8 ms·

Tor: 1100 relays still run end-of-life tor versions

90 points by bcaa7f3a8bbc 8y ago

qop 8y ago
Are they encouraged in their languages? How many of those relays are run by ESL operators? Maybe internationalization could improve the adoption speed or update speed or whatever you call that metric. Do these operators actually even know they are EOL'd?
- bcaa7f3a8bbc 8y ago
  Not at all. They don't. Once the relays are up, many people simply forgot their existence at all, except they pay the bill. Just like many people's email server... And it's hard to contract many of them due to its decentralized nature, and most people don't actively follow [tor-relays] mailing list.
f2n 8y ago
Thanks for posting, turns out one of these was mine. I forgot that it existed. 1213 days of uptime, still running Debian Wheezy (don't worry, i'm bringing it up to date now)
- OrangeTux 8y ago
  Is it hard to create a Tor node? And is it juridically safe to be an owner of a Tor node?
  - exikyut 8y ago
    It's very easy, but yes, you cannot control what data exits it. I'm just as curious as you what the GP's internet setup looks like.
    - strken 8y ago
      The GP didn't necessarily say he was running an exit relay, only that he was running a relay of some kind. As far as I know it's a lot less perilous to run a middle relay.
  - moviuro 8y ago
    A TOR relay is pretty safe. You're just a middle-man and have no clue about what's going on. Your IP is still going into every single blacklist of corporate gateways though (because F5, etc. don't care): so don't host multiple services on that IP/server. An exit node is the most dangerous position to be in, because that's were all the bad stuff can be seen.
  - fossuser 8y ago
    I wrote this how to a few years ago: https://tor.stackexchange.com/questions/6567/how-do-i-manually-setup-a-relay-on-os-x https://tor.stackexchange.com/questions/6567/how-do-i-manual... Hopefully it's easier now than it was then. As others said relay nodes are safe and low risk to run. I wouldn't run an exit node without looking into the legal risk and having a plan.
  - maeln 8y ago
    It is pretty easy to setup if you know the basic of administrating a GNU/Linux or BSD machine. It is better if you also know a bit about security on those system too (at least how to configure the firewall). When it come to the legal part, it depends. Being a exit-node can be very tricky. In some country, you will have to register has a telecommunication provider in order not to be considered liable for whatever comes out of your relay. Being a guard-node (the "entry" node for tor client) is usually safe but can still create some trouble. For example, the virus WannaCry was using Tor to connect to its C&C servers. Due to this, some Tor guard node got seized by the French police because they saw WannaCry connect to the IP of those guard node and I guessed, decided that it was necessary to seize them for their investigations ... But you can configure your node to never be chosen has a guard node and to be just a relay and not a exit node. The node will be the middle man between a guard and a exit node and that should be completely safe, unless you live in a country where technology to circumvent censorship are prohibited.
  - swirepe 8y ago
    snap install tor-middle-relay https://snapcraft.io/tor-middle-relay https://snapcraft.io/tor-middle-relay
- akerro 8y ago
  Tor project should have an official Docker image, we could just use it with watchtower, it would autoupdate itself. https://github.com/v2tec/watchtower https://github.com/v2tec/watchtower
  - Operyl 8y ago
    Does docker have container signing yet? If not, this sounds like it could be a disaster waiting to happen (just compromise dockerhuv credentials!)
    - sphix0r 8y ago
      There is, but it seems to be disabled by default. https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/trust/content_trust/ https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/trust/content_trust/
  - mschuster91 8y ago
    This, actually, should be part of Docker itself. Thank you!
- bcaa7f3a8bbc 8y ago
  Thanks for running a Tor relay, even better, Tor relays! Please consider to check the right sidebar for new versions on https://blog.torproject.org/ https://blog.torproject.org/, add Debian repos from Tor Project instead of using default repo, and read [tor-relays]* mailing list routinely. It's a fun read comparable to Hacker News, well, sometimes. * https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-re...
  - f2n 8y ago
    I had the Tor Project's repos added, but I guess no auto updates.
- maeln 8y ago
  The same happened to me. I was pretty sure that the VPS that was running the node was shutdown but it turn out it was still running.
- penagwin 8y ago
  Where does one host this without getting SWATTED?
operandroid 8y ago
Given the project's goals, TOR cannot operate release versioning, interoperability, and backward compatibility like a "normal" open source project. Old versions need to be something akin to a burnable one-time-pad, that gets burnt when deemed more vulnerable than it's up-versioned, more secure replacement. In many ways, this kind of sucks as an idea, but in pragmatic terms, I just really wouldn't want idiots relaying traffic I'd feel paranoid about, in ways that'd cause me to lose sleep at night. That said, I don't even think the routing protocol has honest merit. The idea that you should place an all-consuming degree of trust in the honor system surrounding exit node operators having total access to plain-text traffic is beyond-the-pale in its stupidity. No one can field a satisfactory answer for me, regarding why it's okay that exit node operators have access to plain-text traffic. Oh, because traffic analysis is hard, and most exit node operators are amateur hobbyists. or maybe That's just the way it works. You can't make TOR work any other way. That's basically what I hear. It's the HAM radio excuse put another way. HAM radio has utility, bause we think it's neat. You don't need to worry, because it's free for everyone to use. Okay, but that's not what TOR is trying to accomplish.
