5 ms·

That's definitely not true if your endpoint you're talking to is an *.onion . A connection to an Onion is encrypted to the destination. That also means if you

That's definitely not true if your endpoint you're talking to is an *.onion . A connection to an Onion is encrypted to the destination. That also means if you were running, say NodeRed with authentication, sending credentials "over the clear" (no SSL cert, because stupidity) it's not actually sent over the clear. It's encrypted to the public key relating to your onion address. Now, if you're using Public Internet->Tor->Public Internet, then absolutely yes the last node CAN read the contents of your packets. In that case, you absolutely need appropriate encryption to hide the contents (sigh, not the metadata) of your packets.

LinuxBender 8y ago
I would still prefer https on a .onion. If tor itself is popped, then traffic can be routed or mirrored to another host. This has happened in a PoC and was fixed in a security update in one of the alpha releases. There are additional fixes required for HS that are coming. If the target is using https, you can see if the signature changes (there are addons for this). Digicert will sign .onion domains, though the hidden site must be willing to share their identity with Digicert. I would love to see LetsEncrypt sign .onion domains, assuming they are willing to connect back to a .onion to validate the server.
- detaro 8y ago
  The CA/B Forum rules only allow EV certificates for .onion, so even if Let's Encrypt wanted they couldn't give out .onion certificates without getting that changed first.
  - LinuxBender 8y ago
    Oh right, that is a good point. I suppose Digicert is the only option for now then. Perhaps the Tor team or an affiliate could set up a simplified CA and have a public CA cert restricted to .onion that folks could install as a work around to having browsers trust it by default.
  - schoen 8y ago
    I'm trying to get that rule changed and working with several other organizations on this.
    - detaro 8y ago
      Are there public discussions somewhere yet? I always find it interesting to peek into these processes.
      - schoen 8y ago
        We talked about it in this thread in November. https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2017-November/thread.html#12451 https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2017-November/thread.h... Since then Fotis Loukos and I have drafted a ballot, which I believe he plans to introduce soon after asking a few other organizations to look it over. You can subscribe to the cabfpub mailing list without becoming an Interested Party or Member. Only Interested Parties or Members can post to the list, while only Members can introduce or vote on ballots. (Edit: Strangely, the reason for this is seemingly not that they're worried that the general public will make crazy suggestions, but rather that the general public will make patented suggestions, without being willing to license them according to the Forum's patent policy, and thereby sneak patented technology into the standards.)
- crankylinuxuser 8y ago
  Indeed, I too would love to have SSL certs for .onions and not have to bend over with an Extended Payment... Err, Verification check. I thought about setting up boulder on tor, and start rolling it myself. But then again who'd trust me? This should be part of the Tor organization. I can't see my own system getting inertia, or put into TBB, or Firefox for that matter. It was hard enough for LE to be put in trusted CAs on machines.
- jerheinze 8y ago
  https://matt.traudt.xyz/posts/dont-https-your-o44SnkW2.html https://matt.traudt.xyz/posts/dont-https-your-o44SnkW2.html
  - LinuxBender 8y ago
    Those are interesting preferences and perspectives. I will set up a site to counter them from my perspective and experiences. To summarize, you are a dissident. I am a news reporter. You are giving me information about your government. Your life and the lives of your family members now depend 100% on the security of the Tor Proxy transport. Tor is a proxy transport and nothing more. As a dissident, you have been trained by me to install addons that validate the signature of my HTTPS certs will not change. I also showed you how to do this using openssl s_client. When Tor is popped and routing you to your government hosts, you will see the SSL signature change. Per my instructions, you will cease all communication with me. Without HTTPS, you are relying entirely on the transport for assurance of who you are talking to. This is neither appropriate nor acceptable for this type of communication. PGP is not a mitigating control, because the handshake has completed and you are now downloading your state sponsored rootkit. It's too late by that point. The only thing we have to validate ID and allow or block application traffic is a certificate.
    - jerheinze 8y ago
      > Without HTTPS, you are relying entirely on the transport for assurance of who you are talking to. That's not the case, even with a SecureDrop setup, a Gov can compromise your SecureDrop machine and listen directly.
      - LinuxBender 8y ago
        Exactly, they have to pop my machine too. They can't just take control of the traffic in the middle, which absolutely can be done in Tor with enough gov controlled guard nodes, as the arms race of patching has proven. I can set up multiple canaries that they will have to pop and the fingerprint of one of those canaries is going to change or drop off the net.

