6 ms·

Why does the Tor Browser Bundle ship with HTTPS Everywhere? Surely if you're connected through a Tor circuit, HTTPS provides no extra security?

StavrosK 8y ago
This is the biggest misconception about Tor. Tor provides anonymity, but any node (EDIT: any exit node) can read what you're sending if it's not encrypted. You need both.
- detaro 8y ago
  nitpick: exit node. The ones on the way can't, neither can any if you access hidden services.
  - StavrosK 8y ago
    Yes, sorry, I should have specified.
- crankylinuxuser 8y ago
  That's definitely not true if your endpoint you're talking to is an *.onion . A connection to an Onion is encrypted to the destination. That also means if you were running, say NodeRed with authentication, sending credentials "over the clear" (no SSL cert, because stupidity) it's not actually sent over the clear. It's encrypted to the public key relating to your onion address. Now, if you're using Public Internet->Tor->Public Internet, then absolutely yes the last node CAN read the contents of your packets. In that case, you absolutely need appropriate encryption to hide the contents (sigh, not the metadata) of your packets.
  - LinuxBender 8y ago
    I would still prefer https on a .onion. If tor itself is popped, then traffic can be routed or mirrored to another host. This has happened in a PoC and was fixed in a security update in one of the alpha releases. There are additional fixes required for HS that are coming. If the target is using https, you can see if the signature changes (there are addons for this). Digicert will sign .onion domains, though the hidden site must be willing to share their identity with Digicert. I would love to see LetsEncrypt sign .onion domains, assuming they are willing to connect back to a .onion to validate the server.
    - detaro 8y ago
      The CA/B Forum rules only allow EV certificates for .onion, so even if Let's Encrypt wanted they couldn't give out .onion certificates without getting that changed first.
      - LinuxBender 8y ago
        Oh right, that is a good point. I suppose Digicert is the only option for now then. Perhaps the Tor team or an affiliate could set up a simplified CA and have a public CA cert restricted to .onion that folks could install as a work around to having browsers trust it by default.
      - schoen 8y ago
        I'm trying to get that rule changed and working with several other organizations on this.
        detaro 8y ago
        Are there public discussions somewhere yet? I always find it interesting to peek into these processes.
        schoen 8y ago
        We talked about it in this thread in November. https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2017-November/thread.html#12451 https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2017-November/thread.h... Since then Fotis Loukos and I have drafted a ballot, which I believe he plans to introduce soon after asking a few other organizations to look it over. You can subscribe to the cabfpub mailing list without becoming an Interested Party or Member. Only Interested Parties or Members can post to the list, while only Members can introduce or vote on ballots. (Edit: Strangely, the reason for this is seemingly not that they're worried that the general public will make crazy suggestions, but rather that the general public will make patented suggestions, without being willing to license them according to the Forum's patent policy, and thereby sneak patented technology into the standards.)
    - 8y ago
akerro 8y ago
You -> Tor node -> Tor node -> Tor Exit node -> http/https clearnet -> NSA/GCQH/BND/you name it -> destination server
shp0ngle 8y ago
If you connect to a clearnet website, the clearnet website is fetched by the exit node. If it's not HTTPS, the exit node can change the website however it wants.
jerheinze 8y ago
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#CanExitNodesEavesdrop https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#CanExitNodesEave... Yes, the guy running the exit node can read the bytes that come in and out there. Tor anonymizes the origin of your traffic, and it makes sure to encrypt everything inside the Tor network, but it does not magically encrypt all traffic throughout the Internet. This is why you should always use end-to-end encryption such as SSL for sensitive Internet connections. ``` Fortunately HTTPS adoption is much better now :)
- akerro 8y ago
  >Fortunately HTTPS adoption is much better now :) It's HSTS what we need in 2018
  - crankylinuxuser 8y ago
    I disagree. Ive seen HSTS applied to things like Windows 10 updates, to prevent users from seeing what exactly your OS is sending to the mothership. Ideally, we should be able to see exactly the content being exfiltrated, and choose to allow/disallow. But the moment we use tools like ettercap or mitmssl, it kills the session and we can't see the data. HSTS seems more "self cutting" than useful at this juncture.
    - maerF0x0 8y ago
      If its truly your OS I think you can read all the network data you want to, including the key negotiation. Albeit its not the easiest thing to do.
    - kchr 8y ago
      The use of HSTS is a way to suggest to your clients that they use SSL for that domain - for all requests within a time span (which could be "forever"). If anything, the vendors you mention should be applauded for taking that step towards a more secure distribution of updates. Not enforcing SSL makes malware injection through updates way way easier. Debian introduced HTTPS repos a while back as an option, but not by default. Other distros already offer it.
stordoff 8y ago
If you're connecting to a clearnet site, you probably need HTTPS _more_ than on a standard connection - you _explicitly_ have a node between you and the site that you don't necessarily trust (see, e.g., https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/06/25/can-you-trust-tors-exit-nodes/ https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/06/25/can-you-trust-to...).
HugoDaniel 8y ago
anonymity /= confidentiality you can stay anonymous while making sure anyone can read what you are sending. you can send confidential messages while making sure anyone knows who you are. you can also combine the two :)
- oconnor663 8y ago
  > you can stay anonymous while making sure anyone can read what you are sending. That depends a lot on what you're sending. Tor stops people from identifying you based on your IP address, but you can still identify yourself by logging in on http://not-encrypted.com http://not-encrypted.com.
Lennie 8y ago
Please read and play with the graphics on this page, it explains it all: https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https