- gcb0 8y ago
  I agree that exit nodes are inherently bad and avoid it. but it is a good solution that is indeed akin to the utility HAM operators provide. I fail to see why it's not.
- yjftsjthsd-h 8y ago
  Well... That is how it works. Either traffic stays on tor (hidden service) or it leaves and the exit node can see it. This is a good reason to use HTTPS. How would you like it to work?
  - operandroid 8y ago
    So, TOR works in this way, but some other hypothetical ideal system would never work this way. An ideal system would operate in such a way that reading an ordinary public resource requires no single peer. If I want to simply read a wikipedia page, no single individual should be capable of knowing that I requested that page, and be tasked with the entire responsibility of proxying my request. No single peer should even know that a wikipedia page is what I asked for, who I asked for content from, or where I've been and what I've been doing. Right now HTTPS offers content privacy, but no meta data privacy. TOR offers a degree of meta data privacy, but no guarantee of content privacy. Even with the two combined, the TOR exit node can still understand that someone logged into Gmail, and someone probably tried to send a message with an overall length of ~2MB. With a strategic vantage point, enough facts could become evident, that TOR would fail to offer enough protection, and still out someone trying to accomplish a secret task with TOR. It should be possible to provide both content privacy and meta data privacy, so that my solid gold widget factory plans are mailed safely to my vacation home, and no one knows that I mailed them to myself, that I mailed anything at all, or what I mailed if that's what I was doing. I don't care about how "it" works, if TOR can only suck one way, and can't not suck some other way. I want something that doesn't suck. I already said I don't want TOR. TOR doesn't need to be something else. It just needs to stop telling people it's something better than it actually is.
forapurpose 8y ago
> We encourage everyone to configure their relays to do updates automatically I understand the general security benefits of automatic updates, but on something with as big a target on its back as Tor, isn't it asking for trouble? An attacker could poison an update and make vulnerable the entire network for as long as it takes for the Tor Project to discover the problem and patch it. How does the security professional balance such issues? I can imagine mitigating the risk with rolling updates, but the 0-days aren't patched immediately.
- fyfy18 8y ago
  How about if the node just shutdown after X period of no updates? It would be inconvenient for the admin and users specifically using that node, but would be a win for overall network security. It could still expose a vulnerability meaning someone could kill the whole network, but that’s better than compromising it.
  - cyphar 8y ago
    Tor routes more packets through "trusted" nodes that have a history of being fast, and so on. I wonder whether an automated kill switch would affect those statistics (resulting in possibly lower overall network bandwidth because the trust level of most nodes would be worse).
    - Xophmeister 8y ago
      If trust is quantified by node, then surely it could just be reduced as a function of outdatedness.
  - LinuxBender 8y ago
    This is a great idea. I would make it configurable, with a vaguely worded configuration directive like: DisableAutoDisable I_Know_What_I_Am_Doing Then add logic that prefers up to date nodes over out of date nodes, if that does not already exist.
maerF0x0 8y ago
If they're not updating their main software, what makes us think they're patching the host? It makes me wonder what percent of those 1100 are compromised. For example the 1213 days of presumably no updates by f2n (mentioned in another comment: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17150526 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17150526 )
- cesarb 8y ago
  The attack surface matters. If the only exposed services are tor and sshd with public key authentication, one would need a vulnerability in either to compromise the host. How long ago was the last RCE on pre-authentication sshd? (Of course, the lack of patches means that, once someone gets a RCE on either of these daemons, it's probably game over for the host.)
coolspot 8y ago
Maybe feds don’t want to upgrade their vast cloud of Tor nodes just yet [1][2] 1 - https://blog.torproject.org/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack https://blog.torproject.org/tor-security-advisory-relay-earl... 2 - https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/active-attack-on-tor-network-tried-to-decloak-users-for-five-months/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/activ...
- John_KZ 8y ago
  Is there anyone that still believes TOR will protect him from state actors? It's nice that people still run exit nodes, but it's so expensive and dangerous that you cannot expect a satisfactory number of nodes to be run for moral reasons and not for monetary/surveillance ones. Also since most of the nodes are run on VM instances, a few companies could potentially recover all the routing and keys from the servers RAM if they feel like it. They're not going to do it for the average joe, but things like the Patriot act and it's European equivalents make sure intelligence agencies can do it if they want.
