2 ms·
No. Cryptographically-random data + non-cryptographically-random data = non-cryptographically-random data. In this case, the non-random data is (at the very l
by Groxx 16y ago
No.
Cryptographically-random data + non-cryptographically-random data = non-cryptographically-random data.
In this case, the non-random data is (at the very least) where the checking code fails.
Good enough for an ASP site hosting a personal blog? Probably. Good enough for any moderate-scale target? No. Botnets break random delays pretty quickly, especially because a big attack means the server slows all operations, showing bigger and bigger differences between the two failure points.
I'd also be willing to bet that, even with custom errors turned on, at least slightly different code routes are followed between different error codes, magnifying the difference between the different errors despite displaying identically.
What I'd be interested in, if anyone knows, is if ASP.NET signs anything which is also encrypted. From what I've been reading / seeing, it seems it doesn't, and it's not just a checking-padding-first mistake. If that's the case, then ASP literally can't tell if something is valid until it hits code that tries to use it, which is a crypto-cracker's dream come true.