciphers and the ECLDP. Dual EC was an RNG, which is (among other things) an important symmetric primitive. I think the definition of NOBUS that you're working is the one that's broken, not mine. I'm not sure where we'll get with it. I'm okay with your misunderstanding. Please ignore that part of the comment and read the remaining content. Please don't let an objection on a small part of the content distract you from the remaining content of the argument. > I also think you're overestimating the frequency with which powerful new techniques for attacking block ciphers occur in the literature. You are clearly underestimating the frequency. We both understand how heavily caveated your argument referencing Matsui is. My fear is that your misunderstanding and underestimation will lead to FUD about backdoors, like it did last time with DUAL_EC. It's also important to note that your argument has shifted significantly in this short exchange. NSA only cares about NOBUS weaknesses for operational and national security advantages. Thanks for your time.