  - Santosh83 8y ago
    I'm just throwing an idea out here. It is often stated that running Tor exit nodes is both costly and dangerous. For understandable reasons. Yet the network needs more such nodes, to defeat the scenario of one powerful entity operating hundreds of exit nodes. It would be nice if even ordinary Tor users can run transient exit nodes. Now as it stands, nobody will do it. So why not change the functionality of Tor such that it becomes possible for a user to operate an exit node for a whitelisted list of sites (either based on IP or domain names) that they are willing to funnel traffic for? It's still better than giving up and letting a majority of exit nodes be controlled by state actors and other powerful entities right? Serving traffic only for a set of white-listed endpoints can considerably reduce the risk of running afoul of local law enforcement. I realise this effectively cripples Tor, but normal "uncensored" exit nodes can still operate, by those willing to run them.
    - zingmars 8y ago
bcaa7f3a8bbc 8y ago
I'm the submitter. I see there is much misunderstanding and misinformation of Tor relays, even on Hacker News. I'm not a Tor dev, but I've been running a node for years, so I'd guess I somewhat have an authoritative opinion on this issue. The issue is simple and no conspiracy theory required. 1. This report mainly deals with Tor relays. A Tor relay is not a Tor Exit (well, you can argue Exit is a special type of relay). Tor relays can be run on all servers, optimally, with fixed IP address, bandwidth >10Mbps (do set appropriate bandwidth limit in /etc/torrc, or it burns all your bandwidth), anyone can help the network by running one. Tor relays only generate encrypted traffic to other Tor relays, and risk of running one relay is even lower than, let's say, a BitTorrent client. All you need is 5 lines of /etc/torrc, but better to tune the networking stack first. 2. Tor Project does not run any Tor nodes(x), most operators are enthusiasts, others are NGOs and privacy service providers doing a charity. If you read the [tor-relays] mailing list, you can see the people are just like those who run their personal email servers. Enthusiasts consist the people who are both networking hobbyist (understand networking, BGP, also familiar with network/server providers(x) around the world, for getting the maximum bandwidth, OVH, anyone?), and privacy enthusiasts (who know what is public key cryptography, uses GnuPG, follow security news, etc). There are lots of networking hobbyist (okay, not too many), and privacy enthusiasts. But only those people who have BOTH the hobbies, would eventually find their way to the [tor-relays] community, a small number. 2a. You see, the major obstacle of the growth is lack of publicity, and misunderstanding of Tor relays/exits. In 2014, EFF started a "Tor Challenge", and resulted a surge of 1,700 new nodes. Most of the nodes are STILL ONLINE (and probably being forgotten and hence outdated...). The speed of the Tor network has increased significantly due to the growth of interest since 2013, but more relays are always needed, currently there are less than 7000 nodes. Do you want to run? Start from https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorRelayGuide https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorRelayGuide 3. Tor almost uses a rolling release model. The development pace is fast (but developers are not too many, need more), you can see Alpha versions being released almost every week. And they are more like a "mainline" version rather than a "alpha" version, and most of the time these "alpha" is already stable enough for casual uses. After the next alpha series is released, the current alpha is promoted to the "stable" series. This release model has some problems with traditional Linux/UNIX distros. For example, the Tor version in Debian (not Tor's) and OpenBSD's official repository is ALWAYS outdated by an entire series, since it has been freezed since distro's release date. Recently Tor just made another release, renders lots of current server being completely outdated. 4. Running a Tor Exit generally requires more cares of the servers, routinely respond to abuse mails, diagnose server problems and optimize performance. I haven't check, but I guess only a small percentage of these outdated versions are Exit. 4a. Running a relay is easy, most relay operators set up their servers in a fire-and-forgot basis, the servers are barely being touched anymore, once it has been configured and running correctly. Once the relays are up, many people simply forgot their existence at all, except they pay the bill. Just like many people's email server... And it's hard to contract many of them due to its decentralized nature, and most people don't actively follow [tor-relays] mailing list. Many careless operators also don't actively check their contract emails. Few of them even don't bother to leave contract information, or name their nodes (default: i_didnt_edit_config)... 5. Because Tor releases often, occasionally some people don't want to deploy updates until the next major maintenance reboot, because they don't want to lose the high uptime and large traffic they've waited to get for months (for new nodes, Tor traffic reaches to the maximum only after 3 weeks of continuous operation)... TLDR, I guess automatic update is the solution, since the update is already signed. Also, we may need to make running Tor relay a more interactive process. (x) Even authoritative servers are contributed to well-known members of the developer community, in a individual basis. (x) But don't use OVH for your new Tor relays, it's already the largest network of Tor nodes thanks to the cheap bandwidth.

