5 ms·
>Usually If only... BCP 38[0] is nowhere near usual. Lots of networks, including some very problematic big ones (cough Hurricane Electric cough), do not imple
by dice 8y ago
>Usually
If only...
BCP 38[0] is nowhere near usual. Lots of networks, including some very problematic big ones (cough Hurricane Electric cough), do not implement it as a matter of course. The AWS Route53 hijack last month which resulted in downtime for a number of sites plus a six figure coin theft[1] could have been prevented by adequate filtering.
0: https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp38 https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp38
1: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/04/suspicious-event-hijacks-amazon-traffic-for-2-hours-steals-cryptocurrency/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/04/suspi...
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- namibj 8y agoCould one argue for tort/negligence against the ISP who should have filtered, but didn't, if one's coins were stolen through that? Or even possibly the same, but in criminal court?
- stingraycharles 8y agoJust as with the discussion about hackable routers yesterday, there are no laws for this.
- mmt 8y agoI doubt it, since the argument you're suggesting is that the ISP didn't take the best possible care, whereas the standard for negligence is, I believe (IANAL), reasonable care. They may also not even have a duty of care in the first place, as to the truth of any metadata they're passing on. As a sibling comment pointed out, it's not as if there are laws for this.
- zzz157 8y ago> IANAL I'm not here to judge. What you choose to do in your own time is none of our business :)
- knorker 8y agoUhm, BCP38 is about forwarding, not the BGP control plane