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Well, since we are motivated by self preservation it might make sense to talk about blameworthiness when we figure out whether to lock you up or the person who

Well, since we are motivated by self preservation it might make sense to talk about blameworthiness when we figure out whether to lock you up or the person who threw you, or to cut out the brain tumor that caused you to suddenly become aggressive. Invoking free will still does not make any sense though, because you cannot choose your past, and I don't think you can argue that the past doesn't have any causal influence over you.

Symmetry 8y ago
The notion that something is only free will if it uncaused is not at all the compatibalist position. The general compatibilist position is that an action is done with free will of a person if the causal chain it is part of runs through that person's intent for the action to occur, or conventionally that person's 'will'. If you choose to define an action as representing free will only if it is uncaused then first, you've made up a definition entirely at odds with the normal English usages and, second, your definition is useless because it only cuts actions into those actions that exist and those that don't and we already have a perfectly good word for that so the new one is redundant.
- MikkoFinell 8y ago
  Okay I accept your compatibilist definition that actions are done with free will despite being part of a causal chain. Congratulations, you won the language game, and can proceed to claim we agreed free will is real. You now have as much free will as a rock rolling down a hill. > If you choose to define an action as representing free will only if it is uncaused then first, you've made up a definition entirely at odds with the normal English usages I was trying to be precise, and assumed you agree that something that's part of a causal chain cannot be reasonably be called "free" by any common sense definition. You can't change the past after all, can you? If not then you're a product of circumstance just like everything else in the universe.
  - Symmetry 8y ago
    I think that if I'm walking down the road on a hot day and get thirsty and then I decide to buy a soda then my purchase is of my free will despite being cause by the heat, cause by society teaching me about buying things, etc. And I insist that if you told a non-philospher I bought it of my own free will they would agree. So I think you're entirely wrong to say that something that is part of a causal chain cannot be called free. Now, if you told a normal person that someone in that circumstance couldn't have done anything except buy the soda they would agree that would mean I didn't have free will but they wouldn't see why. To them the "My decisionness" and "Could have been differentness" are the same thing. But philosophically we have to choose one or the other and it's both more useful, in terms of carving reality at the joints, and in greater accordance with common usage to pick "My decisionness" as what we interpret "free will" to mean. I'm sorry I'm not directly addressing your point about changing the past, but that's because I'm still rather confused by how it relates to free will. Certainly I'd say that nobody can change the past.
    - MikkoFinell 8y ago
      > So I think you're entirely wrong to say that something that is part of a causal chain cannot be called free. Yes you can call it free since you have defined free to mean acting according to your motivations, just like I predicted in my original comment. But since your behavior is caused by your motivations, and your motivations have it's own causes, and so on, I really don't see what you actually win (except the language game) by describing the process as free. It's about as free as the last cogwheel in a machine. > I'm sorry I'm not directly addressing your point about changing the past, but that's because I'm still rather confused by how it relates to free will. Suppose your will is a function of your brain, and suppose that your brain is a function of gene expression and environmental stimuli. Suppose you are unable to choose your genes, and suppose that you are unable to alter the history of environmental stimuli. It follows that the causes of your will are outside your control. If you don't control your will, then your will is not free.

Symmetry 8y ago

The notion that something is only free will if it uncaused is not at all the compatibalist position. The general compatibilist position is that an action is done with free will of a person if the causal chain it is part of runs through that person's intent for the action to occur, or conventionally that person's 'will'. If you choose to define an action as representing free will only if it is uncaused then first, you've made up a definition entirely at odds with the normal English usages and, second, your definition is useless because it only cuts actions into those actions that exist and those that don't and we already have a perfectly good word for that so the new one is redundant.

MikkoFinell 8y ago
Okay I accept your compatibilist definition that actions are done with free will despite being part of a causal chain. Congratulations, you won the language game, and can proceed to claim we agreed free will is real. You now have as much free will as a rock rolling down a hill. > If you choose to define an action as representing free will only if it is uncaused then first, you've made up a definition entirely at odds with the normal English usages I was trying to be precise, and assumed you agree that something that's part of a causal chain cannot be reasonably be called "free" by any common sense definition. You can't change the past after all, can you? If not then you're a product of circumstance just like everything else in the universe.
- Symmetry 8y ago
  I think that if I'm walking down the road on a hot day and get thirsty and then I decide to buy a soda then my purchase is of my free will despite being cause by the heat, cause by society teaching me about buying things, etc. And I insist that if you told a non-philospher I bought it of my own free will they would agree. So I think you're entirely wrong to say that something that is part of a causal chain cannot be called free. Now, if you told a normal person that someone in that circumstance couldn't have done anything except buy the soda they would agree that would mean I didn't have free will but they wouldn't see why. To them the "My decisionness" and "Could have been differentness" are the same thing. But philosophically we have to choose one or the other and it's both more useful, in terms of carving reality at the joints, and in greater accordance with common usage to pick "My decisionness" as what we interpret "free will" to mean. I'm sorry I'm not directly addressing your point about changing the past, but that's because I'm still rather confused by how it relates to free will. Certainly I'd say that nobody can change the past.
  - MikkoFinell 8y ago
    > So I think you're entirely wrong to say that something that is part of a causal chain cannot be called free. Yes you can call it free since you have defined free to mean acting according to your motivations, just like I predicted in my original comment. But since your behavior is caused by your motivations, and your motivations have it's own causes, and so on, I really don't see what you actually win (except the language game) by describing the process as free. It's about as free as the last cogwheel in a machine. > I'm sorry I'm not directly addressing your point about changing the past, but that's because I'm still rather confused by how it relates to free will. Suppose your will is a function of your brain, and suppose that your brain is a function of gene expression and environmental stimuli. Suppose you are unable to choose your genes, and suppose that you are unable to alter the history of environmental stimuli. It follows that the causes of your will are outside your control. If you don't control your will, then your will is not free.