3 ms·
Out of curiosity, were Speck to be known as vulnerable to key recovery attacks, would you still endorse it as better than no encryption? Personally, I agree wi
by larkeith 8y ago
Out of curiosity, were Speck to be known as vulnerable to key recovery attacks, would you still endorse it as better than no encryption?
Personally, I agree with his point - for applications where AES is unsuitable and no encryption is currently in use, it is better to wait for hardware to support AES (or an alternative to Speck to become available) rather than implement an algorithm that may lead to expanded vulnerability of the device via key recovery.
- bostik 8y agoSorry to barge in from the outside, but your question is vaguely specified. > Out of curiosity, were Speck to be known as vulnerable to key recovery attacks, would you still endorse it as better than no encryption? My answer to this would be: "it depends". In this case, it depends on the security margin and just how much easier the key recovery attacks would be compared to brute force. For a cipher with 128-bit key, if the best known attack, after years of careful and aggressive cryptanalysis, required 2^122 work I probably would use it. If the best attack required 2^90 work, I wouldn't use it. After all we are talking about security margins and risk tolerance.