16 ms·

Isn't the problem here much like the presumed cause for Air France 447 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Fr

Isn't the problem here much like the presumed cause for Air France 447 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447)? The pilots are so used to automatic operation that happens 99.9% of the time that they are not prepared for the random time when it does. A bit like someone guarding a bank for 20 years and then gets robbed and can't react in time because they mind has taught them that nothing ever happens.

emodendroket 8y ago
Well, I'd say that's an issue, but not the only one.
- lbriner 8y ago
  I was thinking that the assumption in the design is that the operator can always handle the hard/fringe cases but the reality is that due to the AF447 principle (whatever it's called), this is precisely what the operator cannot do reliably.
  - emodendroket 8y ago
    Yeah, I agree, but it seems that they also had no alert and were asking the operator to simultaneously record data, leading to them not even looking at the road at the time the crash happened.
ApolloFortyNine 8y ago
I'd like to throw out that one of the pilots of that flight was pulling up during a stall warning. I don't think it's really similar to this accident, since it'd kind of be like the driver realizing they have to break, but gassing it instead. Also interesting is that in a Boeing, this likely would have never happened. In an Airbus control inputs are averaged together, so the captain had no idea his copilot was pulling back during a stall warning. In a Boeing, the control gear provides feedback (physically moves) to the pilots, so they would have been able to realize they were giving opposite inputs. Source: https://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a3115/what-really-happened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877/ https://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a3115/what-really-ha... Excerpt below: 02:13:40 (Robert) Remonte... remonte... remonte... remonte... Climb... climb... climb... climb... 02:13:40 (Bonin) Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l'heure! But I've had the stick back the whole time! At last, Bonin tells the others the crucial fact whose import he has so grievously failed to understand himself. 02:13:42 (Captain) Non, non, non... Ne remonte pas... non, non. No, no, no... Don't climb... no, no.
Merad 8y ago
I don't think they're very comparable. AF447 was in no trouble whatsoever when the autopilot cut out. From that point a cascading series of misunderstandings led the pilots to crash the fully flyable plane. Going by memory, the sequence goes something like this: * Ice clogs the aircraft's pitot tube, so the computer loses airspeed sensor data. This causes the autopilot to turn off and the flight computer to change to "alternate law". This is very important because normally the computer does not allow a pilot to stall the aircraft. Under alternate law the pilot has more direct/traditional control, and can stall. * The pilots didn't clearly understand why the autopilot went out, or that they were in alternate law. The copilot (who was flying the aircraft) began pulling back on the stick, without communicating his action. * The pilots started to get stall warnings, but didn't understand how they could be stalling, because they didn't know they were in alternate law. * The captain tried to take control to recover. Despite verbally acknowledging the control hand-off (IIRC) the co-pilot continued pulling back on his stick. * The captain didn't realize that his control inputs are being overridden by the co-pilot and becomes increasingly confused about why the aircraft isn't responding to his inputs. * By the time the captain does realize what is happening, it's far too late to recover.
abandonliberty 8y ago
Also why sentries get easily taken out in action movies.

emodendroket 8y ago

Well, I'd say that's an issue, but not the only one.

lbriner 8y ago
I was thinking that the assumption in the design is that the operator can always handle the hard/fringe cases but the reality is that due to the AF447 principle (whatever it's called), this is precisely what the operator cannot do reliably.
- emodendroket 8y ago
  Yeah, I agree, but it seems that they also had no alert and were asking the operator to simultaneously record data, leading to them not even looking at the road at the time the crash happened.

ApolloFortyNine 8y ago

I'd like to throw out that one of the pilots of that flight was pulling up during a stall warning. I don't think it's really similar to this accident, since it'd kind of be like the driver realizing they have to break, but gassing it instead. Also interesting is that in a Boeing, this likely would have never happened. In an Airbus control inputs are averaged together, so the captain had no idea his copilot was pulling back during a stall warning. In a Boeing, the control gear provides feedback (physically moves) to the pilots, so they would have been able to realize they were giving opposite inputs. Source: https://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a3115/what-really-happened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877/ https://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a3115/what-really-ha... Excerpt below: 02:13:40 (Robert) Remonte... remonte... remonte... remonte... Climb... climb... climb... climb... 02:13:40 (Bonin) Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l'heure! But I've had the stick back the whole time! At last, Bonin tells the others the crucial fact whose import he has so grievously failed to understand himself. 02:13:42 (Captain) Non, non, non... Ne remonte pas... non, non. No, no, no... Don't climb... no, no.

Merad 8y ago

I don't think they're very comparable. AF447 was in no trouble whatsoever when the autopilot cut out. From that point a cascading series of misunderstandings led the pilots to crash the fully flyable plane. Going by memory, the sequence goes something like this: * Ice clogs the aircraft's pitot tube, so the computer loses airspeed sensor data. This causes the autopilot to turn off and the flight computer to change to "alternate law". This is very important because normally the computer does not allow a pilot to stall the aircraft. Under alternate law the pilot has more direct/traditional control, and can stall. * The pilots didn't clearly understand why the autopilot went out, or that they were in alternate law. The copilot (who was flying the aircraft) began pulling back on the stick, without communicating his action. * The pilots started to get stall warnings, but didn't understand how they could be stalling, because they didn't know they were in alternate law. * The captain tried to take control to recover. Despite verbally acknowledging the control hand-off (IIRC) the co-pilot continued pulling back on his stick. * The captain didn't realize that his control inputs are being overridden by the co-pilot and becomes increasingly confused about why the aircraft isn't responding to his inputs. * By the time the captain does realize what is happening, it's far too late to recover.

abandonliberty 8y ago

Also why sentries get easily taken out in action movies.