Vevo was a partially thought-out venture, executed well but not well enough. It was always hampered by the studios' stubborn direction: licensing limitations th

Vevo was a partially thought-out venture, executed well but not well enough. It was always hampered by the studios' stubborn direction: licensing limitations that kept it out of lots of markets, not enough cross-promotion through sponsorships, retail channels, or advertising, and intentional lack of scope to avoid cannibalizing music sales. And they were hamstrung by the legacy of their initial decision to syndicate to YouTube: most people probably discovered the name 'Vevo' through seeing their watermark on music videos posted to YouTube, but subsequently had little reason to explore what Vevo is or does. Not that they missed anything: Vevo didn't do anything that YouTube didn't already do. They wanted the cake both ways: leverage YouTube's audience and discovery, while running a not-at-all-captive, ad-supported competitor just for the sake of perceived control and leverage. That's cute. If it wasn't such a half-assed venture, Vevo could've become the single most valuable subscription music streaming destination: a captive Spotify for daily use, with music videos on demand. But studios couldn't commit to the serious business decision of withdrawing their licensed content from other platforms that have already built an audience. Instead, now they've abandoned their ambition to have their own digital distribution solution, and have decided that focusing on licensing and revenue sharing is their preferred outcome. It's interesting to compare this to TV, where the major incumbents are still interested in gating their content to their respective captive distribution portals.