2 ms·
> when we didn't have program formats that could be statically transformed and verified to do exactly what the operator desires. Which we still don't. Rowhamme
by kllrnohj 8y ago
> when we didn't have program formats that could be statically transformed and verified to do exactly what the operator desires.
Which we still don't. Rowhammer, spectre/meltdown, etc... proved that even if the code doesn't violate any sandbox constraints that doesn't mean it didn't violate everything the sandbox was attempting to protect.
Hardware isolation is still very important and very necessary, now more than ever.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- _wmd 8y agoJFC. The reason the bugs you refer to are so important is because they /spanned/ hardware protection domains.
- kllrnohj 8y agoYes, which means they also spanned software protection domains. Meaning your software protection didn't work, regardless of how "verifiable" the bytecode is. And a few of those so far have no known software protection domain fix, relying instead of hardware domains (eg spectre, which is why Chrome pushing site isolation hard - because they can't fix the software protection and are relying on hardware ones instead)