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> It seems suspicious that this is classified as philosophy - it has an empirical foundation! You can even design experiments to test these "theories of metasci
by naasking 9y ago
> It seems suspicious that this is classified as philosophy - it has an empirical foundation! You can even design experiments to test these "theories of metascience:" just check to see how fast the scientists that work according to them produce successful theories.
I'm very skeptical that such a foundation would work faster or achieve more optimal results than an analytical approach. You can keep going meta, but so can I, and the analytical approach will always outpace the empirical one.
> Roughly speaking, the division I am making here goes: experiments plus arguments makes science, arguments without experiments makes philosophy.
I suppose it depends what you classify as "arguments". Science traditionally produces theories that provide predictive power, but also explanatory power. This latter aspect is often overlooked, but it's essential since it provides insights into further possible experiments. If your "arguments" includes an ontology for scientific theories, then I could agree with your breakdown, but notice that an ontology overlaps with philosophical inquiry.
Also, there's a new and growing branch called "experimental philosophy" which includes experiments that test intuitions on philosophical questions, so it's still not quite clear cut!
- whatshisface 9y ago>the analytical approach will always outpace the empirical one. It sounds like you're describing and empirical meta-approach: that we should pick the approach that goes the fastest. I'm not proposing that analysis be thrown away, just that it is and should be controlled by empiricism (at every meta-level). Essentially, I'm arguing that science applies to itself recursively: if you take empiricism as axiomatic, then science can "choose" its own philosophy, just like it chooses its theories: empirically. >Also, there's a new and growing branch called "experimental philosophy" which includes experiments that test intuitions on philosophical questions. In that vein, you could claim that all philosophy is empirical: An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals was plain evidence that Hume's brain had produced certain beliefs about morals. So, is philosophy of science an exploration of its namesake, or an exploration of the brains of philosophers of science? I say, whenever it has empirical grounding (in the success of science), it works like science and tells us things about how to do science, and when it's inwardly-focused it is just information about how philosophers' brains work. >but also explanatory power As far as I can tell, explanations are stories that make our brains feel comfortable with the procedures that we use to predict things. Why? Because perfect stories will be discarded without a second thought if another completely unpalatable theory comes along with better predictive power. Story-sentences about this stuff (for example, "the virtual particles pop in and out of existence in the vacuum") carry as much information about our brains as they do about the universe that they're supposedly describing.
- naasking 9y ago> Essentially, I'm arguing that science applies to itself recursively: if you take empiricism as axiomatic, then science can "choose" its own philosophy, just like it chooses its theories: empirically. It's not at all clear what "take empiricism as axiomatic" even means. This itself consists of a few a long-running philosophical debates: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constructive-empiricism/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constructive-empiricism/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-empiricism https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-empiricism > Because perfect stories will be discarded without a second thought if another completely unpalatable theory comes along with better predictive power. I disagree. Newton's theories are still widely taught despite their inaccuracy, because their predictive power suffices and their explanatory power is superior to more accurate but sophisticated theories. Furthermore, there's a good reason why the foundations of quantum mechanics are still hotly debated in some circles, despite the fact that such debates will have little practical impact on most practicing physicists. And such debates over explanatory power have yielded valuable insights into QM, like Bell's theorem which resulted from Bell's interest in the de Broglie-Bohm theory, and numerous other no-go theorems. Certainly a theory with superior predictive power will be employed for predictions, but it will immediately launch an effort to provide a coherent explanatory framework.
- whatshisface 9y agoDoes Newtonian mechanics really have explanatory power? You can equally well describe motion in the language of forces and acceleration, the language of fields and momentum, and whatever other combinations you would want to pick. Textual "explanations" are just (non-unique!) assignments of literary constructions to procedures of prediction.
- naasking 9y agoSome textual explanations better match our daily experience, and thus our intuitions, than others. Ask anyone if they are mapping something whether they prefer polar or Cartesian coordinates.