90 points by bcaa7f3a8bbc 8y ago

qop 8y ago

Are they encouraged in their languages? How many of those relays are run by ESL operators? Maybe internationalization could improve the adoption speed or update speed or whatever you call that metric. Do these operators actually even know they are EOL'd?

bcaa7f3a8bbc 8y ago
Not at all. They don't. Once the relays are up, many people simply forgot their existence at all, except they pay the bill. Just like many people's email server... And it's hard to contract many of them due to its decentralized nature, and most people don't actively follow [tor-relays] mailing list.

f2n 8y ago

Thanks for posting, turns out one of these was mine. I forgot that it existed. 1213 days of uptime, still running Debian Wheezy (don't worry, i'm bringing it up to date now)

OrangeTux 8y ago
Is it hard to create a Tor node? And is it juridically safe to be an owner of a Tor node?
- exikyut 8y ago
  It's very easy, but yes, you cannot control what data exits it. I'm just as curious as you what the GP's internet setup looks like.
  - strken 8y ago
    The GP didn't necessarily say he was running an exit relay, only that he was running a relay of some kind. As far as I know it's a lot less perilous to run a middle relay.
- moviuro 8y ago
  A TOR relay is pretty safe. You're just a middle-man and have no clue about what's going on. Your IP is still going into every single blacklist of corporate gateways though (because F5, etc. don't care): so don't host multiple services on that IP/server. An exit node is the most dangerous position to be in, because that's were all the bad stuff can be seen.
- fossuser 8y ago
  I wrote this how to a few years ago: https://tor.stackexchange.com/questions/6567/how-do-i-manually-setup-a-relay-on-os-x https://tor.stackexchange.com/questions/6567/how-do-i-manual... Hopefully it's easier now than it was then. As others said relay nodes are safe and low risk to run. I wouldn't run an exit node without looking into the legal risk and having a plan.
- maeln 8y ago
  It is pretty easy to setup if you know the basic of administrating a GNU/Linux or BSD machine. It is better if you also know a bit about security on those system too (at least how to configure the firewall). When it come to the legal part, it depends. Being a exit-node can be very tricky. In some country, you will have to register has a telecommunication provider in order not to be considered liable for whatever comes out of your relay. Being a guard-node (the "entry" node for tor client) is usually safe but can still create some trouble. For example, the virus WannaCry was using Tor to connect to its C&C servers. Due to this, some Tor guard node got seized by the French police because they saw WannaCry connect to the IP of those guard node and I guessed, decided that it was necessary to seize them for their investigations ... But you can configure your node to never be chosen has a guard node and to be just a relay and not a exit node. The node will be the middle man between a guard and a exit node and that should be completely safe, unless you live in a country where technology to circumvent censorship are prohibited.
- swirepe 8y ago
  snap install tor-middle-relay https://snapcraft.io/tor-middle-relay https://snapcraft.io/tor-middle-relay
akerro 8y ago
Tor project should have an official Docker image, we could just use it with watchtower, it would autoupdate itself. https://github.com/v2tec/watchtower https://github.com/v2tec/watchtower
- Operyl 8y ago
  Does docker have container signing yet? If not, this sounds like it could be a disaster waiting to happen (just compromise dockerhuv credentials!)
  - sphix0r 8y ago
    There is, but it seems to be disabled by default. https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/trust/content_trust/ https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/trust/content_trust/
- mschuster91 8y ago
  This, actually, should be part of Docker itself. Thank you!
bcaa7f3a8bbc 8y ago
