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Why isn't this a solution: Everyone has some gpg-like setup. If we see a statement or video or audio by a person accompanied by a public (graphic or audible)

Why isn't this a solution: Everyone has some gpg-like setup. If we see a statement or video or audio by a person accompanied by a public (graphic or audible) key that checks out...ok, done, verified. If we don't, then we can justifiably disregard the statement or video or audio.

falcon620 8y ago
I really like this idea. Every video frame from a political/public personality is cryptographically signed with their private key and edge viewing devices are able to tell if it's properly signed or not. It's easy to imagine this idea becoming a part of video (be it VOD or broadcast) encoding standards in the future, once this becomes a critical thing. In terms of UX: one could imagine a simple indication on TVs: an RGB led that shines in different colors depending on verified authenticity levels.
- cortesoft 8y ago
  Most of the shocking, status-quo challenging videos these days are cell-phone videos taken by bystanders. Those videos are how we find out about police brutality and other abuses by authorities. I don't see how this video signing system will help verify a cell phone video taken by a random bystander.
  - falcon620 8y ago
    Well, no, it won't. It will however make sure that you're watching actual Obama 2, and not some computer simulation of him doing some disgusting thing.
  - jcims 8y ago
    Sensor supplier could embed the crypto in the hardware as close to the imager as possible and issue signing keys for each device. OEM would write firmware to extract that from the camera bitstream and dump it into the metadata of the image (something along those lines anyway) The image and signature could be added as authentication layers and then a third layer added to allow post-production (crop/levels/etc). Right click in your browser to 'see original image' with a little padlock in the corner. Ideally this would include GPS info to reduce likelihood that someone would just project a desired image on a screen and photograph that.
    - cortesoft 8y ago
      That assumes a lot of trust in OEM providers, and there would be a lot of incentive to compromise the key.
      - jcims 8y ago
        Agreed. Nothing is foolproof. It would make it harder for Joe Sixpack to spoof images, I guess the question is whether or not that's better.
        cortesoft 8y ago
        Yeah, joe six pack is not the one I am worried about. Nation states are.
    - supermdguy 8y ago
      Sounds like DRM. Also, it wouldn't be too hard for the people who actually want to hack it.
  - John_KZ 8y ago
    Yes, this is terrible. We're going back to the "dark ages" when a horrendous crime could happen in broad daylight around multiple witnesses and nobody would be found or sentenced.
stiglitz 8y ago
Would work in some but not all scenarios. Perhaps the video is legitimate but embarrassing for the represented party, so the represented party declines to sign it.
- mjh2539 8y ago
  You're right...so here's the logical space: A. Video/audio/text of/by person, signed, we have knowledge that this video bears their signature, they endorse it B. Unsigned B1. Unsigned because it's not them B2. Unsigned because they don't want it to be associated with them I think this is still a better state of affairs because we can verify positive endorsements as genuine or not. You're right, we couldn't verify stuff they refused to sign, but! Imagine the state coerces people to carry small devices with radio transmitters that constantly transmit, over the length of a second, a signed key, ad infinitum; that way no one can plausibly deny that it wasn't them (unless someone plants the persons device on an imposter).
  - sushid 8y ago
    If I have some embarrassing/damning video I want to post online you can bet your ass I'm going to scrub off any metadata. If there could be some repercussions (e.g. police brutality, gang violence, whistleblowing, etc.) I'm going to go above and beyond to make it not traceable to me. And you're here asking the government to make it a law to make all video outputs traceable to the creator? Perhaps you should apply to the NSA or Palantir.
    - stiglitz 8y ago
      I think it’s a thought experiment and not a suggestion. And the transmitter is for the person being videotaped, not the person creating the video. Though of course you raise a good point about anonymity of the video creator.
- jessaustin 8y ago
  Videos should be signed by cameras, using keys only those cameras have, at the time the videos are made. Sure, this means they have to be online so their manufacturers can supervise and record key generation, but that's simple now.
dogecoinbase 8y ago
Why isn't this a solution: Everyone has some gpg-like setup. The self-answering question.
noobermin 8y ago
You could even go further than that. If you employ a set of digital cameras, say for security cameras or other things, each has a private key which it uses to sign whatever it records. Obtaining said key would require physical access to the device. Then, when it matters, your organization has a set of public keys which it uses to verify that the picture/video is legitimate.