StavrosK 8y ago

This is the biggest misconception about Tor. Tor provides anonymity, but any node (EDIT: any exit node) can read what you're sending if it's not encrypted. You need both.

detaro 8y ago
nitpick: exit node. The ones on the way can't, neither can any if you access hidden services.
- StavrosK 8y ago
  Yes, sorry, I should have specified.
crankylinuxuser 8y ago
That's definitely not true if your endpoint you're talking to is an *.onion . A connection to an Onion is encrypted to the destination. That also means if you were running, say NodeRed with authentication, sending credentials "over the clear" (no SSL cert, because stupidity) it's not actually sent over the clear. It's encrypted to the public key relating to your onion address. Now, if you're using Public Internet->Tor->Public Internet, then absolutely yes the last node CAN read the contents of your packets. In that case, you absolutely need appropriate encryption to hide the contents (sigh, not the metadata) of your packets.
- LinuxBender 8y ago
  I would still prefer https on a .onion. If tor itself is popped, then traffic can be routed or mirrored to another host. This has happened in a PoC and was fixed in a security update in one of the alpha releases. There are additional fixes required for HS that are coming. If the target is using https, you can see if the signature changes (there are addons for this). Digicert will sign .onion domains, though the hidden site must be willing to share their identity with Digicert. I would love to see LetsEncrypt sign .onion domains, assuming they are willing to connect back to a .onion to validate the server.
  - detaro 8y ago
    The CA/B Forum rules only allow EV certificates for .onion, so even if Let's Encrypt wanted they couldn't give out .onion certificates without getting that changed first.
    - LinuxBender 8y ago
      Oh right, that is a good point. I suppose Digicert is the only option for now then. Perhaps the Tor team or an affiliate could set up a simplified CA and have a public CA cert restricted to .onion that folks could install as a work around to having browsers trust it by default.
    - schoen 8y ago
      I'm trying to get that rule changed and working with several other organizations on this.
      - detaro 8y ago
        Are there public discussions somewhere yet? I always find it interesting to peek into these processes.
        schoen 8y ago
        We talked about it in this thread in November. https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2017-November/thread.html#12451 https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2017-November/thread.h... Since then Fotis Loukos and I have drafted a ballot, which I believe he plans to introduce soon after asking a few other organizations to look it over. You can subscribe to the cabfpub mailing list without becoming an Interested Party or Member. Only Interested Parties or Members can post to the list, while only Members can introduce or vote on ballots. (Edit: Strangely, the reason for this is seemingly not that they're worried that the general public will make crazy suggestions, but rather that the general public will make patented suggestions, without being willing to license them according to the Forum's patent policy, and thereby sneak patented technology into the standards.)
  - 8y ago

akerro 8y ago

You -> Tor node -> Tor node -> Tor Exit node -> http/https clearnet -> NSA/GCQH/BND/you name it -> destination server

shp0ngle 8y ago

If you connect to a clearnet website, the clearnet website is fetched by the exit node. If it's not HTTPS, the exit node can change the website however it wants.

jerheinze 8y ago

https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#CanExitNodesEavesdrop https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#CanExitNodesEave... Yes, the guy running the exit node can read the bytes that come in and out there. Tor anonymizes the origin of your traffic, and it makes sure to encrypt everything inside the Tor network, but it does not magically encrypt all traffic throughout the Internet. This is why you should always use end-to-end encryption such as SSL for sensitive Internet connections. ``` Fortunately HTTPS adoption is much better now :)

akerro 8y ago
>Fortunately HTTPS adoption is much better now :) It's HSTS what we need in 2018
- crankylinuxuser 8y ago
  I disagree. Ive seen HSTS applied to things like Windows 10 updates, to prevent users from seeing what exactly your OS is sending to the mothership. Ideally, we should be able to see exactly the content being exfiltrated, and choose to allow/disallow. But the moment we use tools like ettercap or mitmssl, it kills the session and we can't see the data. HSTS seems more "self cutting" than useful at this juncture.
  - maerF0x0 8y ago
    If its truly your OS I think you can read all the network data you want to, including the key negotiation. Albeit its not the easiest thing to do.
  - kchr 8y ago
    The use of HSTS is a way to suggest to your clients that they use SSL for that domain - for all requests within a time span (which could be "forever"). If anything, the vendors you mention should be applauded for taking that step towards a more secure distribution of updates. Not enforcing SSL makes malware injection through updates way way easier. Debian introduced HTTPS repos a while back as an option, but not by default. Other distros already offer it.

stordoff 8y ago

If you're connecting to a clearnet site, you probably need HTTPS _more_ than on a standard connection - you _explicitly_ have a node between you and the site that you don't necessarily trust (see, e.g., https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/06/25/can-you-trust-tors-exit-nodes/ https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/06/25/can-you-trust-to...).

HugoDaniel 8y ago

anonymity /= confidentiality you can stay anonymous while making sure anyone can read what you are sending. you can send confidential messages while making sure anyone knows who you are. you can also combine the two :)

oconnor663 8y ago
> you can stay anonymous while making sure anyone can read what you are sending. That depends a lot on what you're sending. Tor stops people from identifying you based on your IP address, but you can still identify yourself by logging in on http://not-encrypted.com http://not-encrypted.com.

Lennie 8y ago

Please read and play with the graphics on this page, it explains it all: https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https