Thanks for running a Tor relay, even better, Tor relays! Please consider to check the right sidebar for new versions on https://blog.torproject.org/ https://blog.torproject.org/, add Debian repos from Tor Project instead of using default repo, and read [tor-relays]* mailing list routinely. It's a fun read comparable to Hacker News, well, sometimes. * https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-re...
- f2n 8y ago
  I had the Tor Project's repos added, but I guess no auto updates.
maeln 8y ago
The same happened to me. I was pretty sure that the VPS that was running the node was shutdown but it turn out it was still running.
penagwin 8y ago
Where does one host this without getting SWATTED?

operandroid 8y ago

Given the project's goals, TOR cannot operate release versioning, interoperability, and backward compatibility like a "normal" open source project. Old versions need to be something akin to a burnable one-time-pad, that gets burnt when deemed more vulnerable than it's up-versioned, more secure replacement. In many ways, this kind of sucks as an idea, but in pragmatic terms, I just really wouldn't want idiots relaying traffic I'd feel paranoid about, in ways that'd cause me to lose sleep at night. That said, I don't even think the routing protocol has honest merit. The idea that you should place an all-consuming degree of trust in the honor system surrounding exit node operators having total access to plain-text traffic is beyond-the-pale in its stupidity. No one can field a satisfactory answer for me, regarding why it's okay that exit node operators have access to plain-text traffic. Oh, because traffic analysis is hard, and most exit node operators are amateur hobbyists. or maybe That's just the way it works. You can't make TOR work any other way. That's basically what I hear. It's the HAM radio excuse put another way. HAM radio has utility, bause we think it's neat. You don't need to worry, because it's free for everyone to use. Okay, but that's not what TOR is trying to accomplish.

gcb0 8y ago
I agree that exit nodes are inherently bad and avoid it. but it is a good solution that is indeed akin to the utility HAM operators provide. I fail to see why it's not.
yjftsjthsd-h 8y ago
Well... That is how it works. Either traffic stays on tor (hidden service) or it leaves and the exit node can see it. This is a good reason to use HTTPS. How would you like it to work?
- operandroid 8y ago
  So, TOR works in this way, but some other hypothetical ideal system would never work this way. An ideal system would operate in such a way that reading an ordinary public resource requires no single peer. If I want to simply read a wikipedia page, no single individual should be capable of knowing that I requested that page, and be tasked with the entire responsibility of proxying my request. No single peer should even know that a wikipedia page is what I asked for, who I asked for content from, or where I've been and what I've been doing. Right now HTTPS offers content privacy, but no meta data privacy. TOR offers a degree of meta data privacy, but no guarantee of content privacy. Even with the two combined, the TOR exit node can still understand that someone logged into Gmail, and someone probably tried to send a message with an overall length of ~2MB. With a strategic vantage point, enough facts could become evident, that TOR would fail to offer enough protection, and still out someone trying to accomplish a secret task with TOR. It should be possible to provide both content privacy and meta data privacy, so that my solid gold widget factory plans are mailed safely to my vacation home, and no one knows that I mailed them to myself, that I mailed anything at all, or what I mailed if that's what I was doing. I don't care about how "it" works, if TOR can only suck one way, and can't not suck some other way. I want something that doesn't suck. I already said I don't want TOR. TOR doesn't need to be something else. It just needs to stop telling people it's something better than it actually is.