falcon620 8y ago

I really like this idea. Every video frame from a political/public personality is cryptographically signed with their private key and edge viewing devices are able to tell if it's properly signed or not. It's easy to imagine this idea becoming a part of video (be it VOD or broadcast) encoding standards in the future, once this becomes a critical thing. In terms of UX: one could imagine a simple indication on TVs: an RGB led that shines in different colors depending on verified authenticity levels.

cortesoft 8y ago
Most of the shocking, status-quo challenging videos these days are cell-phone videos taken by bystanders. Those videos are how we find out about police brutality and other abuses by authorities. I don't see how this video signing system will help verify a cell phone video taken by a random bystander.
- falcon620 8y ago
  Well, no, it won't. It will however make sure that you're watching actual Obama 2, and not some computer simulation of him doing some disgusting thing.
- jcims 8y ago
  Sensor supplier could embed the crypto in the hardware as close to the imager as possible and issue signing keys for each device. OEM would write firmware to extract that from the camera bitstream and dump it into the metadata of the image (something along those lines anyway) The image and signature could be added as authentication layers and then a third layer added to allow post-production (crop/levels/etc). Right click in your browser to 'see original image' with a little padlock in the corner. Ideally this would include GPS info to reduce likelihood that someone would just project a desired image on a screen and photograph that.
  - cortesoft 8y ago
    That assumes a lot of trust in OEM providers, and there would be a lot of incentive to compromise the key.
    - jcims 8y ago
      Agreed. Nothing is foolproof. It would make it harder for Joe Sixpack to spoof images, I guess the question is whether or not that's better.
      - cortesoft 8y ago
        Yeah, joe six pack is not the one I am worried about. Nation states are.
  - supermdguy 8y ago
    Sounds like DRM. Also, it wouldn't be too hard for the people who actually want to hack it.
- John_KZ 8y ago
  Yes, this is terrible. We're going back to the "dark ages" when a horrendous crime could happen in broad daylight around multiple witnesses and nobody would be found or sentenced.

stiglitz 8y ago

Would work in some but not all scenarios. Perhaps the video is legitimate but embarrassing for the represented party, so the represented party declines to sign it.

mjh2539 8y ago
You're right...so here's the logical space: A. Video/audio/text of/by person, signed, we have knowledge that this video bears their signature, they endorse it B. Unsigned B1. Unsigned because it's not them B2. Unsigned because they don't want it to be associated with them I think this is still a better state of affairs because we can verify positive endorsements as genuine or not. You're right, we couldn't verify stuff they refused to sign, but! Imagine the state coerces people to carry small devices with radio transmitters that constantly transmit, over the length of a second, a signed key, ad infinitum; that way no one can plausibly deny that it wasn't them (unless someone plants the persons device on an imposter).
- sushid 8y ago
  If I have some embarrassing/damning video I want to post online you can bet your ass I'm going to scrub off any metadata. If there could be some repercussions (e.g. police brutality, gang violence, whistleblowing, etc.) I'm going to go above and beyond to make it not traceable to me. And you're here asking the government to make it a law to make all video outputs traceable to the creator? Perhaps you should apply to the NSA or Palantir.
  - stiglitz 8y ago
    I think it’s a thought experiment and not a suggestion. And the transmitter is for the person being videotaped, not the person creating the video. Though of course you raise a good point about anonymity of the video creator.
jessaustin 8y ago
Videos should be signed by cameras, using keys only those cameras have, at the time the videos are made. Sure, this means they have to be online so their manufacturers can supervise and record key generation, but that's simple now.

dogecoinbase 8y ago

Why isn't this a solution: Everyone has some gpg-like setup. The self-answering question.

noobermin 8y ago

You could even go further than that. If you employ a set of digital cameras, say for security cameras or other things, each has a private key which it uses to sign whatever it records. Obtaining said key would require physical access to the device. Then, when it matters, your organization has a set of public keys which it uses to verify that the picture/video is legitimate.