Once a take-down resistant network is assembled, it can be filled with any sort of content. Given that the content may be arbitrary, looking at the content alo

Once a take-down resistant network is assembled, it can be filled with any sort of content. Given that the content may be arbitrary, looking at the content alone is not enough. Analysis of at-risk "swing voting" audiences would be the qualifier for an offending orchestrated botnet. The intent of these botnets for the past victory was to "milgram" people into voting Trump (influence opinion, by surrounding and immersing of easily swindled individuals in currated content, many sources creating a magnitude perception for illusory peer pressure) [0] so, the content is nothing if it isn't seen. Whatever the case, this is last year's tactic. It's possible that it may never be used again, in anticipation of adaptaion to defend against it. That's if you buy into the hypothesis that this is why people voted the way they did in the 2016 election, and that external technical influence was truly responsible, and even capable of such a manner of attack. To be honest, it also sounds like a kissing cousing to the hand-wavey premise of flashing inserts of suggestive hypnotic single-frame advertisments (BUY MORE POPCORN fnord) in movie theaters to provoke subliminal brainwashing so that people buy more popcorn at movie theaters. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milgram_experiment https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milgram_experiment