forapurpose 8y ago

> We encourage everyone to configure their relays to do updates automatically I understand the general security benefits of automatic updates, but on something with as big a target on its back as Tor, isn't it asking for trouble? An attacker could poison an update and make vulnerable the entire network for as long as it takes for the Tor Project to discover the problem and patch it. How does the security professional balance such issues? I can imagine mitigating the risk with rolling updates, but the 0-days aren't patched immediately.

fyfy18 8y ago
How about if the node just shutdown after X period of no updates? It would be inconvenient for the admin and users specifically using that node, but would be a win for overall network security. It could still expose a vulnerability meaning someone could kill the whole network, but that’s better than compromising it.
- cyphar 8y ago
  Tor routes more packets through "trusted" nodes that have a history of being fast, and so on. I wonder whether an automated kill switch would affect those statistics (resulting in possibly lower overall network bandwidth because the trust level of most nodes would be worse).
  - Xophmeister 8y ago
    If trust is quantified by node, then surely it could just be reduced as a function of outdatedness.
- LinuxBender 8y ago
  This is a great idea. I would make it configurable, with a vaguely worded configuration directive like: DisableAutoDisable I_Know_What_I_Am_Doing Then add logic that prefers up to date nodes over out of date nodes, if that does not already exist.

maerF0x0 8y ago

If they're not updating their main software, what makes us think they're patching the host? It makes me wonder what percent of those 1100 are compromised. For example the 1213 days of presumably no updates by f2n (mentioned in another comment: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17150526 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17150526 )

cesarb 8y ago
The attack surface matters. If the only exposed services are tor and sshd with public key authentication, one would need a vulnerability in either to compromise the host. How long ago was the last RCE on pre-authentication sshd? (Of course, the lack of patches means that, once someone gets a RCE on either of these daemons, it's probably game over for the host.)

coolspot 8y ago

Maybe feds don’t want to upgrade their vast cloud of Tor nodes just yet [1][2] 1 - https://blog.torproject.org/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack https://blog.torproject.org/tor-security-advisory-relay-earl... 2 - https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/active-attack-on-tor-network-tried-to-decloak-users-for-five-months/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/07/activ...

John_KZ 8y ago
Is there anyone that still believes TOR will protect him from state actors? It's nice that people still run exit nodes, but it's so expensive and dangerous that you cannot expect a satisfactory number of nodes to be run for moral reasons and not for monetary/surveillance ones. Also since most of the nodes are run on VM instances, a few companies could potentially recover all the routing and keys from the servers RAM if they feel like it. They're not going to do it for the average joe, but things like the Patriot act and it's European equivalents make sure intelligence agencies can do it if they want.
- Santosh83 8y ago
  I'm just throwing an idea out here. It is often stated that running Tor exit nodes is both costly and dangerous. For understandable reasons. Yet the network needs more such nodes, to defeat the scenario of one powerful entity operating hundreds of exit nodes. It would be nice if even ordinary Tor users can run transient exit nodes. Now as it stands, nobody will do it. So why not change the functionality of Tor such that it becomes possible for a user to operate an exit node for a whitelisted list of sites (either based on IP or domain names) that they are willing to funnel traffic for? It's still better than giving up and letting a majority of exit nodes be controlled by state actors and other powerful entities right? Serving traffic only for a set of white-listed endpoints can considerably reduce the risk of running afoul of local law enforcement. I realise this effectively cripples Tor, but normal "uncensored" exit nodes can still operate, by those willing to run them.
  - zingmars 8y ago

