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> We recommend that all mobile device makers do the same. Kind of insencere when the biggest competitor has been doing this since 2013 (the feature is marketed

> We recommend that all mobile device makers do the same. Kind of insencere when the biggest competitor has been doing this since 2013 (the feature is marketed as “secure enclave” by Apple)

praptak 8y ago
Does Apple market their solution as resistant to someone having all Apple's keys but not the user password?
- ucaetano 8y ago
  Based on the San Bernardino case, no. It wasn't a matter of feasibility, Apple could have done it but refused to.
mandevil 8y ago
The Apple Secure Enclave cannot defend against someone who has the signing keys to the password software (or at least couldn't as of 2016)- that's why the FBI wanted Apple's "help" over the San Bernardino shooter. Apple said no, but could have done it- it was a policy choice of theirs to fight the FBI. Google has created a situation with the Pixel2 where they can't do that sort of thing even if they wanted to. And justified it without ever referencing "Search Warrants" or "Nation-state threat actors" even though that is the obvious driving force here.
- deleted 8y ago
  [deleted]
- saurik 8y ago
  > ...or at least couldn't as of 2016... The iPhone 5c came out in 2013 (and was a budget device based on the hardware design from 2012; the iPhone 5s--which I believe, though would happily be proved wrong, had already fixed this issue--actually came out at the same time as the iPhone 5c). I have no love for Apple (clearly), and I think they (and, sadly, the EFF) were being disincenuous at the time about the definition of "back door", but you are just spreading misinformation here: "as of 2016" would imply the iPhone 7 was vulnerable, which is a much newer device than the one from the infamous San Bernadino scenario :/.
  - kobayashi 8y ago
    >I have no love for Apple (clearly) For those who are unaware, Saurik created Cydia, the package manager for jailbroken iOS devices, as well as a whole bunch of jailbroken iOS-related software.
  - asfasgasg 8y ago
    So is the contention that Apple is already insider attack-resistant? Or is the contention merely that they might be?
- jakobegger 8y ago
  The phone in San Bernardino case did not yet have the secure enclave.
bitmapbrother 8y ago
This is not simply about the presence of a "secure enclave" or security module as Google calls it. It's about preventing the firmware on the security module from being compromised without knowing the users password. To mitigate these risks, Google Pixel 2 devices implement insider attack resistance in the tamper-resistant hardware security module that guards the encryption keys for user data. This helps prevent an attacker who manages to produce properly signed malicious firmware from installing it on the security module in a lost or stolen device without the user's cooperation. Specifically, it is not possible to upgrade the firmware that checks the user's password unless you present the correct user password. There is a way to "force" an upgrade, for example when a returned device is refurbished for resale, but forcing it wipes the secrets used to decrypt the user's data, effectively destroying it.
- jakobegger 8y ago
  Yes, I know. I thought that the secure enclave requires the user passcode to authorize an update, but after re-reading the iOS security whitepaper, I am no longer sure that this is actually correct. (it’s not mentioned anywhere) So while you do have to provide your passcode to update an iOS device, it could be that this requirement is only enforced at a higher level (ie. not by the secure enclave itself).
wffurr 8y ago
> biggest competitor You mean Samsung?

> We recommend that all mobile device makers do the same. Kind of insencere when the biggest competitor has been doing this since 2013 (the feature is marketed as “secure enclave” by Apple)

praptak 8y ago

Does Apple market their solution as resistant to someone having all Apple's keys but not the user password?

ucaetano 8y ago
Based on the San Bernardino case, no. It wasn't a matter of feasibility, Apple could have done it but refused to.

mandevil 8y ago

The Apple Secure Enclave cannot defend against someone who has the signing keys to the password software (or at least couldn't as of 2016)- that's why the FBI wanted Apple's "help" over the San Bernardino shooter. Apple said no, but could have done it- it was a policy choice of theirs to fight the FBI. Google has created a situation with the Pixel2 where they can't do that sort of thing even if they wanted to. And justified it without ever referencing "Search Warrants" or "Nation-state threat actors" even though that is the obvious driving force here.

deleted 8y ago
[deleted]
saurik 8y ago
> ...or at least couldn't as of 2016... The iPhone 5c came out in 2013 (and was a budget device based on the hardware design from 2012; the iPhone 5s--which I believe, though would happily be proved wrong, had already fixed this issue--actually came out at the same time as the iPhone 5c). I have no love for Apple (clearly), and I think they (and, sadly, the EFF) were being disincenuous at the time about the definition of "back door", but you are just spreading misinformation here: "as of 2016" would imply the iPhone 7 was vulnerable, which is a much newer device than the one from the infamous San Bernadino scenario :/.
- kobayashi 8y ago
  >I have no love for Apple (clearly) For those who are unaware, Saurik created Cydia, the package manager for jailbroken iOS devices, as well as a whole bunch of jailbroken iOS-related software.
- asfasgasg 8y ago
  So is the contention that Apple is already insider attack-resistant? Or is the contention merely that they might be?
jakobegger 8y ago
The phone in San Bernardino case did not yet have the secure enclave.

bitmapbrother 8y ago

This is not simply about the presence of a "secure enclave" or security module as Google calls it. It's about preventing the firmware on the security module from being compromised without knowing the users password. To mitigate these risks, Google Pixel 2 devices implement insider attack resistance in the tamper-resistant hardware security module that guards the encryption keys for user data. This helps prevent an attacker who manages to produce properly signed malicious firmware from installing it on the security module in a lost or stolen device without the user's cooperation. Specifically, it is not possible to upgrade the firmware that checks the user's password unless you present the correct user password. There is a way to "force" an upgrade, for example when a returned device is refurbished for resale, but forcing it wipes the secrets used to decrypt the user's data, effectively destroying it.

jakobegger 8y ago
Yes, I know. I thought that the secure enclave requires the user passcode to authorize an update, but after re-reading the iOS security whitepaper, I am no longer sure that this is actually correct. (it’s not mentioned anywhere) So while you do have to provide your passcode to update an iOS device, it could be that this requirement is only enforced at a higher level (ie. not by the secure enclave itself).

wffurr 8y ago

> biggest competitor You mean Samsung?