LinuxBender 8y ago

I would still prefer https on a .onion. If tor itself is popped, then traffic can be routed or mirrored to another host. This has happened in a PoC and was fixed in a security update in one of the alpha releases. There are additional fixes required for HS that are coming. If the target is using https, you can see if the signature changes (there are addons for this). Digicert will sign .onion domains, though the hidden site must be willing to share their identity with Digicert. I would love to see LetsEncrypt sign .onion domains, assuming they are willing to connect back to a .onion to validate the server.

detaro 8y ago
The CA/B Forum rules only allow EV certificates for .onion, so even if Let's Encrypt wanted they couldn't give out .onion certificates without getting that changed first.
- LinuxBender 8y ago
  Oh right, that is a good point. I suppose Digicert is the only option for now then. Perhaps the Tor team or an affiliate could set up a simplified CA and have a public CA cert restricted to .onion that folks could install as a work around to having browsers trust it by default.
- schoen 8y ago
  I'm trying to get that rule changed and working with several other organizations on this.
  - detaro 8y ago
    Are there public discussions somewhere yet? I always find it interesting to peek into these processes.
    - schoen 8y ago
      We talked about it in this thread in November. https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2017-November/thread.html#12451 https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2017-November/thread.h... Since then Fotis Loukos and I have drafted a ballot, which I believe he plans to introduce soon after asking a few other organizations to look it over. You can subscribe to the cabfpub mailing list without becoming an Interested Party or Member. Only Interested Parties or Members can post to the list, while only Members can introduce or vote on ballots. (Edit: Strangely, the reason for this is seemingly not that they're worried that the general public will make crazy suggestions, but rather that the general public will make patented suggestions, without being willing to license them according to the Forum's patent policy, and thereby sneak patented technology into the standards.)
crankylinuxuser 8y ago
Indeed, I too would love to have SSL certs for .onions and not have to bend over with an Extended Payment... Err, Verification check. I thought about setting up boulder on tor, and start rolling it myself. But then again who'd trust me? This should be part of the Tor organization. I can't see my own system getting inertia, or put into TBB, or Firefox for that matter. It was hard enough for LE to be put in trusted CAs on machines.
jerheinze 8y ago
https://matt.traudt.xyz/posts/dont-https-your-o44SnkW2.html https://matt.traudt.xyz/posts/dont-https-your-o44SnkW2.html
- LinuxBender 8y ago
  Those are interesting preferences and perspectives. I will set up a site to counter them from my perspective and experiences. To summarize, you are a dissident. I am a news reporter. You are giving me information about your government. Your life and the lives of your family members now depend 100% on the security of the Tor Proxy transport. Tor is a proxy transport and nothing more. As a dissident, you have been trained by me to install addons that validate the signature of my HTTPS certs will not change. I also showed you how to do this using openssl s_client. When Tor is popped and routing you to your government hosts, you will see the SSL signature change. Per my instructions, you will cease all communication with me. Without HTTPS, you are relying entirely on the transport for assurance of who you are talking to. This is neither appropriate nor acceptable for this type of communication. PGP is not a mitigating control, because the handshake has completed and you are now downloading your state sponsored rootkit. It's too late by that point. The only thing we have to validate ID and allow or block application traffic is a certificate.
  - jerheinze 8y ago
    > Without HTTPS, you are relying entirely on the transport for assurance of who you are talking to. That's not the case, even with a SecureDrop setup, a Gov can compromise your SecureDrop machine and listen directly.
    - LinuxBender 8y ago
      Exactly, they have to pop my machine too. They can't just take control of the traffic in the middle, which absolutely can be done in Tor with enough gov controlled guard nodes, as the arms race of patching has proven. I can set up multiple canaries that they will have to pop and the fingerprint of one of those canaries is going to change or drop off the net.