bcaa7f3a8bbc 8y ago

I'm the submitter. I see there is much misunderstanding and misinformation of Tor relays, even on Hacker News. I'm not a Tor dev, but I've been running a node for years, so I'd guess I somewhat have an authoritative opinion on this issue. The issue is simple and no conspiracy theory required. 1. This report mainly deals with Tor relays. A Tor relay is not a Tor Exit (well, you can argue Exit is a special type of relay). Tor relays can be run on all servers, optimally, with fixed IP address, bandwidth >10Mbps (do set appropriate bandwidth limit in /etc/torrc, or it burns all your bandwidth), anyone can help the network by running one. Tor relays only generate encrypted traffic to other Tor relays, and risk of running one relay is even lower than, let's say, a BitTorrent client. All you need is 5 lines of /etc/torrc, but better to tune the networking stack first. 2. Tor Project does not run any Tor nodes(x), most operators are enthusiasts, others are NGOs and privacy service providers doing a charity. If you read the [tor-relays] mailing list, you can see the people are just like those who run their personal email servers. Enthusiasts consist the people who are both networking hobbyist (understand networking, BGP, also familiar with network/server providers(x) around the world, for getting the maximum bandwidth, OVH, anyone?), and privacy enthusiasts (who know what is public key cryptography, uses GnuPG, follow security news, etc). There are lots of networking hobbyist (okay, not too many), and privacy enthusiasts. But only those people who have BOTH the hobbies, would eventually find their way to the [tor-relays] community, a small number. 2a. You see, the major obstacle of the growth is lack of publicity, and misunderstanding of Tor relays/exits. In 2014, EFF started a "Tor Challenge", and resulted a surge of 1,700 new nodes. Most of the nodes are STILL ONLINE (and probably being forgotten and hence outdated...). The speed of the Tor network has increased significantly due to the growth of interest since 2013, but more relays are always needed, currently there are less than 7000 nodes. Do you want to run? Start from https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorRelayGuide https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorRelayGuide 3. Tor almost uses a rolling release model. The development pace is fast (but developers are not too many, need more), you can see Alpha versions being released almost every week. And they are more like a "mainline" version rather than a "alpha" version, and most of the time these "alpha" is already stable enough for casual uses. After the next alpha series is released, the current alpha is promoted to the "stable" series. This release model has some problems with traditional Linux/UNIX distros. For example, the Tor version in Debian (not Tor's) and OpenBSD's official repository is ALWAYS outdated by an entire series, since it has been freezed since distro's release date. Recently Tor just made another release, renders lots of current server being completely outdated. 4. Running a Tor Exit generally requires more cares of the servers, routinely respond to abuse mails, diagnose server problems and optimize performance. I haven't check, but I guess only a small percentage of these outdated versions are Exit. 4a. Running a relay is easy, most relay operators set up their servers in a fire-and-forgot basis, the servers are barely being touched anymore, once it has been configured and running correctly. Once the relays are up, many people simply forgot their existence at all, except they pay the bill. Just like many people's email server... And it's hard to contract many of them due to its decentralized nature, and most people don't actively follow [tor-relays] mailing list. Many careless operators also don't actively check their contract emails. Few of them even don't bother to leave contract information, or name their nodes (default: i_didnt_edit_config)... 5. Because Tor releases often, occasionally some people don't want to deploy updates until the next major maintenance reboot, because they don't want to lose the high uptime and large traffic they've waited to get for months (for new nodes, Tor traffic reaches to the maximum only after 3 weeks of continuous operation)... TLDR, I guess automatic update is the solution, since the update is already signed. Also, we may need to make running Tor relay a more interactive process. (x) Even authoritative servers are contributed to well-known members of the developer community, in a individual basis. (x) But don't use OVH for your new Tor relays, it's already the largest network of Tor nodes thanks to the cheap bandwidth.