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AFAIK, all the CPU microcode updates were for fixing Meltdown, not Spectre. Unless and until CPU manufacturers find a way to fix speculative execution for good,
by kibwen 8y ago
AFAIK, all the CPU microcode updates were for fixing Meltdown, not Spectre. Unless and until CPU manufacturers find a way to fix speculative execution for good, software-based mitigations would seem to be mandatory.
- sp332 8y agoAMD also pushed firmware updates, and they weren't affected by Meltdown.
- kibwen 8y agoDo you have a link to the firmware update announcement? Are there patch notes?
- sp332 8y agoThis is the latest I've heard about it: https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2018/04/latest-windows-updates-bring-spectre-protection-to-amd-systems/ https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2018/04/latest-windows-updat... I think the firmware generally comes from vendors, which for personal PCs means motherboard manufacturers. I did find this linked from an older Verge article: https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/security-updates https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/security-updates
- kibwen 8y agoThanks for the links. But the Ars link seems to confirm that all these mitigations need to be done in software, and that the firmware updates merely give the OS the hooks necessary to implement their own mitigations (implying that application software didn't get or need any help from the CPU in applying mitigations). And if all this is being done in software anyway, then it would seem to suggest that should at least partially suffice for a scheme like the OP's (someone who knows more about what these hooks actually do should say more). I'm not sure whether that means it's as secure in practice as conventional OSes--naively we should expect that it's not until proven otherwise--but it also appears to be a far cry from the above claim that "software isolated processes are now basically impossible to do", which, even if true, seems true as well for the software we already have.
- ori_b 8y agoThe problem is that "fixing speculative execution" means "stopping to make things faster in any measurable way". Given that the caches are there to make things 2 orders of magnitude faster, this is rather crippling. The hardware based protections are the only boundary where you can "fix" speculative execution without slowing down your system by 100x. The hardware boundaries effectively act as hints that say to the hardware "slowing down things by 100x here won't kill performance too badly -- we should turn off speculation for safety". Without those hints, everything needs to get that much slower.
- andreiw 8y agoConsidering the hardware mitigations aren’t some magic bullet, but are a “big hammer” that cripples CPU OoO behavior in crrtain ways for everything, software mitigations don’t seem that unreasonable. Of course, “software mitigations” use CPU facilities as well, and can allow for making critical sections safe. In practice, it is well understood what code needs to be written in a spectre-safe way. The difficult question isnhow to write code to anticipate the next 10 varieties of speculation attacks...
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- modeless 8y agoI do not believe that it's impossible to fix Spectre in hardware without disabling speculation. How about we fix the state changes that Spectre detects. For example, we could have a buffer that stores evicted cache lines during speculation and restores them if a rollback is necessary. Yeah, it wouldn't be free, but it would be faster than disabling all speculation.
- ori_b 8y ago> For example, we could have a buffer that stores evicted cache lines during speculation and restores them if a rollback is necessary The problem is that with pure software isolation, as being discussed here, every access is observable within the "same program", so every speedup would need to be rolled back. With hardware boundaries, you know which speculations to roll back (or just avoid doing), so you can put a fix in silicon.
- muricula 8y agoUnfortunately, this is not correct. Intel and AMD exposed MSRs for the Indirect Branch Prediction Buffer (variant 2), Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (variant 2), and Memory Disambiguation Disable (variant 4). Variant 1 is unfixed. Variant 3 is meltdown.