3 ms·
"would take about 20 seconds, thanks to Let's Encrypt" Let's Encrypt does not offer certificates for IP addresses. They choose only to offer DV certificates us
by tialaramex 8y ago
"would take about 20 seconds, thanks to Let's Encrypt"
Let's Encrypt does not offer certificates for IP addresses. They choose only to offer DV certificates using methods 3.2.2.4.6 and 3.2.2.4.7
How much of your hypothetical half hour will you spend trying to figure out why your chosen ACME client reports "Policy forbids issuance" when asked for an IP address?
As to who is staring at CT logs, well there's the fun thing about the design of CT, the _logs_ aren't where you would be staring, you would be looking at a _monitor_ and a monitor can be configured to do whatever it so happens you think is important. We know that commercial CAs already sell monitoring as part of "Enterprise security" type offerings.
Facebook took... I want to say minutes here, but I can't find an exact timeline, to spot that a certificate had been issued by Let's Encrypt for a name in their DNS hierarchy and begin investigating what went wrong.
Certificate Transparency isn't finished. As it stands today your authoritarian government "only" needs to ensure that nobody notices these shenanigans as unavoidably they create a "smoking gun" which would lead to their pet CA being distrusted. That's a tall order, but certainly not impossible in the short term, or for attacks in which the bogus certs are shown to a small number of individual targets rather than a broad population that will invariably notice by accident.
But longer term CT is intended for use with a gossip protocol so that it's impossible for the pretence to be kept up. Sooner or later a node somewhere will end up realising that there's an inconsistency, either it has seen SCTs that weren't logged, or it has seen logs that aren't consistent with the logs other nodes see, either of which is a matter for distrust.
BGP has no relationship to the Web PKI, which is what I presume you're referring to by "the CA system". The relatively small number of parties interested in BGP have developed their own PKI to fit their needs.
- peterwwillis 8y agoBGP allows anyone to issue fake certs, so it does have a relationship to web PKI. And sure, if you have a couple billion dollars, you can set up fancy infrastructure and response teams to monitor the whole web (that you are aware of, that participate in CT) for a strangely-issued cert. Or you could just get a cert issued by the CA you normally use. In which case, now we have to track some kind of "customer number" per CA. If you use more than one CA (Google does) now you're tracking different customer numbers on different CAs. And all that has to be standardized. Most of these "fixes" for web PKI's glaring holes are intended for large multinational corporations, or are optional, or specific to a particular browser, and don't address the main concern: _do not trust an IP address to be who it claims to be_.
- tialaramex 8y agoNo, you wouldn't use a "customer number". The usual approach taken for these genuinely concerned outfits goes like this: 1. Agree contractual terms with particular Certificate Authorities in which all certs for names in your hierarchy need explicit approval from your security people. 2. Set DNSSEC-secured CAA records for your names forbidding issuance by other Certificate Authorities. This funnels requests from hypothetical bad guys into your security people, which is exactly what they don't want. It loses you the shiny capability to do "spur of the moment" issuance, but presumably if you want these sort of terms the phrase "spur of the moment" causes you to start writhing and clutching your throat anyway. Insider threats will usually be much _worse_ than outsiders. As to things being "specific to a particular browser" we can't and don't want to be able to force, say, Microsoft and Apple to do things just because everybody else decided they're a good idea. The same with the trust store programmes. I can't make Microsoft take this seriously, but Microsoft can't make me use their SChannel and associated trust store. Maybe you have a lot more pull with Microsoft than I do. If we're in a world where the "easiest" way to get a bogus certificate is now to do global BGP hijack of an entire /24 then I think we're on the right track.