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Well, measuring overhead isn't a great way to measure efficacy (trying to game this metric often leads to behaviors that are penny-wise and pound-foolish), but
by emodendroket 8y ago
Well, measuring overhead isn't a great way to measure efficacy (trying to game this metric often leads to behaviors that are penny-wise and pound-foolish), but I don't find utilitarianism a compelling moral philosophy and really find the idea of trying to quantify how much good a charity does kind of silly.
- jopsen 8y agoObviously, it's impossible to capture all the variables, but in quantifying the good we do, we value all lives the same, and strive to maximize the good we do. If the EA movement forces big charities to focus a bit more on bang for buck, then that's a win. Perfect efficiency will never be possible anyways.
- emodendroket 8y agoI have some experience in the nonprofit sector. While you obviously don't want to see people being cavalier with donor dollars, nonprofits that are obsessed with cost cutting are more effective at scolding people for wanting a chair that isn't falling apart or making a few too many photocopies than they are at their missions.
- jopsen 8y agoLooking at givewells analysis, they don't seem too focused on office supplies, but rather whether the charity did any follow-up studies, how far it scales and what it costs. But the follow-up studies seem far more important, than the per unit cost of mosquito nets.
- casebash 8y agoEven if there are things that quantitative measurement can't capture, perhaps we could at least use it to rule out donating to some charities?
- emodendroket 8y agoIf you want to answer a question like "who distributes the most malaria nets per dollar?" then quantitative measure is very effective. I don't think that's most questions facing someone who wants to do good, though.
- Vinnl 8y ago> I don't find utilitarianism a compelling moral philosophy Could you expand on this some more? The primary argument against utilitarianism I recall is the hypothetical situation of there being that gets infinitely happy if you donate to it, so that the maximally useful thing would always be to donate to that being (or something like that, but you get the gist). But such a being does not exist, and if we accept that our utilitarian gifts are not going to be perfect, isn't it a reasonable assumption that by trying to maximise the amount of good that can be done for our bucks, on average, the amount of good that will be done for our bucks will be higher than if we did not approach it like that?
- emodendroket 8y agoHere's a classic problem for utilitarianism: You are a doctor. You have four patients. Three are young men in otherwise good health who need an organ or they will die very soon -- two of them need kidneys and one of them needs a heart. Your fourth patient is a homeless person who's broken his leg but is otherwise well. You know for a fact he has no friends or family who will notice he is gone, and that nobody will know it if you kill him. Under a strict utilitarian framework, it is not only permissible but actually mandatory that you kill this man and harvest his organs to maximize utility. Another popular one is a variant on the trolley problem. Most people feel it is morally permissible to change the switch on the train tracks to go toward the side with fewer people, even though it will lead to some people dying. Most people do not feel it is permissible to push someone (say in a car) in front of the train in order that they may stop the train while being killed in the process. There are others of this genre but you probably get the basic idea. Utilitarianism can lead to plainly monstrous conclusions. I'm suspicious of any "formula" to solve all ethical problems.
- perl4ever 8y agoI don't think "utilitarianism" incorporates any principle that homeless people are worthless. Really, depending on how you define utility, it can be molded into anything. Note that harvesting organs means he will definitely die, but the organ transplants may fail, or may only work for a limited time. It could be rather than assuming "two lives saved minus one life lost" you should use "probability/quality adjusted years of life gained". And incorporate uncertainty. Also, in your example of pushing someone in front of the train, wouldn't your moral intuition depend on the stakes? Suppose that the train not being stopped was going to set off a chain reaction that would kill all life on earth?